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As artificial intelligence becomes ever more ubiquitous in 
society, it likewise finds itself prominent in military applications. 
At one time relegated to the domain of science fiction, 
autonomous military systems have become reality. Although not 
yet at the technological fidelity of systems like those portrayed 
in popular fiction like the Terminator, lethal autonomous 
weapons have nonetheless become the topic of international 
debate regarding their legality and morality. 
This dissertation contributes to both the theoretical foundations 
and practical implementations of what it means to have 
meaningful human control (MHC) of fully autonomous weapons 
systems (AWS). 
It discusses the lacunae of how autonomy is understood as 
problematic in the international debate for the prohibition 
of AWS and addresses this privation by proposing a more 
holistic and nuanced framework for MHC. The main practical 
contribution of this dissertation is the proposal for how to 
actually implement this more nuanced conception of MHC. For 
this purpose, a modified value sensitive design (VSD) approach 
is proposed as a principled framework uniquely capable 
of addressing not only the unique challenges proposed by 
artificial intelligence for design but also the complexity of the 
relationship between industry and the military. 
The coupling of this theoretical conception of MHC with the 
practical approach of VSD, it is claimed, provides a more 
nuanced foundation on which international discussions on the 
legality and potential prohibition of certain AWS can take place 
and consequentially be strengthened.
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LIST OF PAPERS AND ABSTRACTS
The abstracts included here are the original abstracts of the published papers directly 
relevant to this thesis. In the introduction the abstracts have been re-written in order to 
holistically and organically weave the threads that run through this thesis. 
PART I
Umbrello, Steven, 2021. “Coupling Levels of Abstraction in Understanding Meaningful 
Human Control of Autonomous Weapons: A Two-Tiered Approach.” Ethics and Information 
Technology. 
Abstract The international debate on the ethics and legality of autonomous 
weapon systems (AWS), along with the call for a ban, primarily focus on the 
nebulous concept of fully autonomous AWS. These are AWS capable of 
target selection and engagement absent human supervision or control. This 
paper argues that such a conception of autonomy is divorced from both 
military planning and decision-making operations; it also ignores the design 
requirements that govern AWS engineering and the subsequent tracking and 
tracing of moral responsibility. To show how military operations can be coupled 
with design ethics, this paper marries two different kinds of meaningful human 
control (MHC) termed levels of abstraction. Under this two-tiered understanding 
of MHC, the contentious notion of ‘full’ autonomy becomes unproblematic. 
Umbrello, Steven, 2020. “Meaningful Human Control Over Smart Home Systems.” HUMANA.
MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies, 13(37), 40-65.
Abstract The last decade has witnessed the mass distribution and adoption 
of smart home systems and devices powered by artificial intelligence 
systems ranging from household appliances like fridges and toasters to 
more background systems such as air and water quality controllers. The 
pervasiveness of these sociotechnical systems makes analysing their ethical 
implications necessary during the design phases of these devices to ensure 
not only sociotechnical resilience, but to design them for human values in 
mind and thus preserve meaningful human control over them. This paper 
engages in a conceptual investigations of how meaningful human control 
over smart home devices can be attained through design. The value sensitive 
design (VSD) approach is proposed as a way of attaining this level of control. 
In the proposed framework, values are identified and defined, stakeholder 
groups are investigated and brought into the design process and the 
technical constraints of the technologies in question are considered. The 
paper concludes with some initial examples that illustrate a more adoptable 
way forward for both ethicists and engineers of smart home devices.
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PART II
Umbrello, Steven; van de Poel, Ibo, 2021. “Mapping Value Sensitive Design onto AI for 
Social Good Principles.” AI and Ethics, 1(3), 283-296. 
Abstract Value Sensitive Design (VSD) is an established method for integrating 
values in technical design. It has been applied to different technologies and 
recently also to artificial intelligence (AI). We argue that AI poses a number of 
specific challenges to VSD that require a somewhat adapted VSD approach. 
In particular, machine learning (ML) poses two challenges to VSD. First, it 
may opaque (to humans) how an AI systems has learned certain things, 
which requires attention for such values as transparency, explainability and 
accountability. Second, ML may lead to AI systems adapting themselves 
in such ways that they ‘disembody’ the values that have been embodied 
in them. In order to address these, we propose a threefold adapted VSD 
approach: 1) integrating the AI4SG principles in VSD as design norms from 
which more specific design requirements can be derived, 2) distinguishing 
between values to be promoted by the design and values to be respected by 
the design in order to ensure that the resulting design does not only do no 
harm but also contributes to doing good, and 3) extending the VSD process 
to encompass the whole life cycle of an AI technology in order to be able to 
monitor unintended value consequences and to redesign the technology if 
necessary. We illustrate the new VSD for AI approach with an example use 












Power is information and information, power. Our current global epoch can arguably be 
defined by the exponential ability to compute information; thus, computers have ubiquitously 
ingrained themselves in every aspect of our quotidian existence, from the major to the 
banal. Notions of personhood, human essence, dignity, and the meaning of life have been 
brought under both scholarly and public scrutiny as these technologies shift traditionally 
held notions of what it means to be human in the age of artificial intelligence. Among others, 
the social, ethical, legal, and cultural issues regarding these technologies have therefore 
been the subject of intense scholarly debate and conversation in determining the current 
and future design and deployment of these technologies to ensure that they are beneficial 
to humanity and do not cripple human flourishing (Bostrom, 2014; Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 
2014). 
More poignantly, the development of these information technologies within the military 
sphere has garnered significant attention, as their implementation as constructs capable 
of force – a traditionally human-human affair – come with new ethical and legal issues 
surrounding machine autonomy, human dignity, and just war theory, among others. It also 
becomes a deeply personal affair, as the abdication of the capacity to select and kill targets 
without human interference proves instinctively controversial. The ethical and legal norms 
that have been historically developed to adjudicate the justified use of violence and how to 
deal with recalcitrant force likewise become the center of debate as autonomous weapons 
systems (AWSs) have been spotted on the developmental horizon. The use of armed drones 
– unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – can arguably be characterised as the beginning of the 
technological divide separating humans from the direct use of force, although humanity 
retains the ultimate kill command over the release of such force. 
The next step in the proliferation of automation consists in (fully) AWSs, in which the divide 
– both physical and psychological – appears to be absolute regarding human operators 
and the robots themselves, and the target selection and payload release are done without 
human confirmation or intervention (Docherty, 2012). It is the aim of this dissertation to 
provide some guidance to both the specialist reader as well as the international community 
at large in sober response to the tensions that have arisen from AWSs. In doing so, the 
concept of “autonomy” is brought to the fore, raising the central question as to what exactly 
constitutes autonomy and if full autonomy can and should be designed in AWSs. To this 
end, this dissertation takes the concept of meaningful human control (MHC) as its main 
conceptual and philosophical framework in tackling these issues. This concept, arising within 
the heated discussions on AWSs, has traditionally come to mean meeting the minimum 
sufficient condition of having personnel “in/on the loop” who can be held accountable, 
thereby avoiding a “responsibility gap” that may emerge with the full autonomy of systems 
(Santoni de Sio and Mecacci, 2021). Discussions that took place in Geneva in 2014 and 




the term “MHC” is often used haphasardly when speaking about AWSs, it provides a basis 
which ban supporters can sink their teeth into, that is, a partial ban on fully AWSs, thereby 
escaping the seeming paradox of having human control over a fully autonomous system. 
 
In both public and scholarly debates, AWSs have been subject to three central ethical 
criticisms: (1) fait accompli, autonomous systems will not have the capacity to distinguish 
and execute the sophisticated practical and moral categories necessary for the level of 
compliance demanded by the laws of armed conflict (Guarini & Bello, 2012; N. E. Sharkey, 
2008). These laws require compliance to satisfy jus in bello, by meeting the minimum 
necessary conditions for distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants, such 
that the proportionality in the use of force is similarly distinguished and that such use of 
force against non-military targets is not disproportional to the desired military outcome 
(Heyns, 2013). To this end, it can be clarified prima facie that the abdication of the use 
of force to (fully) autonomous systems raises significant legal and ethical issues. (2) The 
abdication of the use of force that may ultimately serve lethal ends is mala in se, meaning 
that their deployment is fundamentally immoral because it raises ethical concerns regarding 
human rights and, more critically, what it means to preserve human dignity – and dying a 
dignified death – in contexts such as wars (Sparrow, 2016; Wallach, 2013). (3) Either through 
maleficent use, design, deployment, or technical/human error, (fully) AWSs will create a 
liability vacuum, in which the responsibility gap between failure/misuse and attribution of 
responsibly can become severed (Chamayou, 2015; Heyns, 2013). 
For the above reasons, the literature and debate has spawned concepts and arguments 
supporting the necessity of the principle of meaningful human control. The specialist non-
profit organisation Article 36, which focuses on reducing harm caused by weapons, defines 
MHC over AWSs as follows: 
[It is] required in every individual attack. Sufficient human control over the use 
of weapons, and their effects, is essential to ensuring that the use of a weapon is 
morally justifiable and legal. Such control is also required for accountability over the 
consequences of the use of force. Critical aspects of human control broadly relate to:
• The pre-programmed target parameters, the weapon’s sensor-mechanism and 
the algorithms used to match sensor-input to target parameters.
• The geographic area within which and the time during which the weapon 
system operates independently of human control.
Similarly, states must understand: 
• the process by which a system identifies individual target objects, and 





The principle was introduced to provide a more holistic and thus meaningful form of control 
over AWSs, rather than the difficult-to-define and often self-undermining concept of what 
exactly constitutes having humans “in/on-the-loop” (Crootof, 2016; Roff & Moyes, 2016). 
Thus, MHC appears to permit issues regarding human dignity – what can be interpreted 
in certain international contexts as being essential to understanding human rights – to be 
foundational in considerations regarding the legality of AWSs. 
However, the difficulty that policymakers currently face is detailing the exact nature of 
evaluating the quality of control that can be deemed to be meaningful, the level of autonomy 
in systems and networks thereof that can be technically encompassed by such a definition, 
and the design specifications that can be adopted to operationalise such concepts in 
practice. 
In their paper Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Systems: A Philosophical 
Account, philosophy of technology and ethics scholars Filippo Santoni de Sio and Jeroen 
van den Hoven provide a novel and more philosophically nuanced account of how to 
conceptualise MHC as well as preliminary suggestions for operationalising such a concept 
in design. In exploring the concept of MHC, this thesis threads the various conceptions 
of MHC as presented in the literature, focusing primarily on Santoni de Sio and van den 
Hoven’s conception, which is arguably more philosophically nuanced and robust. In 
doing so, it is my aim to deconstruct the philosophical underpinnings that constitute their 
understanding of autonomy and the role it plays in satisfying the conditions critical to MHC 
possession. If successful, the thesis will demonstrate the conceptual feasibility of satisfying 
a robust principle of MHC that can be applied to fully AWSs (and fully autonomous systems 
in general), as well as the case in which the conditions of MHC can be buttressed through 
an increase in systems autonomy if designed appropriately. 
In addition, this thesis aims to explore the operationalisation of MHC in a responsible 
manner, thereby bringing it in line with the general objectives of responsible research and 
innovation (RRI) that are foundational to multinational parties such as the EU and the UN, 
with the aims of developing technologies and techniques that are sustainable and compliant 
with the key values of stakeholders (Groves, 2017; United Nations, 2018; van den Hoven & 
Jacob, 2013). To this end, the value-sensitive design (VSD) methodology is adopted as the 
principled and philosophically grounded design framework for the operationalisation of 
MHC over (fully) AWSs. 
The articles referenced in this dissertation – which have previously been published 
elsewhere – jointly build the foundation of the various concepts that I explore, both from 
a philosophical and a conceptual perspective. More specifically, the definition of the 




VSD approach requires modification in light of some technical issues that have emerged 
from typically opaque artificial intelligence (AI) systems are explored. Although many of 
the papers explicitly mention and discuss these approaches and concepts with regards 
to applying them to discrete technologies such as general AI, there is no specific or 
exclusive focus on this context of application. This rests on the notion that, at the abstract 
level of theory formation and philosophical reflection on autonomy, meaningful control and 
technological design – on which this thesis focuses, as explained later in this dissertation – 
this difference in context and discrete application is non-essential.
In this introduction, I discuss various elements in order to place the proceeding sections 
and chapters in a broader conceptual prospect and delineate the veins that run through 
them. First, I discuss the motivation behind this specific project, the challenges encountered 
in such an endeavour, as well as the potential boons that await should the reader deem 
them sufficient in meeting their objectives (§1.1). Second, I outline the state of the art in 
the research on MHC, autonomy, and the VSD (§1.2). Third, I explain the central guiding 
questions that drive this dissertation and consider the implications of “operationalising” 
MHC on (fully) AWS (§1.3). Fourth, I raise issues surrounding autonomy in the military context, 
which adds further nuances to the underlying philosophical structure of MHC (§1.4). Fifth, I 
present a reading guide with a preview of the various chapters (§1.5). Finally, I conclude with 
some potential suggestions for fruitful research projects (§1.6). I assume that the reader of 
this doctoral thesis is familiar with the concepts of MHC; otherwise, I suggest deferring first 
to Annex I, which provides the necessary background on the topics covered later in this 
discussion. 
1.1 PROJECT BACKGROUND: DEVELOPMENTS AND 
METHODS
As with academic papers published in peer-reviewed journals, it is common practice to 
justify the merits of each piece of research for publication by determining the challenges 
that are currently being dealt with in the scholarship and how the article in question 
aims at addressing such a research gap. However, as has become common practice in 
ethnography and sociocultural anthropology, it is advisable to determine the influences on 
any one author and how such influences have consequently affected the work (see also 
‘About the Author’). To this end, I use the present section to outline the main practical and 
theoretical influences underlying this work. 
Beginning with the practical side, the organisational and structural style of this dissertation 
is heavily influenced by the paper-based doctoral dissertation of Dr. Ilse Oosterlaken, who 




and Its Design – A Philosophical Exploration at the Technical University in Delft, Netherlands 
on January 15, 2013. The table of contents as well as the organisation of sections in this 
dissertation mirrors much of hers; however, given the originality of this thesis and the 
difference in topic, there are also significant changes which reflect differing viewpoints. 
Similarly, the two annexes that follow this introductory chapter are meant to serve as the 
traditionally labelled “literature review” that is commonly included in dissertations. The 
decision to relegate the literature review to annexes, aside from a similarity to Oosterlaken’s 
layout, is a stylistic one; it arguably improves the flow of the dissertation and conveys its 
central philosophical point. Dividing the literature review into parts helps the reader to 
determine what they can extract from it for their own research, as well as satisfies traditional 
academic norms of inclusion. How the literature review is conducted, however, differs starkly 
from Oosterlaken’s methods, given that it is based on several contemporary approaches 
to conducting a literature review, primarily the methodology outlined in Justus Randolph’s 
article, A Guide to Writing the Dissertation Literature Review (Randolph, 2009).1 
With regards to its theoretical underpinnings, this dissertation can be categorised as 
building on the foundations laid down by the philosophy of technology in general, which 
has shifted away from the purely instrumental view of technology as neutral tools or artifacts 
adopted by humans. The shift away from this instrumental view of technology and towards 
an interactive one has been a fundamental stepping stone in what has been called the 
“design turn in applied ethics” (van den Hoven, 2017). In this view, technology is considered 
to be fundamentally value-laden and in a constant, co-constitutive relationship with 
stakeholders. Because technologies are laden with values, the question of why and how 
we design technologies to embody these values becomes of critical importance if such 
technologies are to benefit the stakeholder communities involved. 
This broader trend of conceptualising technologies as interactional has led to the more 
specific concept of responsible innovation (RI),2 which considers the ethical impacts that 
technologies and their design can have on societies as well as how to mitigate technological 
risks while engaging in ethically-driven design. Various design approaches that take the 
value-laden quality of technology as fundamental, such as the VSD, have been proposed 
as a means of attaining the objectives central to RI (Friedman & Hendry, 2019). 
It was during my time at IEET (Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies) and GCRI 
1 Several other contemporary approaches to conducting and writing a literature review were considered, including the 
integrative literature review formulated by Richard Torraco (Torraco, 2016), Chris Hart’s imaginative critical realism in 
mapping information (Hart, 2018), as well as the survey of systemic approaches method introduced by Andrew Booth, 
Anthea Sutton, and Diana Papaioannou (2016). Although the surveyed approaches all share common ground, the 
approach described by Randolph was ultimately chosen for its comprehensiveness and succinctness. 
2 This concept, although not an old one, has already been established as a central concept in technology and research 
innovation within policy platforms and ethical guidelines by both private and public organisations, most notably the 





(Global Catastrophic Risk Institute) that my cross-examination through various theories 
and principles ranging from molecular nanotechnology, artificial intelligence (including 
AGI/ASI3 issues), existential risk theories, as well as posthumanist and transhumanist 
philosophies took place. While concurrently reading both science and technology studies 
(STS) at York University and ethics at the University of Edinburgh, those influences 
contaminated how I viewed ethics in technology. Value sensitive design has always been 
my primary nexus of research, exploring the strengths and areas for improvement within 
the approach. Naturally, my various scholarly backgrounds influence the means through 
which I address those challenges. Working with Seth Baum, Executive Director at GCRI, 
I conducted my first real research project, which culminated in a published paper in the 
journal Futures entitled Evaluating Future Nanotechnology: The Net Societal Impacts of 
Atomically Precise Manufacturing (2018). In it, we applied a consequentialist calculus to 
the net benefits and risks of atomically precise manufacturing in various domains spanning 
social, military, and environmental spheres (Umbrello & Baum, 2018). However, practical 
ethics as it concerns real people, in relation to technologies, resists being explained by 
the oppressive reduction of human values to economic ones that are central to the cost-
benefit calculations of consequentialist and utilitarian approaches. Qualities such as beauty, 
calmness, love, and empathy, among others, can hardly be translated in any meaningful 
way by conceptualisations of ethics, neither utilitarian, consequentialist, nor Kantian. 
To this end, my research drove me towards continental approaches to ethics, including 
the postphenomenology of technology as well as the posthumanist philosophies that seek 
to extricate themselves from the often sterile understandings of certain Enlightenment 
and humanist philosophies (i.e., posthumanism). This avenue led to research on moral 
imagination theory, whose main proponents include philosopher Mark Johnson and 
cognitive scientist George Lakoff. The culmination of this approach led to a more holistic 
understanding of how human morality functions at real-world levels, rather than the narrow 
prototypical cases common to philosophical discussion (e.g., trolley dilemmas). This resulted 
in a published paper (2020) on the topic entitled Imaginative Value Sensitive Design: Using 
Moral Imagination Theory to Inform Responsible Technology Design (Umbrello, 2020a). 
The article aims to inform the VSD approach such that it would be sensitive to a more 
authentic understanding of human morality as informed by the cognitive sciences (i.e., 
moral imagination theory), and thus of human values (i.e., valuation), in how technologies 
are to be designed responsibly. A core position in this research project is that the meaning 
of autonomy, as understood in the literature on AWSs and MHC, does not necessarily reflect 
the technical and operational meaning of the concept as it pertains to AWSs within the 
military domain. If such is the case, the MHC of AWSs must be revised if RI is to be achieved 
in any meaningful sense. The VSD methodology has been proposed for this purpose, but 
it too must be revised if it is to meet the unique challenges posed by machine learning and 




artificial neural network-based systems which are proposed to be the main driving systems 
of (fully)AWS. To this end, this dissertation is a merging of praxis – that is, more poignantly, 
a contamination of systems thinking and engineering – and the applied ethics of analytic 
philosophy that has characterised the “design turn” (van de Hoven, 2017).  
Having outlined some of the theoretical underpinnings of this project, two potential, albeit 
non exhaustive, questions may arise in the reader’s mind: (1) Why this transdisciplinary 
approach – that is, what is gained by contaminating theories on MHC and VSD with more 
abstract approaches to technologies such as systems thinking and systems engineering? 
(2) Why choose the VSD as the approach for attaining the MHC of AWSs? In cursory 
response to the former, there is both a scientific and a conceptual gap between the theories 
developed during the Enlightenment on the nature of the human mind and, consequentially, 
its moral and autonomic faculties. These theories, like technologies, function as scaffolds 
that support as well as constrain and narrow to some extent the theories that proceed them, 
propagating certain discriminations and prejudices regarding norms and values. Intuitively, 
then, a re-evaluation of how the theories founded on such approaches and understandings 
becomes necessary in light of recent advances in the cognitive sciences that present 
alternative empirical explanations of how the human brain functions. The associated 
implications may further divide how we apply terms such as autonomy, responsibility, and 
moral agency to humans, and thus to autonomous systems such as AWSs. Likewise, VSD 
is chosen as the preferred approach for attuning this post-Enlightenment reconstruction 
of MHC, as it is a principled method of designing technologies, one that is founded on 
the interactional perspective on human-technology relations as well as adapted to more 
situated and grounded understanding of human values, rendering itself sensitive to how 
humans actually engage in moral decision-making and valuation. Similarly, the approach 
has garnered the interest of multiple funding bodies by virtue of its potency in providing a 
means of achieving RRI. For example, in 2018, the European Research Council awarded a 
2.5-million-euro ERC Advanced Grant to Delft Design for Values researcher Ibo van de Poel, 
who adopted the VSD as one of the primary theoretical approaches to technology design 
for stakeholder values. Similarly, Oosterlaken, Grimshaw, and Janssen (2009) received a 
grant of 550,000 euros from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) 
as part of their grant program, “Responsible Innovation,” to which the VSD approach was 
instrumental (TU Delft, 2012).  
Overall, the stakes are high; AWSs remain on the horizon, despite various multination 
organisations calling for a ban (such as the ICRAC4 and the Campaign to Ban Kill Robots). 
Whether or not a ban will be effective is beyond the scope of this dissertation; although it 
4 The International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC) “is a non-governmental organization (NGO). We are an 
international committee of experts in robotics technology, artificial intelligence, robot ethics, international relations, 
international security, arms control, international humanitarian law, human rights law, and public campaigns, concerned 





may overlook major players who adhere to international treaties and agreements, there is 
nonetheless a tactical advantage in having possession of such arms, and thereby the incentive 
to develop them. It is my hope that the research conducted here can provide a “middle path,” 
viz., design requirements that account for values that are important to all the stakeholders 
involved. If a sufficiently robust definition of MHC can be achieved for (fully) AWSs, then, by 
definition, a ban need not be the center of concern; rather, its pursuit would come at the 
opportunity cost of directing attention to the operationalisation of MHC in those AWSs. 
1.2 RESEARCH ON MHC AND TECHNOLOGY: 
THE MISE EN SCÈNE
The concept of MHC, which originated within the AWS debate in 2014 (Article 36, 2014), has 
attracted global attention and support from both nation states and ban advocates, as well 
as those who criticise the arguments that these advocates have proposed (Biontino, 2016). 
More than two dozen states are in support of a ban on (fully) AWSs, all of which support the 
principle of MHC as a necessary requirement for lawful AWSs to be deployed, so as to ensure 
that human control is never downplayed in the context of AWS design and deployment (Sauer, 
2016; Senear, 2018). To this end, it has been proposed either that MHC must be integrated 
into some existing internationally binding norm applicable to all states, making such a statute 
easier to ratify, or that a de nuovo norm must be synthesised (Asaro, 2016; Morley, 2015). 
Regardless of which route is followed, the fundamental challenge that must be addressed 
is determining what exactly constitutes and satisfies a principle of MHC in AWSs. Each state 
may interpret human control in a different way. Noel Sharkey, a strong proponent of a ban 
on (fully) AWSs, distinguishes five levels of human supervisory control over such systems: 
1. A human engages with and selects a target and initiates any attacks. 
2. The program suggests alternative targets, and a human chooses which one(s) to 
attack. 
3. The program selects a target, and a human must approve it before the attack. 
4. The program selects a target, and a human has a limited amount of time to veto it.
5. The program selects a target and initiates the attack without human involvement.(N. 
Sharkey, 2014)
 
A state might interpret MHC as requiring the lowest levels, 1–3, to be true, whereby humans 
have final executive authority over self-chosen or system-chosen targets. This is a positive 
interpretation of human control and is commonly referred to as the human being “in the 
loop” (Nash, 2015). Similarly, states can interpret MHC as being satisfied by level 4, in which a 




paradigm (Nahavandi, 2017). Level 5 is the level of autonomy – and thus a lack of human 
supervisory control – that Sharkey, and ban proponents in general, are adverse to; i.e., full 
autonomy whereby the target is chosen and engaged with without any human involvement 
in the process (Sauer, 2016; N. Sharkey, 2014). However, the “human-off-the-loop” paradigm 
described in level 5 has been considered grounds for MHC, given that the design of the 
program making targeting decisions and executing those decisions lies in the hands of the 
programmers and system designers themselves (Carpenter, 2014; Heins, 2018). 
Despite a surge in the appropriation of the term “MHC” and the various modalities that 
entities have defined it as, the arguably most nuanced and philosophically grounded 
approach to explicating what it can consist of is provided by Santoni de Sio and van den 
Hoven (2018), as mentioned above. Their fresh view on what constitutes MHC (discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3 and briefly in Annex I) has been appropriated as the theoretical approach 
to the ethical inquiry and control of novel technologies beyond the realm of AWSs. For 
example, the MHC that they propose has already been adopted as a way to understand 
responsibility and liability in the case of autonomous vehicle platooning, in which (semi)
autonomous vehicles and human operators work in conjunction with one another, despite 
levels of autonomy that would normally muddy the waters in liability attribution (Calvert, 
Mecacci, Heikoop, & de Sio, 2018). I myself have recently published on the application of 
their version of MHC to smart home technologies, specifically smart personal assistants 
such as Google Home and Amazon Alexa (Umbrello, 2020b). 
Most of the academic work within the field of MHC on AWSs and autonomous systems 
in general has been conducted only within the last few years. Much of the discussion 
surrounding Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven’s MHC are outlined in both Calvert et al. 
(2018) and Umbrello (2020). The contents of these two papers, along with the original paper 
on this version of MHC (2018), are detailed in Chapter 3. 
Nonetheless, much of the work on MHC has been less about defining what constitutes 
it, and more about the means through which such a constitutional entity, if definable, can 
form a defensible and enforceable international program across both a ban as well as a 
regulation of permissable forms of (semi-)AWS. To this end, this disseration is comparatively 
unique in that it builds on the last few years of scholarship on MHC, aiming to delve into and 
critique the typically preseumed philosophical substratum that lies at the foundation of the 
MHC discourse, and to construct a more holistic definition of MHC that can, if successfully 
demonstrated, be applied to certain forms of (fully) AWS. The geopolitical boons of such an 
enterprise need not be stated. Likewise, formal investigation as to how such a revision of 
MHC can be operationalised via VSD is comparatively unique to past (albeit still relatively 
recent) applications of VSD to Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven’s MHC (Santoni de Sio & 




1.3 MAIN GUIDING QUESTIONS: EXPLORING 
AUTONOMY AND OPERATIONALISING MHC IN 
TERMS OF VSD
The preceding section aimed to provide a cursory overview of the current landscape of MHC 
while also briefly touching on some initial gaps in the research that warrant more attention. 
Given that these areas of research – MHC, AWSs, and VSD – are relatively recent subjects 
of scholarship and public debate, many of the potential areas addressing the questions that 
arise have yet to be formulated, and the field of applied ethics in technology is far from being 
saturated. My published research thus far has been primarily based on the question: how can 
we design transformative technologies that cater to stakeholder values, and what design 
methodologies can we adopt to achieve those ends? Value-sensitive design has been 
the primary and central approach in my research, albeit not without its own philosophical 
issues (discussed in Annex II). Given the marked global increase in both scholarly and public 
discussions on artificial intelligence (AI) systems, the design question becomes of central 
importance to the philosophical debate on how we can guide the development of AI systems 
towards beneficial ends, however the concept of “beneficial” may be construed. 
Because AI systems are foundational to the heated debate on the socioethical and legal 
issues that surround AWS development and deployment, the design question similarly 
delves into the following discussion: if MHC can be conceptually achieved for either or 
both semi- and fully AWSs, what design approach can be adopted to best implement MHC? 
Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven (2018) briefly mention VSD as a potential approach for 
implementing MHC in autonomous systems: 
Responsible Innovation and Value-Sensitive Design research focuses on 
the need to embed and express the relevant values into the technical and 
socio-technical systems (Friedman and Kahn, 2003; van den Hoven, 2007, 
2013). From this perspective, the question to be addressed is how to design 
technical and socio-technical systems which in accordance with the account 
of meaningful human control we have here presented. Based on our analysis 
of meaningful human control, we propose the following two general design 
guidelines, and we briefly show how these can be applied outside the 
military context, by looking at the case study of automated driving systems 
(aka. “autonomous vehicles,” “self-driving cars,” “driverless cars”; Santoni de 
Sio and van den Hoven, 2018, p. 11).
Although their mention of how the values central to MHC can be cast as design requirements 
that play a crucial role in the operationalisation of MHC in VSD, this point is cursory. The 




the general literature on MHC and AWSs that is nonetheless central to any real progress 
towards the RI of such AWSs or even towards a ban. That is the concept of autonomy, and 
what technically constitutes autonomy in (A)WSs. In exploring the concept of autonomy, I 
draw on the concepts of systems thinking (and systems engineering) to underline the co-
variance and co-constitution between human and machine autonomy that is fundamental 
to the understanding of either, particularly within the context of military operations planning 
and deployment (see Chapter 2). 
Originally used by Bell Telephone Laboratories, systems engineering has been an 
increasingly popular approach to engineering technologies, one that has been on the rise 
since its general conception in the 1940s (Schlager, 1956). American engineer Simon Ramo 
popularised the concept from the 1950s onwards, defining it as “a branch of engineering 
which concentrates on the design and application of the whole as distinct from the parts, 
looking at a problem in its entirety, taking account of all the facets and all the variables and 
linking the social to the technological” (Hambleton, 2005, p. 10). The overall aim of this 
approach to artifact design is to understanding complexity holistically with technologies 
that form parts of larger systems and are themselves systems (i.e., constituted of various 
heterogenous nodes). This socio-technical relationship has been fundamental to the 
sociology, anthropology, and philosophy of technology that underlies the STS approach 
to technological analysis, substantiating the inextricable link between nontechnical and 
technical entities. The inseparability of the various facets calls into question concepts 
such as autonomy, viewed as a discrete concept extracted from the sociotechnicity of the 
systems in question, AWSs or otherwise. 
The subsequent goal, then, is to argue for the necessity of a more ontologically grounded 
theory of autonomy as it pertains to the military-industrial complex in achieving a meaningful 
floor for MHC in terms of AWSs. More saliently, for any MHC concept to be effective, it must 
map onto an ontologically secure ground regarding the meaning of autonomy. In doing so, 
how full autonomy is construed shows that MHC can be achieved through an increase in 
certain forms of human-machine autonomies, and that such technical requirements can be 
achieved through a VSD approach. 
1.4 HUMAN AND MACHINE AUTONOMIES: 
OUTLINING THE DIVIDE
In bringing to bear the essential guiding question at the root of this dissertation – how can 
we design transformative technologies that cater to stakeholder values, and what design 
methodologies can we adopt to achieve those ends? – many other philosophical issues 




as AWSs become the topic of consideration. Given the structure of this project, instead of 
providing an arid list of relevant issues that merit close consideration, I opt to simply refer 
to the proceeding chapters that are dedicated to clarifying them. That being said, one of 
the most interesting and central questions of this research project is the following: what is 
the nature of autonomy as it relates to humans and machines in the military domain, and 
how does an understanding of human-machine autonomies and relationships change the 
meaning of MHC? There is a considerable amount of information packed into this question. 
Bringing the concept of autonomy into question requires an intimate understanding of the 
literature across various fields that appropriate the term, including psychology, moral and 
political philosophy, and engineering, among others. 
Of course, no comprehensive view is agreed upon by all in terms of what it means for 
something, whether human or non-human, to be autonomous. For example, Sartor and 
Omicini (2016) distinguish the autonomy of AWSs as consisting of three “dimensions”: (1) 
independence, (2) cognitive skills, and (3) cognitive-behavioral architecture (Sartor & 
Omicini, 2016). This dissertation does not claim to provide such a comprehensive definition, 
lest it meet Icarus’s fate. What it does aim to do, however, is direct how we interpret 
autonomy when we speak about military operations (since it is the domain of interest here), 
and how this warrants consideration during the design phases (e.g., VSD) of AWSs if MHC 
is to be achieved. Although the introductory chapter does not provide the medium for 
discussing this in any detail, it bears noting that the theoretical underpinning adopts the 
more interactional and systemic approach at understanding the military-industrial complex 
in order to better grasp what autonomy can mean. In doing so, it aims to bridge the severing 
of praxis so as to inform the more analytical applied ethics of design. 
 
In light of the above considerations, this doctoral dissertation can be read as being 
differentiated into two distinct philosophical parts:
• Part I, divided into three chapters, is markedly ontological. That is, it aims to show 
how full autonomy is not mala in se, but rather that increased autonomy can actually 
augment the ability to attain MHC in certain types of AWSs. To this end, systems 
thinking is used as the concrete landscape upon which a more ontologically grounded 
understanding of MHC can be framed. 
• Part II, divided into four chapters, is markedly ethical. Through the lens of designing for 
values, it explores how VSD can be used as the approach to design AWSs so as to attain 
MHC (as defined under the systemic understanding of autonomy proposed in Part I). 
The ontological explorations of autonomy as well as systems thinking provide the general 
philosophical basis upon which the latter part of the dissertation can take the practical, 
applied steps. Taken holistically, the chapters of this dissertation aim to argue that a systems 




operations planning allow for an understanding of full autonomy that can be achieved under 
MHC via VSD. However, the latter part of the thesis, in which VSD becomes the emphasised 
paradigm, is not taken prima facie, but rather brought under similar philosophical scrutiny 
as I have done in other articles, and discussed in greater depth in Chapter 5. The traditional 
conception within the VSD literature of the philosophical foundations and the process of 
valuation of stakeholder values in the design process is called into question (see Annex II). 
The work undertaken in Part I requires VSD to be sensitive to multiple levels of abstraction 
in design; more poignantly, VSD must be sensitive to the operational and organisational 
norms of the military-industrial complex (see Chapter 6) as well as employ full-lifecycle 
monitoring to avoid unforeseen (or unforeseeable) recalcitrance (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
Taken together, this dissertation aims to provide a more focused understanding of both 
MHC and VSD in practice. 
1.5 READING GUIDE AND PAPER PREVIEWS
In the previous subsection, I explained the main tensions underlying the aim of this thesis 
as well as the structure of the project itself, detailing the mains parts of the work as well 
as briefly summarising each of the chapters. Here, I outline the various papers that are 
included in some substantive form (fully or partially) in the dissertations. Unlike primarily 
paper-based dissertations (e.g., Oosterlaken, 2013), the published papers and chapters 
used sporadically throughout this work are used to support the arguments and aims that 
constitute the objectives of this dissertation rather than construct the dissertation itself.
What makes this particularly hybrid approach interesting is that it enables a wider audience 
to pick this work up and read the parts necessary or relevant to them without loss of fidelity. 
Because many of the papers included are directed at different audiences – viz., primarily 
to philosophers of technology or to engineers/designers – those chapters can be read as 
discrete works in and of themselves, even though they provide the medium of germination 
for the chapters that proceed them. This, of course, does not mean that the chapters primarily 
directed at one audience would not be of interest to others – this dissertation is a self-
proclaimed trans-/interdisciplinary enterprise – but rather that they need not be read as such. 
Chapter 3, for example, is a streamlined version of a paper originally published in the journal, 
Humana.Mente. This paper argues that VSD provides a strong design approach to framing 
and designing for MHC in smart home systems. Although such a paper has implications 
for how engineering practices are to be conducted, engineers may most likely be lost in 




oriented designers who are more familiar with various design approaches such as VSD 
may find more of value and interest. Designers and engineers who are more practiced-
oriented, for instance, may be more inclined towards Part II, in which abstract values are 
demonstrated and more concretely translated into technical design requirements. 
TABLE 1. Individual papers included in this dissertation
Paper Title Published in Target Audience Possibly of Interest to
PART 1: 
Coupling Levels of Abstraction in 
Understanding Meaningful Human 
Control of Autonomous Weapons: A 
Two-Tiered Approach
Ethics and Information 
Technology (2021)
Policymakers Philosophers of 
technology/ theoretically 
oriented designers
3. Meaningful Human Control 
Over Smart Home Systems: 
A Value-Sensitive Design 
Approach
Humana.Mente Journal 






Mapping AI for Social Good Principles 
onto Value-Sensitive Design
AI and Ethics (2021) Systems engineers Programmers/systems 
engineers/policymakers
Table 1 is intended to allow the reader to quickly navigate the included papers as well as 
orient their within the dissertation as a whole. The numbers to the left of the paper title 
represent the associated chapter which forms part or all of the paper. Where number 
are absent, the associated paper is used throughout the entire part of the thesis. This 
is a useful tool, since reading the dissertation as a whole, depending on the audience, 
can become repetitive, seeing as multiple papers detail some of the same conceptual 
tools, frameworks, and approaches – such as VSD,  which is outlined in many of the 
included papers. However, unlike other paper-based dissertations, this project does not 
leave the articles in their original form. In order to increase readability and symbiosis 
between chapters, the styles of the introductions and conclusions of the included papers 
are changed, and much of the body of those works is dispersed among a large quantity of 
original work for this project. The original abstracts can be found in the section preceding 
the introduction. Following this paragraph, the reader can find the abstracts of the 
chapters containing the included papers, albeit slightly modified to render the transitions 




PART I: A PHILOSOPHY OF SYSTEMS THINKING AND MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL
Coupling Levels of Abstraction in Understanding Meaningful Human Control of 
Autonomous Weapons: A Two-Tiered Approach
Originally published in 2021 in the journal Ethics and Information Technology:
Chapter 2 – Systems Theory: An Ontology for Engineering
In order to bridge the levels of abstraction and thereby conceptualise a unified 
theory of MHC over AWSs, as well as to subsequently unify this conception 
of MHC with a design approach that is capable of designing for it (i.e., VSD), 
this chapter proposes systems thinking as the ontological substrata. The main 
reason for adopting this approach is that it (implicitly) characterises the two 
levels of abstraction for understanding MHC. The operational level of control 
is characterised by a plurality of actors and networks that complicates but also 
constitutes how military operations are structured, planned, and conducted. 
Likewise, the design level of control is fundamentally built on the notion of 
tracking and tracing networks of systems and actors within both the use and the 
design histories of those systems. In addition, systems thinking is the theoretical 
framework from which systems engineering derives. It is essentially the practical 
and managerial implementation of a systems thinking ontology, whereas VSD 
exists as a sort of parallel approach to the systems thinking design methodology
Chapter 4 – Coupling Levels of Abstraction: A Two-Tiered Approach
The marriage of both levels of MHC (i.e., the operational and design levels) 
is demonstrated to be symbiotic with regards to MHC. Here, the argument is 
that military operations always already constrain the autonomy of any and all 
agents within the military-industrial complex as a function of the procedures that 
necessarily take place a priori to the deployment of force (i.e., the operational 
level). Close cooperation between institutions and infrastructures that constitute 
the military-industrial complex (e.g., the military, industry, government, and 
legislative norms) likewise form the supraindividual agent that can be said to 
be the possessor of MHC, if the design history can be traced and its behaviors 
can be tracked to the relevant moral agents (i.e., MIC). These two levels of 
abstraction warrant closer cooperation within the MIC so as to allow more 
accurate mapping of the moral intentions of the aforementioned agents onto 
AWSs that are being developed/deployed. The consequence here is that, if 
MHC obtains across both levels of control, then not only is autonomy per se 





Meaningful Human Control Over Smart Home Systems: A Value-Sensitive Design 
Approach
Originally published in 2020 in the journal Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies: 
13 (37), 40–65. 
Chapter 3 – Meaningful Human Control: Two Approaches
To couple the various levels of abstraction, this section builds on the literature 
review of Annex I, in which both Ekelhof and Santoni de Sio’s works on MHC, 
among others, are explained. In this chapter, the approaches presented in 
these papers are discussed, in addition to how we can begin to view those 
approaches as symbiotic in terms of their systems thinking affinities. The initial 
groundwork is then laid for understanding how they both complement each 
other without encumberment. 
PART II: DESIGNING MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL WITH VALUE-SENSITIVE DESIGN
Mapping AI for Social Good Principles onto Value-Sensitive Design
Originally published in 2021 in the journal AI and Ethics: 1 (3), 283-296.
Chapter 5 – Value-Sensitive Design: Conceptual Challenges Posed by AI Systems
Value-sensitive design has been adopted as a principled approach to designing 
various existent as well as futuristic/transformative technologies. The VSD 
approach is fundamentally predicated on the interactional stance towards 
technology – or, more precisely, that societal and social factors co-construct and 
co-vary with technological artifacts. Part of the rationale behind this approach 
is that technologies embody values. However, AI systems that employ machine 
learning (ML) and/or artificial neural networks are often opaque, and thus the 
values that they may (dis)embody can be unforeseen or unforeseeable. This 
chapter discusses the different ways in which technologies embody values and 
how they fit within the larger systems thinking approach, as well as how to more 
saliently frame the embodiment of values for AI systems such as AWSs. 
Chapter 6 – Adapting the VSD Approach
As ML systems (often) learn in ways that are opaque to humans, we need to 
pay attention to values such as transparency, explicability, and accountability. 
To address this issue, as well as the potential “disembodiment” of certain 
values over time, I propose a threefold, modified VSD approach: (1) integrating 
a known set of VSD principles (AI4SG) as design norms, from which more 
specific requirements can be derived; (2) distinguishing between values that are 
promoted and respected by the design to ensure outcomes that not only prevent 




VSD process to encompass the whole lifecycle of an AI technology, so as to 
monitor unintended value consequences and redesign as needed.
Chapter 7 – The AI4SG-VSD Design Process in Action: Multi-Tiered Design and 
Multi-Tiered MHC
The AI4SG-VSD approach described in the previous two chapters is employed 
with the AWS as the use case. In doing so, I outline the values to be promoted 
as much as possible (e.g., the LOACs), the (constraining) values to be respected 
as much as possible (e.g., the EU HLEG AI), as well as the AI4SG norms as a 
means for translating these abstract values into technical design requirements. 
The value hierarchy is chosen as the tool for illustrating how designers can 
begin to conceptualise this translation to design for values rather than ex post 
facto, ad hoc, or not at all. Likewise, I discuss how full-lifecycle monitoring and 
incremental deployment into an envelope of safe use to determine the emergent 
behaviours and consequent implicated values can be used to evaluate whether 
a system requires a redesign. In the event that this cannot be done, such types 
of systems should be considered de facto, or otherwise prohibited, given the 
associated risks of bypassing such an approach.
1.6 CONCLUSIONS
In summary of this introduction, it is worthwhile to note the importance of the explorations 
undertaken by this dissertation in the proceeding sections. Undoubtedly, exploring 
the notion of the MHC of AWSs comes with obvious sociopolitical and ethical boons. 
The definition of MHC, however, is another matter, as is the practical implementation of 
any meaningful conception of MHC. In the end, the latter question may prove to be the 
most difficult hurdle; but first, the question of what to design must be brought to the fore. 
Deciphering the notion of autonomy, given its indispensability to AWSs (it is, after all, the first 
letter of the acronym), is critical to understanding how AWSs function and tracking threads 
of accountability and liability, among other issues. Drawing on fundamental notions within 
systems thinking, military planning, and engineering, provides important conceptual tools 
and initial steps to understanding the network of causation and responsibility in establishing 
an ontologically grounded understanding of human-AWS relations. 
The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to re-center life (viz. human, animal, and 
environmental, among others) as the object being designed for. That is, stakeholders – 
rather than the technology in question – take center stage when discrete technologies are 
being considered. Seeing as AWSs are on the horizon, there is a growing anxiety that their 




worry, yet rather than succumb to technological determinism or instrumentalism, interacting 
with the technology early on and throughout the development programs of such systems 
can provide the middle way that is beneficial to all stakeholders. This, of course, is neither 
an admonition nor a statement in support for the development of AWSs and thereby their 
deployment for violent ends. I accept, however, that the “end of the war” is nowhere in sight, 
and that AWSs are more likely than not to be developed. This dissertation is my humble 
offering to the community currently engaged in the debate over a solution to design AWSs 
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ANNEX I: MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL – 
AN INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION 
If the problem is how to maintain meaningful human control of autonomous warfighting 
systems, no good solution presents itself  (Adams, 2001, 11)
The concept of ‘meaningful human control’ (MHC) originates from the discourse on 
autonomous weapons systems (AWS). It emphasises the notion that humans must remain 
in a position of control or oversight over the decision-making of a lethal system (Article 36, 
2015; Morley, 2015). In other words, such types of systems should not be able to execute 
lethal action without human intervention. The above quote by scholar and political military 
strategist Thomas K. Adams belies the difficulty of formulating a practical solution (something 
that might constitute MHC) while also preserving the ever-increasing processing rates that 
accompany increased automation (Adams, 2001). 
The literature on AWS that deals specifically with issues linked to human supervision 
and participation in the decision-making process can be divided into three interrelated 
categories. Each category involves an arguably distinct set of human capacities or features 
that are also privy to machines:
1. The assignment and abdication of responsibility, liability, and accountability (Allen & 
Wallach, 2014; Asaro, 2016; Scherer, 2015);
2. Humans as possessors of a discrete ability to make moral/ethical determinations, 
which is rooted in their empathic capacities (Asaro, 2009; Docherty, 2012);
3. The inability of machines to perform at certain levels or respond to certain situations 
that humans arguably can. At present, the system redundancy, error detection, and 
recovery architecture of machines cannot match the technical level of a comparable 
human equivalent in terms of function (Heyns, 2013). 
These three categories of MHC are not limited to AWS per se, but apply to achieving 
MHC over autonomous systems in general. Recent scholarship has taken this challenge 
on by exploring the issue of achieving MHC over less directly lethal (yet still contentious) 
technologies such as autonomous vehicles (Calvert, Mecacci, Heikoop, & de Sio, 2018) 
and smart home systems (Umbrello, 2020). Scholarship has also addressed the general 
design and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) systems that are socially beneficial and 
systemically resilient (Stephanidis et al., 2019). For readers unfamiliar with the literature on 
MHC, this introduction provides a robust account of various scholarly perspectives. 
Technological innovation geared towards increased efficacy in war theatres has historically 




(Kania, 2017; Tucker, 2017). Similar attention has been paid, both in public and in academic 
debates within scholarly journals, to warfare innovations outside the military sphere 
(Altmann, 2005; Geiss, 2015; Walsh, 2015). At an international level, the UN Convention on 
Conventional Weapons was designed to address various issues regarding the legality and 
ethical development and use of AWS (Germany, 2014). One of the primary vectors of debate 
for this legal framework centred on what it means to exercise human control/supervision 
over these types of weapons. What current technological capabilities can support or 
constrain that type of control? Although there is no consensus on the particularities of 
what constitutes such control, there is convergence on a minimum standard of human 
engagement in the functioning of these types of systems (Crootof, 2016; Korpela, 2017). 
Aside from MHC, some other similar concepts have emerged (such as ‘sufficient human 
control’ and ‘appropriate levels of human judgment’). However, the literature on MHC has 
proven most pervasive. Ekelhof (2019) provides a useful chart to capture the “recurring 
terms, themes, and elements in existing descriptions of human control standards” (Figure 1). 
Bolded terms show the relationships between each of the varying concepts. Although 
there are similarities between the concepts, there are also substantive differences. The 
primary philosophical underpinning that unites the various elements is the human-machine 
relationship. More specifically, it is the notion that there is a relationship between the human 
(operator or otherwise) and the autonomous system rather than pure independence (a point 
discussed in greater detail in Part I of this dissertation). The plurality of positions, as well as 
the various philosophical and/or legal motivations underlying these positions, contributes 
to ongoing difficulties in forging consensus on the conceptual and technical requirements 
that would meet necessary and sufficient conditions for MHC. 
This difficulty is exacerbated by pressure on states to agree to legally binding tools (“The 
Campaign To Stop Killer Robots,” n.d.) and political agreements (Germany/France, 2017), 
along with other constructs, regarding their use. Pressure has increased in light of ongoing 
trends towards ever greater automation and the dehumanisation of warfare, wherein human 
combatants are removed from the war theatre (Marauhn, 2018). Regardless of the route that 
is taken, both the difficulty and prescience of having a converging theory of MHC lies in 
translating its more abstract concepts into a functional definition of actual military practices 
– there is difficulty moving from theory to practice, in other words. This is best illustrated 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has aimed to refocus 
discussion on speculative future weapons technologies by shifting attention to existing 
warfare systems in order to determine the relationships between humans and technology 
(ICRC, 2016). Knowledge of existing relationships can then be used as groundwork to inform 
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IHL compliance is 
considered a core 
driver of the concept.
FIGURE 1. Recurring terms, themes, and elements in existing descriptions of human control standards 
(Source: Ekelhof, 2019, 344)
As mentioned already, various approaches have been taken to address what constitutes 
MHC. For the sake of space and length, I do not discuss all of the literature on MHC. Rather, I 
focus on a selection of six papers (six approaches) that have tackled the issue from different 
approaches. This allows for a more comprehensive appreciation of the various perspectives 
on attaining MHC. The six approaches are as follows: 
1. Preserving MHC through proper preparation and legitimate context for use, viz. 
through current NATO targeting procedures (Roorda, 2015); 
2. Attaining MHC by having a human agent make “near-time decision[s]” in a AWS 
engagement (Asaro, 2012);




function of AWS to ensure proper attribution of responsibility (Saxon, 2016); 
4. Attaining MHC through apprising designers/programmers of their moral role in the 
architecture of AWS (Leveringhaus, 2016); 
5. Attaining MHC through design requirements involving necessary conditions to 
track the relevant moral reasons for agent actions and trace the relevant lines of 
responsibility through design histories (Mecacci & de Sio, 2019; Santoni de Sio & 
van den Hoven, 2018);
6. Preserving MHC by distributing responsibility for decisions through the entirety of 
the military-industrial complex (Ekelhof, 2019). 
2.1 TARGETING PROCEDURES
Roorda (2015) locates the vector of MHC for AWS in the existing guidelines for NATO’s targeting 
procedures. The author argues that AWS do not need to be able to distinguish or make 
proportionality decisions that human agents need to make as international humanitarian law 
(IHL) does not prescribe such a necessary condition. Rather, Roorda argues it is the ‘effects’ 
of attack decisions that must map onto relevant norms. Human operators and commanders 
are the nexus point upon which responsibility falls. He thus argues that an important factor 
for decision- making lies with those human agents. They are tasked with determining the 
appropriate context for use of any given system and its particular capabilities. NATO’s existing 
targeting procedures provide this normative foundation, particularly given their incorporation 
of legal code, for the responsible deployment and use of arms including AWS. To that end, 
Roorda argues fully autonomous AWS may be used without direct human supervision – 
provided they can meet the normative requirements of NATO’s targeting procedures as well 
as remain sensitive to informed decisions made by human operators about the proper context 
for deployment and use. Let us explore this in greater detail. 
Roorda’s argument rests on what he considers to be a privation in the debate on the 
autonomy of AWS: that these forms of arms are overly anthropomorphised, self-governing, 
and discrete (from human operators). Because of this, the focus on the legality of the 
weapons’ ability to conform to normative moral requirements that has characterised the 
debate is fundamentally misplaced. Even if such weapons are capable of selecting and 
engaging targets without human selection and authorisation, they nonetheless remain 
within a larger human-machine network where the context for use is a highly relevant factor. 
Because actual military operations require planning and execution, types of weapons, their 
deployment, and the context for use are also governed by rule and procedures. It is during 
these phases that legal and ethical constraints are negotiated to ensure proper use of 
force, so it is here that the vector for MHC can be located for AWS. 
Various normative frameworks already constrain assessments gathered and formulated 




combine these constraints to determine the appropriate and proportional use of force in 
an operation. These various legal and operational rules constitute very specific operational 
objectives that terminate in a single decision, which constrains whatever method of force is 
used regardless of its technological level of autonomy. Roorda (2015) sums up the decision-
making procedure as follows: 
The doctrine defines joint targeting as: the process of determining the 
effects necessary to achieve the commander’s goals (ICRC, 2018), identifying 
the actions necessary to create the desired effects based on the means 
available, selecting and prioritizing targets, and synchronising fires with other 
military capabilities, and then assessing their cumulative effectiveness and 
taking remedial action if necessary. (155)
Given that the decision-making process and final decision for operation are determined 
by humans, they implicate human responsibility for operational outcomes. Regardless 
of the types of systems used to carry out the final operational decision (even ones with 
autonomous targeting and engagement systems), responsibility for their use falls exclusively 
to humans, i.e., those who formulated the decision. This is because the operational process 
anterior to deployment constrains the set of appropriate targets a priori. For this reason, the 
autonomy of AWS co-varies with human operators. Systems are thus neither responsible 
for the formulation of such operational plans, nor their own place in the execution of those 
decisions. Similarly, the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) do not specify the level at which 
compliance with legal norms is required. It would thus be absurd to require AWS to be 
compliant per se. Instead, compliance with the LOAC can be satisfied (as it normally is) 
during the operational decision-making process that determines targets, context for use, 
and the means of achieving objectives. 
2.2 NEAR-TIME INTERVENTION
Here, we discuss the more technology-focused argument for attaining MHC derived by 
Asaro (2012). Alongside Jürgen Altmann, Noel Sharkey, and Rob Sparrow, Peter Asaro 
pioneered the position of the International Committee on Robot Arms Control (ICRAC) in favor 
of the prohibition of AWS. Given that the latter eliminate human judgment in the initiation of 
lethal force, they threaten to undermine bodies of international humanitarian law (IHL) and 
international human rights law (IHRL). Asaro defines AWS as “any automated system that 
can initiate lethal force without the specific, conscious, and deliberate decision of a human 
operator, controller, or supervisor” (2012, 694). In this, he acknowledges a nuanced point 
regarding what differentiates such systems from other independent weapons systems such 
as landmines or the auto-turret system: they are less ‘weapons-as-tools’ and more like a 
system that uses weapons or, more specifically, an autonomous weapons platform. Echoing 




us to think in terms of ‘systems’ that might encompass a great variety of configurations of 
sensors, information processing, and weapons deployment, and to focus on the process 
by which the use of force is initiated” (2012, 694). What Asaro describes captures the 
complexity of the technical systems that form AWS, and his point is not unimportant. The 
shift in perspective occurs not so much in terms of AWS-as-a-tool and even less as AWS-
as-a-system. Instead, it positions AWS as within (or part of) a system or network. This point 
forms the crux of the philosophical lining detailed in the first part of this disseration on 
reformulating a more systems-based notion of MHC. 
In an effort to reduce the potential to undermine humanitarian or human rights law, Asaro 
proposes both minimum and necessary conditions that must exist for AWS to fall under 
MHC. Firstly, he describes what the US military designates as a ‘kill chain’ or, more aptly put, 
the process through which an order to execute is achieved: find, fix, track, target, engage, 
and assess. Asaro (2012) argues that having the so-called ‘ human on the loop’ is the middle 
ground between (fully) AWS and the direct operation control of having a human-in-the-loop. 
This means the presence of a human at any single point in that six-step chain is a necessary 
but insufficient condition. For AWS to be under MHC, humans must be able to assess and 
verify the target and engage steps. According to Asaro, this is the defining characteristic 
of (fully) AWS. Abdication of these two steps to a process that is fully divorced from human 
involvement (i.e., purely in the hands of the machine) fails to meet the minimum standard 
for MHC. Failure then opens the floodgates for violation of international humanitarian and 
human rights law. 
 
Consequently, a treaty defining the meaning of what constitutes AWS as well as their design, 
deployment, and use would be fundamentally predicated on compliance with international 
humanitarian and human rights law. Responsibility would be necessarily attributed to 
‘informed and trained’ human operators making target and engagement decisions, all 
of which are currently delineated in current military practices governed by international 
treaties on the conduct of warfare. The ICRAC itself has formulated guidelines on the means 
through which target acquisition is deemed legitimite and in compliance with international 
humanitarian and human rights law. 
2.3 PROPER COMMANDER TRAINING
Echoing the potential for violations to humanitarian and human rights law observed by 
Asaro, Saxon (2016) argues that the general use of autonomous drones and AWS does not 
necessarily entail a responsibility gap in terms of attributing individual moral responsibility 
to a human in the kill chain. He reviews the literature on criminal responsibility to show the 
existing theories applicable to crimes committed through use of these weapon platforms 
(aerial autonomous drones, in his case). But he concedes that as advancements in these 




the issues of responsibility attribution described in criminal responsibility theories become 
more challenging. Still, he never acknowledges their inability to address such issues. 
Saxon (2016) argues that compliance with international humanitarian law requires human 
supervision across four stages of military operations: 
(1) the procurement/acquisition stage, (2) the planning stage of the mission or 
attack when a human must choose which weapon system to employ (systems 
will vary across a range of autonomy) (echoed by Ekelhof in 2.5), (3) following 
the choice of an autonomous drone, a decision as to the level of human 
attention – if any – to assign to the system for the mission, but prior to the 
attack, and (4) specific inputs of human judgment – if necessary – to comply 
with international legal obligations and/or political interests immediately 
before, during, and after the attack. (18-19) 
Moreover, the human supervisor must monitor continued legal compliance throughout 
stages 2 to 4. If crimes are committed through the use of these systems, the degree of 
autonomy present in such systems must be accounted for in any analysis of criminal liability. 
He then mentions that (fully) AWS may preclude mens rea entirely, strangely enough, which 
would sever individual responsibility for crimes committed. 
Saxon locates the vector of responsibility in conventional criminal law, where crimes 
committed by a AWS must be found in the human operators or commanders who (whether 
through negligence or intent) fielded the AWS contra legem. Of course, the customary 
minimum necessary conditions of habeas corpus apply in regards to having sufficient 
evidence of such intent. Attribution of responsibility can even be assigned in a ‘superior’ 
way. This means a commander can be held personally responsible for criminal acts 
of omission rather than commission or direct intent, which are governed under direct 
responsibility. The finding holds true even for commander-subordinate complexities in the 
military hierarchy of criminal orders passed down (omission). Criminal acts of commission 
by a commander, such as knowingly deploying AWS in civilian-dense regions, can be used 
as evidence for the attribution of direct criminal responsibility. Technical measures during 
design can enable tracing lines of responsibility to support mens rea in terms of commands 
given (either directly from a commander or by way of subordinates) through various ledger 
systems within the AWS themselves. 
 
This puts the ultimate responsibility for the use, deployment, and amelioration of potential 
malfunctions on commanders. Thus despite the ever-increasing independence, speed, 
and complexity of autonomous systems, proper training is needed. Training must include 
an effective means of shutting down systems when the first signs of potential recalcitrance 




economic costs of the system itself. MHC here means proper training for commanders so their 
decisions remain discretely within their domain throughout the planning and fielding stages.
2.4 THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF DESIGNERS
Leveringhaus (2016) takes an approach similar to both that of Roorda (2015) and Santoni de 
Sio et al (2018, 2019). The former locates MHC within targeting procedures, while the latter 
locates it partly in relation to relevant designers/programmers. Leveringhaus explores the 
distinction between allocating moral responsibility for both semi- and fully AWS between 
drone pilots and programmers. Tackling the challenges that emerge from the allocation 
of moral responsibility, he argues these issues are best confronted with what he calls a 
‘Standard of Care Approach’. Leveringhaus predicates his analysis and application of the 
Standard of Care approach on three background considerations: automated targeting, 
moral responsibility, and Just War theory. 
Automated Targeting 
The notion of automated targeting as a strong disjunction (i.e., either there is automated 
targeting or there is not) is a fallacious one. Instead, Leveringhaus (2016, 169-170) 
distinguishes five different stages of the decision-making process (the so-called kill chain) 
in terms of where each stage can be automated:
1. Observation stage: the acquisition of information about particular target or a specific 
situational scenario;
2. Orientation/analysis stage: analysis of the available information; 
3. Decision stage: making targeting decisions based upon the analysis of the available 
information at stage 2;
4. Enactment stage: enforcement of a targeting decision made at stage 3; 
5. Assessment stage: assessment of the aftermath of the military act. 
In this case, (semi-)autonomous drones typically automate the large quantities of data that 
their sensors input in the first two stages. Drone programming filters out what it deems 
irrelevant to decision-making and feeds the remainder to the pilot. The pilot may make 
a decision at the third stage, then feed that decision to an automated payload delivery 
system (stage 4). This, of course, is just an example of how various stages can be 
automated or not. As this paradigm can design different combinations of automation and 
human control, automated targeting and payload delivery is not an either/or proposition. 
Instead, the distinction between fully-autonomous drones and the semi-autonomous 
system described above is that the former ascribes automation to the entire five-stage 
process. Leveringhaus refers to those who program fully autonomous drones as ‘drone 
programmers’, distinguishing between them and ‘drone pilots’ who form the human-in-the-





Leveringhaus draws on the work of Santoni de Sio and Di Nucci (2016), delimiting his 
conception of responsibility to focus solely on moral responsibility rather than two other 
distinct (albeit interrelated) concepts of causal and legal responsibility (2016, 170). By 
centring moral responsibility as the focus of MHC, he adopts Strawson’s (1962) conception 
of moral responsibility that eschews the nuanced arguments underlying debates on free 
will. The Strawsonian approach features notions of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness 
predicated on social practices (Leveringhaus, 2016, 170). The moral responsibility of any 
given agent ensures their liability for any praise or blame associated with the results of 
their practices. Other agents are similarly justified in attributing the proper praise or blame 
to the liable agent. To this end, Leveringhaus’ (2016) chapter explores whether or not “the 
increasing automation of drones necessitates a rethinking of practices of praising and 
blaming” (170). 
Just War Theory
Just War theory is used as a moral landscape to frame the practices of praising and blaming. 
The theory refers to the rules and regulations that constrain the use of force in any given 
armed theatre. Leveringhaus (2016) focuses on one of the tripartite vectors of Just War 
theory, jus in bello or justice in war (as opposed to jus ad bellum or justice pre-war in terms 
of the declaration of war, and jus post bellum or justice after war) (171). The three criteria for 
assigning responsibility for recalcitrance in jus in bello are as follows: 
Distinction obliges belligerents to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate targets by not intentionally targeting the latter;
Proportionality of means obliges belligerents not to cause excessive harm; 
[and]
Military necessity obliges belligerents not to cause unnecessary harm. (ICRC, 
1949; Leveringhaus, 2016, 171)
Leveringhaus continues by arguing that the practices of praising and blaming responsible 
agents provides a solid starting point for tackling these issues. However, they are insufficient 
for allocating full moral responsibly to the military. He further provides five conditions that 
must be met to identify responsible agents (thus making them liable for the blame or praise 
mentioned above). The first three conditions are adopted from Cowley (2014), while the 
fourth and fifth derive from the Nuremburg trials to note that an agent must have: 
1. Moral capacity: the agent must comprehend what they did and why they are held 
responsible for such action(s);




their actions were undertaken;
3. Control: the agent must have been in control of their actions (i.e., have possessed 
the ability to not act the way they did); 
4. Moral perception: the agent must show they had attained (or could not have attained) 
the morally relevant knowledge that allowed them to assess their use of armed force 
in a particular context;
5. Moral choice: the agent could have been able to avoid executing a particular order. 
(Leveringhaus, 2016, 171-172)
According to this criteria, drone pilots and programmers could ostensibly be seen as not 
morally responsible for their actions. This is due to the nature of the automated system, 
which precludes their ability to have either sufficient moral perception and/or control. 
However, the degree of moral competence underpinning moral perception does not 
preclude a programmer from understanding the basic moral rules of their domain (i.e., war 
theatre). Leveringhaus (2016) makes the salient point that “automated targeting does not 
necessarily challenge developing adequate moral competence. Whether a member of 
the military develops or fails to develop adequate moral competence depends, I contend, 
much more on training then on subsequent uses of a particular weapon” (173). 
This would require sufficient training in ethics and law for members of the military, including 
programmers, to understand the underlying elements of jus in bello. Automated targeting 
does not exclude this moral competence per se, as a programmer must be aware of the 
principles of distinction and proportionality. When designing a system, for instance, the 
programmer who ignores these principles would be in direct contravention of jus in bello. 
Of course, and as Leveringhaus admits, there is a gap between agent comprehension 
of the relevant rules and the actual application of these rules. To illustrate, automation of 
step 1 (observation) and step 2 (orientation/analysis) of the kill chain is problematic. This is 
because the filtering of collected information and subsequent feeding-up to the pilot limits 
the relevant moral knowledge necessary for proper analysis. The moral perception of the 
pilot would thus be hindered, affecting decisions made in the remaining stages. 
Yet one might also argue the opposite: without such filtering, the sheer volume of large 
quantities of data could equally obscure the moral perception of pilots and hinder morally 
relevant decision-making. This becomes a fundamental point in the design architecture for 
these systems. The automation of stage 3 (decision) could delimit the choices of available 
targets for a pilot to act upon. However, it could also delimit the space for human error to 
occur. Similarly, automation of stage 4 (enactment) could limit the ability of a pilot to intervene 
in payload delivery. But it could also carry out such a delivery with greater precision than 
a human pilot could. In these semi-automated scenarios with human pilots, the landscape 




problematic when we consider full automation of the kill chain.
Since full automation of the kill chain by an AWS precludes the moral perception of 
programmers, there are arguments about programmer ability to design a kill switch that could 
be used to intervene in recalcitrant systems (Contissa, Lagioia, & Sartor, 2017; Leveringhaus, 
2016). This would put full moral responsibility back in the hands of programmers, given their 
ability to intervene in such an absolute way. Still, distant war theatres are often complex and 
there are always limitations on programmer ability to attain relevant knowledge on any given 
deployment scenario. This limits agent ability to have sufficient moral perception in turn, 
making moral control highly improbable. Leveringhaus argues that popular as it maybe be 
among AWS sceptics, such an argument fails to undermine the attribution of responsibility 
to programmers. Through proper outlining and the application of ‘standards of care’, it is 
possible for the military to both accept the assignation of responsibility and adhere to it. 
 
It is nonetheless difficult for programmers to have sufficient moral perception of what AWS do 
during deployment. Leveringhaus argues that they should take a forward-looking approach 
to moral responsibility, assessing the potential risks that may arise from automation of the 
kill chain once deployed. Drawing from risk theory (which he argues is underdeveloped in 
Just War theory), Leveringhaus believes that riskless war is impossible. Yet programmers 
can nonetheless account for various possible risks that could emerge, and balance these 
risks against each other through design decisions. If this is the case, then programmers are 
still responsible for the resulting risks associated with outcomes from the use of automated 
targeting systems (Leveringhaus, 2016, 176). 
Because the programmer is aware of their limited perception of morally relevant facts and 
risks during deployment, they retain moral responsibility for the decisions they make in 
terms of mitigating and reducing risks prior to deployment. Moral perception of an AWS 
during deployment is critical to understanding risk in warfare. For programmers in particular, 
moral awareness of the risks imposed by deployment is crucial to understanding whether 
their imposition of the associated risks is justified, negligent, or reckless (Leveringhaus, 
2016, 176). If it can be shown that the imposition of risk was justified, then associated 
actions and outcomes do not merit blame (they also do not necessarily merit praise). If 
the associated risks of deployment were negligent or reckless, then it could be said that 
the moral perception and/or competence of the programmer(s) was lacking. If it can be 
shown that such agents failed to take sufficient steps to acquire morally relevant knowledge 
before making decisions about risks, then they could be held responsible for wrongdoing. 
Thus, their actions would merit blame. This forward-looking approach to moral responsibility 
(which is also a fundamental precept of VSD, discussed in greater detail in Annex II) supports 
a broader moral perception. Leveringhaus (2016, 177) argues that this approach actually 




The SoC approach is predicated on devising and adhering to sound principles of care 
regarding the responsible use of semi- and fully autonomous targeting systems in AWS. 
It is intended to determine the contexts for use wherein the deployment of such systems 
impose reasonable risks. Resistance to automation as a danger per se is eschewed here, 
as responsible use of automation is contingent on relevant contexts for deployment and 
the standards of care used in such contexts. This means the SoC approach provides a 
landscape within which moral responsibility can be assigned to programmers and pilots. 
Failure to adhere to either an existing standard of care or a sufficiently adequate standard 
of care can provide the basis for blameworthiness. In other words, 
[s]tandards of care would also govern interactions between drone pilots 
and drone programmers. To reduce risk, drone programmers would have 
to be transparent about the ways in which they program partially automated 
drones. They would have to inform their colleagues about the parameters 
being used for automation, as well as the stages of the targeting process 
being automated. (Leveringhaus, 2016, 177, emphasis mine) 
Within the military context in particular, standards of care also apply to the superiors of 
pilots and programmers. It is the duty of these superiors, along with the more general 
military apparatus, to assess the efficacy of existing standards of care. It is also their duty to 
develop and implement sufficient standards for these types of automated technologies – 
and arguably for all emerging technologies. 
To sum up, Leveringhaus recognises that the deployment and continued development 
of automated technologies (such as the AWS described above) is not unproblematic. But 
problems arising from development can nonetheless be addressed through revision of 
what constitutes moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. MHC is then achieved by 
adhering to standards of care sufficient to reduce negligent and reckless risk-taking, as per 
the conditions set out above by relevant moral actors. Actors include not only pilots and 
programmers, but also their superiors and embodying institutions. 
2.4 MHC AS DESIGN REQUIREMENTS5
In their seminal 2018 paper titled “Meaningful human control over autonomous systems: a 
philosophical account,” Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven depart from existing accounts 
for MHC to instead provide a philosophical one. Their account defines MHC as co-
variance between system behaviour and an agent’s decisional intentions and reason to 
act. The approach aligns directly with (and emerges from) responsible design practices 
and value sensitive design (VSD), above all (Santoni de Sio & van den Hoven, 2018). This 
means systems can be designed in ways that permit agents to forfeit some of their direct 
5  Much of description in this section is adapted from a paper I previously published, which similarly recounts Santoni di Sio 




operational control while still retaining global control over the system. Ironically, more – not 
less – levels of autonomy may permit greater control over a system in some cases. Santoni 
de Sio and van den Hoven (2018) provide the salient and timely example of autonomous 
vehicles or self-driving cars, where users retain overall control of the autonomous mobility 
system even though the system can conceivably put the user in unforeseen and potentially 
threatening conditions. Attaining MHC in this sense allows for clearer lines of accountability 
to be drawn when humans remain ‘in-the-loop’ over a system, as tracking the relevant 
reasons behind agent decisions is a necessary condition.
This approach to tackling MHC is novel because it is comprehensive in its scope, looking 
beyond discrete systems to the entire sociotechnical infrastructure to which these 
systems belong. Although the specific design and deployment of a system implicates 
important factors for understanding MHC, it cannot be understood in isolation from the 
infrastructure, organisations, and other agents that are inextricably connected to system 
design, deployment, and use. The approach is also novel because it frames MHC as 
capable of being designed by engineers – that is, as technical design requirements not 
only for the system itself, but also for the larger sociotechnical infrastructure. But in order 
to achieve this, two conditions must be met: tracking and tracing. As we shall see below, 
satisfaction of these two conditions allows for a more expansive, comprehensive notion of 
meaningful human control. This notion extends beyond solely users to permit agents (such 
as designers, policymakers, organisations, and states) to exert a level of meaningful control. 
It thus demarcates clearer lines for the attribution of responsibility. 
Tracking and Tracing Conditions 
Building off Fischer and Ravizza’s (2000) concept of reason-responsiveness in their theory 
of moral responsibility, Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven (2018) propose two necessary 
conditions for MHC: tracking and tracing. The tracking condition deals with how responsive 
a system is to the actions resulting from human rationale.6 It is more comprehensively 
defined as the
[f ]irst necessary condition of meaningful human control. In order to be under 
meaningful human control, a decision-making system should demonstrably 
and verifiably be responsive to the human moral reasons relevant in the 
circumstances – no matter how many system levels, models, software, or 
devices of whatever nature separate a human being from the ultimate effects 
in the world, some of which may be lethal. That is, decision-making systems 
should track (relevant) human moral reasons. (Santoni de Sio & van den 
Hoven, 2018, 7)
6  The use of the term ‘reasons’ here is understood as any element that can both prompt and demonstrate human behavior, 




In order for a (semi-)autonomous system to satisfy the tracking condition, its behaviour 
must map onto the reasons (intentions, plans, objectives, etc.) causing the relevant 
human agent(s) to undertake or abstain from any action. The tracking condition, then, is 
contingent to determinant design requirements. It requires an autonomous system such 
as an autonomous vehicle to be designed so that, after taking into account all accessible 
relevant input, system behaviour corresponds with human reasons for (in)action as much as 
technically possible. If system behaviour co-varies coherently with the (moral) reasoning of 
an agent, then the system can be said to fall under MHC. 
The tracing condition differs in that it examines whether it is possible to determine the 
human agent(s) within the history of system design and deployment (e.g., designers, 
manufacturers, users, etc.) who are capable of understanding the system’s potential and 
recognising their moral responsibility for the use or deployment of the system (i.e., the 
liability of moral consequence). Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven (2018) define tracing 
more thoroughly as the 
[s]econd necessary condition of meaningful human control: in order for a 
system to be under meaningful human control, its actions/states should be 
traceable to a proper moral understanding on the part of one or more relevant 
human persons who design or interact with the system, meaning that there 
is at least one human agent in the design history or use context involved in 
designing, programming, operating and deploying the autonomous system 
who (a) understands or is in the position to understand the capabilities of the 
system and the possible effects in the world of the its use; (b) understands 
or is in the position to understand that others may have legitimate moral 
reactions toward them because of how the system affects the world and the 
role they occupy. (9)
MHC is attained by agents who can satisfy both of these conditions; only then can they 
be said to have MHC over a system. AWS can prima facie fall under MHC through one or 
more agents when they are designed to support the values of accessibility and explicability 
(explainability and transparency). These values should manifest in system behaviour as 
much as possible. If a system is able to explain its internal decision-making (explicability) 
and such systems are themselves transparent (also a factor of explicability), then such 
systems can – at least in theory – be brought under MHC more easily. This is because 
agent understanding of system use and deployment can be more easily attributed to the 
architecture of system design. 
With these two necessary conditions, MHC ultimately entails a definition of control that 




direct control. It is more stringent than direct control in that it precludes the attribution of 
human control to systems just because they have an agent ‘in-the-loop’ (e.g., a soldier 
co-commanding a field operation with a AWS). Even if armed with a kill switch and 
visibility of the current status and activities of the AWS, a commander of a AWS is not 
necessarily equipped to understand why the system does what it does. Many autonomous 
technologies are subject to ‘black boxing’, which is when the technical infrastructure of a 
system makes its inner workings opaque to the user. In such cases, MHC by the end user 
cannot be attained because the tracing condition cannot be met due to system opacity. It 
is true that other agents, such as designers, programmers, the military institution, or even 
the state, may very well understand what is going on in the so-called black box (although 
not always). Responsibility or MHC can be attributed to these agents as follows: if the 
system successfully tracks their reasons, and if agents are responsible for and capable of 
understanding the behaviour that the system exhibits (based on that tracking), and if agents 
are also responsible for the way it acts (based on its tracking of more proximal reasons 
discussed below).
This understanding of MHC is more comprehensive than that of direct operational control 
because it permits the inclusion of supervisory control. Supervisory control sanctions the 
user to supervise an (semi-)autonomous system that is under operational control, yet also 
allows the user to intervene in operations if necessary. At the same time, this form of direct 
supervisory control is not a necessary condition for possessing MHC. In principle, a (fully) 
AWS can be precise, comprehensive, and transparent in tracking the reasons behind the 
decisions of a human agent in lieu of the human ability to intervene in operations. This 
would still meet conditions for MHC.
Distal and Proximal Reasoning
Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven further develop this conception of agent reasoning 
adopted from the philosophy of intent and action (Bratman, 1984; Mele & William, 1992). 
Their development helps in not only specifying types of reasons within complex systems, 
but also better understanding the inner workings of the tracking condition detailed in 
Calvert et al. (2018). Calvert et al. (2018) began by identifying two types of reasons: distal 
and proximal. Proximal reasons are those intentions that adjoin an action in a temporally 
immediate (concurrent) way. For instance, an agent might intend for a system to fire on an 
enemy combatant in order to cover their flank or to prepare for a dynamic breach. Distal 
reasons are longer term intentions or objectives that are formulated in a less immediate 
way. The use of AWS to reduce allied casualties or to increase operational effectiveness, 








(longer term, general objective)
Proximal Reasons 
(concurrent intentions)
• Plan to maximise operation efficiency
• Plan to reduce human casualties
• Intention to fire on acquired target
• Intention to move to exfiltration area
Distal reasons are the overarching intentions that a relevant agent(s) has for desired system 
operations. The concept of direct operational control is naturally aligned and sensitive 
to proximal reasons, wherein a system functions as a consequence of the immediate, 
concurrent intentions of the human agent. If the pilot of a (semi-)autonomous drone does not 
fire on one or more acquired targets, for example, it is because the pilot had no intention to 
do so in that instant. Perhaps the pilot was waiting for more information from ground troops 
or looking for reinforcements. Semi-autonomous systems like these are, to the best extent 
possible, influenced by the proximal reasons of their human users (pilots). Those users are 
thus causally responsible for the use and consequent impacts of a system.7 MHC expands 
the scope of reasons a system must be sensitive to in order to sufficiently satisfy the tracking 
condition. We can assume AWS are likely connected to various other autonomous systems 
(such as satellite tracking, non-lethal support/operational unmanned ground vehicles such 
as DRDO Daksh, information communication technologies, and warning systems). They 
must thus be sensitive to both proximal reasons as well as distal ones. Satisfaction of solely 
proximal reasons (such as firing on target) can sacrifice more general, objective, and distal 
reasons (such as the reduction of civilian causalities). 
Part I of the dissertation discusses this ‘systems thinking’ approach in greater detail. The 
tracking condition, in particular, requires all elements part of any given system(s) to be 
maximally sensitive/responsive to the relevant (moral) reasons of agents whether users or 
otherwise. This means agents are not the only ones who bear the burden of demonstrating 
maximal ability to behave according to patterns of reasoning. Instead, every point of a 
system’s infrastructure must be similarly sensitive. This responsiveness can be framed by 
designers choosing the proper ‘level of abstraction’ (Floridi, 2017) in creating autonomous 
systems based on the context for use to ensure receiver-contextualised explanations and 
transparent purposes (Floridi, Cowls, King, & Taddeo, 2020). An AWS, for example, cannot 
simply respond to user rationale only. It must also conform to legal and social norms, such 
as international humanitarian and human rights law or the laws of armed conflict. Mecacci 
and Santoni de Sio (2019) explicitly argue that, although the tracking condition requires the 
system to respond to human reasoning and not to other vectors in the system, social and 
legal norms reflect the intentions and reasons of supraindividual agents (e.g., organisations, 
companies, and states) (Mecacci & de Sio, 2019, 4). 
7  This is debatable, given the types of information fed upwards to the user through target acquisition and filtering systems 




The implications of their approach are not insignificant as they appear to run contra the 
intuition that greater autonomy entails less MHC. AWS themselves are composed of systems 
(e.g., for targeting acquisition, payload delivery, information communication technology, 
vehicle platforms, and so on). These are then integrated to form new systems (e.g., battalions, 
corps, the army, the military, etc.). The task of integration requires a comprehensive and 
ubiquitous design that permits all systems to be maximally sensitive. Sensitivity goes 
beyond end user intentions and reasons for action to include societal norms as well as 
legal statutes and policy. As already stipulated, this means having a more stringent notion 
of what constitutes MHC. But a more stringent notion permits increased levels of autonomy 
through increased control over the system by means of design decisions and regulatory 
infrastructure. MHC can be achieved if systems are maximally responsive to the intentions 
of agents beyond end users, such as the designers, companies, and states in general. 
2.5 DISTRIBUTED MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Like Santoni de Sio et al., Ekelhof (2019) touches on the role of designers. Like Leveringhaus, 
he also focuses on technical targeting procedure. But Ekelhof (2019) frames MHC as a 
function of military operations practice that both supports and constrains targets in 
operational areas. Operations necessarily constrain the ‘autonomy’ of systems such as 
AWS, just as with human soldiers. The notion of ‘full’ autonomy is not actually full in the 
sense that is often implied in discussions on autonomous weapons systems. Autonomy is 
always restricted by various operational decisions and planning a priori to deployment and 
operations. 
Ekelhof begins by using a case of conventional air operations to frame human operational 
involvement in a dynamic targeting process. The case illuminates the role of human agent 
decision-making within distributed systems, providing steps for decision-making about 
military planning and operational function. Outlining practices that contextualise the use 
of AWS, these steps are helpful for both policymakers and theorists. Characterising the 
human role in military decision-making, Ekelhof iterates a six part (pre-operational) briefing 
package followed by a six step landscape for mission execution. I briefly summarise these 
parts and steps below. 
Pre-Mission
The Briefing
At this point, the air component is given mission execution information. Such information is 
oftentimes highly detailed in terms of “target location, times, and munitions”, but also less 
detailed when we consider dynamic targeting in situ (Ekelhof 2019, 345). Information is 
distributed to specialists in various areas for operations who then engage in more detailed 
planning. The executers of the mission, in this case fighter pilots, are then brought in. Pilots 




any last-minute preparations. Ekelhof (2019, 345) outlines the following six components, all 
of which should be included in the briefing package: 
1. A description of the target (such as a military compound) consisting of all available 
knowledge; 
2. Target coordinates; 
3. A collateral damage estimation (CDE) to provide the operator with an idea (not 
certainty) of anticipated collateral damage (NATO, 2016). In this case, the risk of 
collateral damage is low as long as predetermined mitigating techniques are applied; 
4. Recommendations for the quantity, type, and mix of lethal and nonlethal weapons 
needed to achieve desired effects (i.e., a weaponeering solution; see USAF, 2017). 
Our example requires GPS-guided munitions;
5. The joint desired impact, which is used as a standard to identify aim points; and
6. The weather forecast. In our case, it will be an overcast night (clouds covering most 
or all of the sky) and heavy rainfall. 
Coupled with other information such as the rules of engagement, the operator can then 
depart and execute the mission. 
In Situ Operations
Step 1: Find
Intelligence and data are required to locate the target of operations. In this case, the target 
is pre-programmed into the navigation systems of both the fighter jet and the payload. 
Whereas a dynamic target requires in situ data collection, here the task involves arriving at 
the pre-programmed “weapons envelope (i.e., the area within which the weapon is capable 
of effectively reaching the target)” (Ekelhof 2019, 345). This process is displayed on the 
operations heads up display (HUD). 
Step 2: Fix
Once the operator arrives within the weapons envelope, onboard systems aim to positively 
identify the target that was confirmed during operational planning. This ensures payload 
delivery complies with relevant military and legal norms (e.g., NATO, 2016). In this case, 
targets were pre-planned and confirmed so the operator typically does not engage in 
visual confirmation of positive target identification. Instead, the operator relies on onboard 
systems and the validation that took place during operational planning to ensure the 
identified target is lawfully engaged. Even in this fixed case of pre-planning, the human 
pilot is not required to attend to anything else during this phase other than arrival within the 
weapons envelope (Ekelhof 2019, 345-346). 
Step 3: Track
The operator tracks the target within the weapons envelope to ensure continuity of positive 




event of a static target (a military compound, in this case), tracking is relatively straightforward 
and involves simply entering into the weapons envelope (Ekelhof 2019, 346).
Step 4: Target
During this phase, the rules of engagement, laws of armed conflict, and other relevant 
bodies of regulation are invoked to ensure lawful targeting and deployment. Reference to 
rules also ensures other considerations, such as for issues related to collateral damage or 
the risk factors incurred by forces. Once again, in this predetermined and validated target 
case, the legal and military experts who vetted the target permit the pilot to simply input 
relevant data into the vehicle and weapons payload delivery systems to ensure proper 
execution. Given the visual impairment of weather conditions in this case, further collateral 
damage estimates cannot be attained as no visual confirmation is possible. Because 
pre-mission planning determined low estimates for collateral damage, and because that 
planning was conducted according to governing norms, the human pilot need not actively 
participate or intervene beyond piloting the vehicle into the weapons envelope (Ekelhof 
2019, 346). 
Step 5: Engage
Once the operator enters the designated weapons envelope, the onboard computer 
suggests the most opportune time to release the payload for maximum effectiveness (based 
on computer knowledge of the capabilities of the equipped weapons systems). Since the 
payload system is guided by GPS, there is no need for any other forms of targeting based 
on visual identification. Once weapon release is authorised by the pilot, the munitions guide 
themselves to the target (Ekelhof 2019, 346).
Step 6: Assess
At this point, the task becomes assessing the damage that resulted from the previous stage 
and determining the effects of the strike. A pilot’s visual assessment can be impaired by 
many different factors (weather conditions, in this case). Visual assessments of collateral 
damage from the vantage point of a pilot may likewise fail to accurately reflect the efficacy 
of the strike and its consequences. For aerial engagements, ground support forces may be 
needed to assess the engagement more accurately (Ekelhof 2019, 346).
When considering MHC, then, it appears most of the work underlying each step falls 
outside the control of the pilot. This is representative of contemporary aerial operations in 
general. Although the pilot is seen as in direct operational control for some of the operation, 
such as piloting the craft to the weapons envelope and engaging in weapons release, 
this type of control is not meaningful in a sufficient sense. Here, the pilot arguably lacks 
‘cognitive clarity and awareness’ of the situation they are engaging with (Article 36, 2015). 




and awareness that might be deemed sufficient or substantial in a meaningful way. It could 
be argued that the operator possesses MHC only because they were briefed pre-mission 
and knew the details of the operations (such as the target, the weapon’s payload, and the 
estimated damage). To that end, various actors within the hierarchy must share some level 
of trust in the lawful validation of briefing details and targets as well as in the normative 
compliance of their engagement.
These discussions at the pilot level can provide some future insight both for operations 
using AWS and contemporary aerial vehicles. But Ekelhof argues that such discussions 
focus on the wrong subject (i.e., the operator). Instead, they should focus on how the military 
can possess MHC over targeting operations as an organization. He believes that current 
international discussions related to AWS focus overly much on the deployment stage of 
AWS and their relations to operators, thus positioning the nexus for MHC between those 
two agents. In doing so, discussions overlook the larger covariance of the division of labour 
between agents within the military body that forms the decision-making process. The 
steps outlined above, particularly the pre-mission briefing stage with its collateral damage 
and proportionality assessments, are largely ignored (as echoed by Roorda, 2015 in 2.1 
above). Ekelhof concludes that a distributed notion of MHC is necessary to more accurately 
account for the various decisions and procedures that different agents engage in prior to 
deployment as part of a larger process. 
For this reason, different agents have different levels of control over any given vector in 
the process. Any sufficient conception of MHC must reflect this variation in both agent 
and control. Such a concept would not negate the role played by human operators, of 
course. Rather, it would position human operators as part of a larger distributed network 
for decision-making. Here, ‘full autonomy’ is not full in the sense that is commonly intuited; 
it is necessarily constrained by the larger apparatus within which it forms a part. This 
observation reflects the point made by Santoni di Sio et al., which is that tracking alone 
does not necessarily entail MHC. MHC must be located post-deployment with the end 
user, but also with designers and CEOs as well as supraindividuals such as companies, 
organisations, and states (i.e., the military).8 This echoes (and Ekelhof repeats it as well) the 
Defence Science Board’s statement that “there are no fully autonomous systems just as 
there are no fully autonomous soldiers, sailors, airmen or Marines” (USSB, 2012, 23).
3 CONCLUSIONS
This introduction provides a short overview of the growing literature on meaningful human 
control, particularly as pertains to AWS. I have presented five different conceptual framings 
for MHC appearing within the literature. Each framing shares some similarities, but all are 
markedly different in the loci of their focus on how MHC might be achieved in these types 





of systems. Roorda (2015) looks at how MHC can be achieved through closer examination 
of the flow of targeting procedures within these systems (2.1). Ekelhof (2019) takes a more 
meta-level approach, scrutinising the overall targeting and decision-making apparatus of the 
military body (2.5). Asaro (2012) employs a more technical line of inquiry, positioning MHC 
as a function of agent ability to intervene in near-term decision-making (2.2). Saxon (2016) 
aims at a similarly agent-centric approach by proposing proper commander training on the 
use and capabilities of these types of systems to close the responsibility gap. Leveringhaus 
(2016) and Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven (2018) take markedly different approaches to 
looking at the moral responsibility of designers as collaborators within the military sphere. 
Both focus on how they design these systems. They also look at tracking and tracing the 
moral reasons of relevant agents within the design and use of these systems. Although 
there may be a tendency to look at these different approaches as mutually exclusive, their 
differences highlight areas that actually bolster each approach. As this dissertation aims to 
create a more holistic conception of MHC that can be adopted to confront imminent issues 
with these emerging systems, the sections that follow will adapt many of the technical and 
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ANNEX II: VALUE SENSITIVE DESIGN AND 
RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION – A LITERATURE 
REVIEW
1 METHODS
As mentioned in the introduction, this literature review is written according to a more 
comprehensive guide on dissertation writing that Randolph (2009) explores in Practical 
Assessment, Research and Evaluation. Although I considered other strategies for 
conducting the literature review, I noticed Randolph’s guide captured overlapping tools 
and strategies. I thus decided to adopt this more comprehensive approach. The guide sets 
out a strategy for producing a satisfactory literature review that normally takes six months. 
Given the time allowance for the completion of a doctoral dissertation (as opposed to some 
other project), this approach was carried out in full. Although there are some limitations to 
this review, they are outlined in the inclusion/exclusion criteria described below. 
1.1 Keywords
An iterative abductive process was necessary to identify relevant keywords. The process 
began with creating a prima facie list of potentially relevant keywords. Next, sources using 
those keywords were identified iteratively. Keywords were then modified based on the 
relevance of these sources. Sources that were too specific were reviewed in-depth for 
relevance, while overly general sources were reviewed based on sources that cited them. 
This process was adopted in light of the history and overall volume of literature that would 
have emerged if the set of keywords had been too large. To ensure the quality and relevance 
of selected literature, I chose three keywords that were used either independently or 




design turn, applied ethics
VALUE SENSITIVE DESIGN
universal, inclusive, participatory, VSD, interactional, 
tripartite, conceptual, emperical, technical, 
stakeholders
DESIGN FOR VALUES
human values, objective, relative
FIGURE 1. The three main keywords listed with more expansive keywords underneath. Some sub-
keywords are more specific, while others are more general. This is because certain keywords are 





The coverage of this literature is an “exhaustive review with selective citation” (in Cooper, 
1988 as cited by Randolph, 2009). The aim was to formulate a comprehensive list of 
scholarly articles relevant to ‘value sensitive design’. Due to more than two decades of 
research into the topic, there is a multitude of sources. Many sources discussed theoretical 
conceptions of VSD, and a smaller population of those articles addressed the application of 
VSD. Although this review mentions many of these articles, most are not discussed in depth 
due to the specificity of their content. Instead, the review extracts the literature on VSD as a 
whole to give a broader and more comprehensible understanding of the approach. 
ENGINEERING PHILOSOPHY
VALUE SENSITIVE DESIGN









DESIGN TURN APPLIED ETHICS
DESIGN
FIGURE 2. An innate tension exists within the keywords relevant to the literature chosen for review. 
Given the (trans-)interdisciplinarity of potentially relevant literature, where should a review begin? 
The keywords ‘Value sensitive design’, ‘design for values’, and ‘ethics by design’ are shown in their 
respective groupings. Groupings are located  in their primary umbrella divisions of ‘engineering’ and 
‘philosophy’. The terms ‘universal’, ‘inclusive’, ‘VSD’, and ‘interactional’ fall primarily within the cross 
domain of ‘design’. The terms ‘human values’, ‘objective’, and ‘relative’ fall primarily within ‘philosophy’. 
The terms ‘design turn’ and ‘applied ethics’ then fall within the intersection of ‘engineering’ and 
‘design’. The intersection of ‘Value sensitive design’ falls within the area of overlap between the three 
main branches: the two umbrellas of ‘engineering’ and ‘philosophy’ and their nexus point of ‘design’. 
Given its centrality, this term proved most salient and relevant for identifying sources of literature to 
include here.
1.3 Research Focus
Cooper (1988) outlines four different research focuses that can be emphasised as the 
foundation for literature taxonomy: research methods, theories, application, and research 




overviews and theoretical explorations on what constitutes VSD. Centring this particular 
category of literature will help the reader better understand the theoretical commitments and 
tools underpinning the VSD approach. It can also highlight some conceptual weaknesses, 
which are discussed in Part II of this dissertation. This does not mean the review excludes 
all other categories of VSD literature. On the contrary, Randolph (2009) argues that all 
literature reviews are some amalgamation of different categories. This review draws on 
literature from the other three categories as case studies and examples to further enrich the 
theoretical unweaving of VSD methodology. 
1.4 Inclusions and Exclusion Criteria
Given more than two decades of rich inquiry into the topic, any single review of the literature 
must narrow down the scope of inclusion to sources that best convey both the history and 
state of the art. It must also selectively exclude sources that may be redundant or less-than-
relevant. The following list of criteria for inclusion/exclusion is informed by Randolph (2009): 
1. Only English sources;
2. Only publications in academic journals and books;
3. Only sources from PhilPapers, the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Springer databases (excluding 
patents and citations) and vsdesign.org9; 
4. Only sources that included ‘value sensitive design’, ‘value-sensitive design’ or ‘vsd’ 
in the title, abstract, or as a keyword.10
The stringent nature of these four criteria ensured a more tractable body of literature 
overall. References to only academic journal articles and books further ensured that the 
source material was of a higher quality. 
1.5 Overview of Final Sources
The review looks at literature from 1996 (for publication of the earliest paper on VSD, see 
Friedman, 1996) and December 2020. I identified 417 article and book contributions in total, 
of which only 57 were available. I reviewed and short-listed all 57 contributions based on 
their abstracts and contents. To create the basis for this review, I chose fifteen sources 
that best encompassed and exemplified either the theoretical commitments or practical 
applications of VSD. These sources are listed in Appendix I. Figure 3 below illustrates the 
marked rise in VSD literature spanning the search parameters. 
9 vsdesign.org is a website managed by the Value Sensitive Design Research Lab and its directors Batya Friedman and 
David Hendry, the pioneers of VSD. 
10 Boolean search strings using the keywords ensured fidelity in the results. Relevance weights of a value of ‘3’ were used 
(the keyword must appear at least three times among the search domain parameters) to increase the probability of 










































Value Sensitive Design Publications 1996-2020
FIGURE 3. Value Sensitive Design Publications 1996-2020
Researchers from the University of Washington and the technical universities of Delft and 
Twente often appear in searches and form the bulk of Appendix I. These include Friedman 
(1996), van de Poel (2014), van den Hoven and Manders-Huits (2009), and Vermaas et al., 
(2010) among others. Their works are published primarily in edited collections by Springer 
or in technology journals such as Science and Engineering Ethics, Ethics and Information 
Technology, Philosophy and Technology, engineering journals such as ACM Transactions 
on Computer-Human Interaction, and trade journals from the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE). 
1.6 Research Questions
As mentioned earlier in the research focus section, Cooper (1988) provides guidelines for 
organising and formulating research questions along the four axes of research methods, 
theories, practices, and research outcomes. This literature review focuses primarily 
on theories but incorporates literature that can be arguably assigned to the other three 
categories in support (or as examples of VSD in various domains). Although relevant, my 
own articles on this topic are excluded from this review beyond cursory mentions as the 
relevant ones are reproduced in full in later sections of this dissertation. 
1.6.1  Theories
Q1.1: What is the origin of VSD and why was it developed?




1.6.2  Research methods
Q2.1: What are VSD method(s) and how are they developed?
Q2.2: What makes VSD different than other stakeholder-based approaches to design?
1.6.3  Practices
Q3.1: How successful has the VSD approach been to actual design programs?
Q3.2: Do speculative VSD applications have any tangible boons?
1.6.4  Research outcomes
Q4.1: Do VSD applications to real-world design programs show sustainable results that 
might promote adoption? 
2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
2.1 Theories
Developed in the late 1980s by Batya Friedman and Peter Kahn at the University of 
Washington, VSD grew out of the field of human-computer interaction (HCI) and information 
systems design. It emerged as a theoretically grounded – often termed ‘principled’ – 
approach to incorporating human values into technology design through stakeholder 
elicitation (Friedman, 1996). There is growing adoption of a philosophical stance on human-
technology interaction and relations. This stance argues that technology is neither purely 
deterministic nor value-neutral (instrumental). Instead, it is imbued with values. Many 
stakeholder theories and methods have thus emerged as a consequence of trying to 
design beneficial technologies (Davis and Nathan, 2014; Friedman, 1996; Friedman et al., 
2013a; Manders-Huits, 2011; van den Hoven et al., 2015). Due to its more comprehensive 
consideration of human values, which occurs in the early stages of the design process as well 
as throughout, VSD has gained the most traction over the last two decades (Friedman et al., 
2015, 2013a; Winkler and Spiekermann, 2018). In an abstract, Friedman and Kahn Jr. (2002, 
1) best summarise VSD as “a theoretically grounded approach to the design of technology 
that accounts for human values in a principled and comprehensive manner throughout the 
design process. It employs an integrative and iterative tripartite methodology, consisting of 
conceptual, empirical, and technical investigations.” 
The founders of the approach devised the methodology in response to a longstanding 
need within the HCI community to incorporate human values (which were already of 
significance) into their design programs. Researchers within the HCI sphere had already 
considered values such as privacy (Ackerman and Cranor, 1999; Agre, 1997; Fuchs, 
1999; Jancke et al., 2001; Palen and Grudin, 2003; Tang, 1997), ownership and property 
(Lipinski and Britz, 2000), physical welfare (Leveson, 1991), freedom from bias (Friedman 
and Nissenbaum, 1996), universal usability (Shneiderman, 1999; Thomas, 1997), autonomy 




and Tseng, 1999; Palen and Grudin, 2003; Rocco, 1998; Zheng et al., 2001). However, there 
was no overarching approach that might enable practically minded designers to design for 
human values rather than sidelining them as an afterthought for ex post facto and ad hoc 
additions (Friedman and Kahn Jr., 2002). 
Support for VSD adoption by designers argues that the approach is fundamentally 
predicated in method, aiming to bridge the gap between abstract stakeholder values 
and more tangible design requirements that designers can operationalise through 
design. Descriptive accounts of methods can help designers and theorists systematically 
compare the boons and privations of competing approaches. As with other approaches 
to technological design, VSD methods emerge from underlying theory. They can be used 
reflexively to clarify and strengthen the theory, forming a recursively self-improving design 
practice. 
VSD is grounded in the notion that human values do not exist in isolation from their socio-
cultural contexts. Design programs themselves emerge from, or are situated in, these same 
socio-cultural contexts. Values such as privacy and security can be understood in different 
ways by different people (van den Hoven and Weckert, 2008). This position directs design 
teams to consider human values as part of a larger sociotechnical milieu, inextricably tied to 
situated human practices. It permits a more comprehensive understanding of how technical 
harms and benefits can be understood during design phases through sociocultural 
contextualisation (Friedman et al., 2017a). The following subsection discusses the six11 main 
philosophical underpinnings that help to frame the VSD approach and associated methods: 
1) an interactional stance on technology, 2) a tripartite methodology, 3) stakeholder 
enrollment, 4) engagement with value tensions, 5) consideration for multi-lifespan design, 
and 6) framing design as a program for progress rather than perfection (Friedman and 
Hendry, 2019). 
1. Interactional stance on technology: as mentioned already, the VSD approach rejects 
technological and social determinism along with pure instrumentalism. Instead, it 
adopts a more ontologically relational approach that argues for the co-constitution 
of technology and human values. This means the various entities that enable 
technological function, such as humans, organisations, infrastructure, and cultural 
groups, also design technologies. In turn, technologies influence how those entities 
function as well as the designs of future technologies (i.e., social entities are designed 
by designed technologies). 
11  Friedman et al., (2017) list seven philosophical underpinnings of VSD; the one excluded here is ‘Co-evolving Technology 
and Social Structure’. I excluded it as a discrete tenet of the approach given that it is a direct consequence of 1), the 
interactional stance on technology. This stance argues that understanding technology and society cannot be done 
in isolation. Instead, systems are sociotechnical. Separation of technology from society is a disservice, making our 
understanding ontologically weaker and less comprehensive. Holistic design takes the interactional stance to mean 
design should be cognizant of the fact that technology and society co-evolve with one another, and that each has an 




2. Tripartite methodology: since its inception (Friedman, 1996), VSD has been described 
as composed of three distinct parts or ‘investigations’ (in other words, it is ‘tripartite’). 
In Figure 4 below, the conceptual, empirical, and technical investigations that form the 
tripartite methodology are understood as iterative. This means they are designed to 
feed back onto one another, creating a more robust sociotechnical design (Friedman 
et al., 2017a). 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS
Empirical evaluation of stakeholder values through 
socio-cultural norms and translation into potential 
design requirements
CONCEPTUAL INVESTIGATIONS
Determination and investigation of values from 
relevant philosophical literature and those 
explicity elicited from stakeholders.
TECHNICAL INVESTIGATIONS
Evaluation of technical limitations on the technology 
itself, in terms of how it supports or constrains 
indentified values and deisgn requirements
FIGURE 4. The recursive VSD tripartite framework employed in this study. (Source: Umbrello, 2020a)
Whether beginning with the context of use, the technology, or its value, the three 
investigations integrate philosophical, technical, and empirical approaches to 
stakeholder elicitation and technological design requirements. The integration bridges 
the gap between abstract ethical principles or values and concrete design requirements 
to support those values overall (see Figure 5 below). In short, conceptual investigations 
involve consulting available philosophical and social literature to extract some initial 
values and design considerations (Manders-Huits, 2011). Empirical investigations then 
aim to enroll stakeholders by determining their values and design requirements. This, in 
turn, restructures the conceptual investigations to ensure elicited results map onto the 
findings (van de Poel, 2014b). Technical investigations take the technology itself under 
consideration in order to determine how the physical and/or digital architecture of the 
artifact supports and/or constrains any of those values (Friedman, 1999; Gazzaneo et 
al., 2020). Tensions and design requirements are formed through the integration of 
the three investigations. Integration occurs as each stage iteratively informs the other 
through the design program to create the most robust system overall (van den Hoven 









FIGURE 5. Starting considerations for VSD. Typically, one of the three is most pertinent to any given 
design. (Source: Umbrello, 2021)
3. Stakeholders: stakeholder enrollment is one of the most central distinguishing facets of 
the VSD approach. As part of the process of becoming value-sensitive, consideration 
of ‘what’ values exist in design necessitates further consideration of ‘whose’ values 
are present. Stakeholders have ‘stakes’ in the design and deployment of a technology. 
They are those who will be most affected by design decisions. Designers are obligated 
to enroll the most robust set of stakeholders into the design program, eliciting what 
values are most important to them in order to design for those values (Cummings, 
2006). Designers must explicate the direct stakeholders (such as users) along with 
indirect stakeholders (such as animals, the environment, or other nations) (Friedman et 
al., 2013b). Because designers are making the design decisions, they must likewise be 
explicit about their own values as direct stakeholders. This clarifies how their decisions 
will either support or constrain technical design requirements, and allows them to 
measure bias or take steps to de-bias their design decisions (Davis and Nathan, 2014; 
Umbrello, 2018). 
4. Value tensions: as mentioned above, values are not discrete, isolated entities. Rather, 
there is a mesh of interconnected valuations of what stakeholders deem important. 
This mesh exists at any spatiotemporal point. It also emerges over time. Discussion 
of any given value thus implicates numerous other values and valuations, all of which 
must then be confronted in design. These valuations can and will exist in tension with 
other valuations, whether conceptually or across various scales of human experience. 
Individual valuations can conflict with one another, with groups, and with other 
populations (Friedman et al., 2017a). This is complicated even further as valuations 
across various scales augment over time, making the designer’s task of mapping 




difficult to argue for an objective means by which these tensions might be conclusively 
resolved (through design or otherwise) (Davis and Nathan, 2015, 2014; Umbrello, 2020). 
VSD nonetheless provides a principled approach that first makes these tensions in 
valuations transparent, then helps guide designers through the most salient design 
choices around them. 
5. Multi-lifespan design: because technology and society are inextricably linked and 
interact with one another, the effects of design decisions are described as ‘scaffolding’. 
In other words, they extend into the future and (in many cases) across multiple lifespans. 
Cascading failures of future systems are contingent upon design decisions made in the 
present. Contemporary design decisions must become ever more prescient, making 
considerations early on and throughout design programs. Technology is implicated 
in the propagation of global famine, hunger, and disease. At the same time, it can be 
equally understood as forming part of the solution. To account for systemic effects 
across multiple lifespans, decisions surrounding technology design must be robust 
and inclusive. As Friedman et al., (2017) succinctly put it, the multi-lifespan perspective 
in VSD encourages “new opportunities for preserving knowledge, supporting 
social structures and processes, remembering and forgetting, and re-envisioning 
infrastructure to support inclusivity and access” (8). 
6. Progress, not perfection: the difficulty designers face when navigating the complexities 
of interconnecting sociotechnical structures and designing for similarly complex human 
values (often in tension) makes design perfection continually elusive. In designing for 
human well-being, design programs must be reframed as guides towards progress. This 
will help provide needed solutions for pressing sociotechnical problems, and avoid the 
pitfalls or lag that may come as a consequence of seeking perfection. Of course, the 
new framing does not exclude a modus operandi of continued improvement. The VSD 
approach simply takes this modus operandi as a fundamental framework for all aspects 
of the methodology. 
2.2 Research Methods
VSD methodology encourages practitioners to engage with and operationalise the 
theoretical constructs underpinning the approach. It also aims for the continual improvement 
of investigations through practice. Similarly, the VSD approach in and of itself is not meant 
to be seen as a discrete or supplementary set of tools for designers to employ in any given 
domain. Instead, the approach is meant to be tailored and integrated into existing design 
environments. This intent increases its overall adoptability value (Friedman and Hendry, 
2019). Over the history of VSD, scholars have proposed many methods and tools as part 
of the approach. In 2017, Friedman et al. proposed fourteen different VSD methods. More 
recently, they added an additional three methods to form a total list of seventeen (Friedman 




In their most recent book Value Sensitive Design: Shaping Technology with Moral 
Imagination, Friedman and Hendry culminate the entirety of VSD history into a single 
opus. The work outlines VSD history, theory, methods, critiques, and responses along with 
potential future research steps (Friedman and Hendry, 2019). In the third chapter, titled 
‘Method’, they provide a useful chart that gives the name of each method accompanied by 
a short overview and key illustrative references. This table is recreated below but, for the 




Purpose: stakeholder identification and legitimation
Identification of individuals, groups, organisations, institutions, 
and societies that might reasonably be affected by the 
technology under investigation and in what ways. There 
are two overarching stakeholder categories: 1) those who 
interact directly with the technology or direct stakeholders, 
and 2) those indirectly affected by the technology or indirect 
stakeholders.
Stakeholder token
Purpose: stakeholder identification and interaction
A playful and versatile toolkit for identifying stakeholders 
and their interactions. Stakeholder tokens facilitate 
identifying stakeholders, distinguishing core from peripheral 
stakeholders, surfacing excluded stakeholders, and 
articulating relationships among stakeholders. 
Value source analysis
Purpose: identify value sources
Distinction between explicitly supported project values, the 
personal values of designers, and values held by other direct 
and indirect stakeholders.
Co-evolve technology and social structure
Purpose: expand design space
Expansion of the design space to include social structures 
integrated with technology, which may yield new solutions 
not possible when considering technology alone. When 
needed, engage with the design of both technology and 
social structure as part of the solution space. Social structures 
may include policy, law, regulations, organisational practices, 
social norms, and others.
Value scenario
Purpose: values representation and elicitation
Narratives (or stories of use) intended to surface human and 
technical aspects of technology and context. Value scenarios 
emphasise implications for direct and indirect stakeholders, 
related key values, widespread use, indirect impacts, longer-
term use, and similar systemic effects.
Value sketch
Purpose: values representation and elicitation
A sketch of activities as a way to tap into the non-verbal 
understandings of stakeholders, their views, and their values 
as relates to a technology
Value-oriented semi-structured interview
Purpose: values elicitation
Semi-structured interview questions as a way to tap into 
stakeholder understandings, views, and values as relates 
to a technology. Questions typically emphasise evaluative 
judgments (e.g., all right or not all right) about a technology 
along with the rationale (e.g., why?) of stakeholders. 
Additional considerations introduced by the stakeholder are 
pursued.
Scalable assessments of information dimensions
Purpose: values elicitation
Sets of questions constructed to tease apart the impact of 
the pervasiveness, proximity ,and granularity of information 









Hierarchically structured categories for coding qualitative 
responses to the value representation and elicitation 
methods. Coding categories are generated from data and a 
conceptualisation of the domain. Each category contains a 
label, definition, and typically up to three sample responses 
from empirical data. Can be applied to oral, written, and visual 
responses.
Value-oriented mock-up, prototype, or field 
deployment
Purpose: values representation and elicitation
Development, analysis, and co-design of mock-ups, 
prototypes and field deployments to scaffold the investigation 
of value implications for technologies that are yet to be 
built or widely adopted. Mock-ups, prototypes, or field 
deployments emphasise implications for direct and indirect 
stakeholders, value tensions, and technology situated in 
human contexts.
Ethnographically informed inquiry on values and 
technology
Purpose: values, technology, and social structure 
framework and analysis
A framework and approach for data collection and analysis 
that uncovers complex, unfolding relationships between 
values, technology, and social structure. Typically involves in-
depth engagement in situated contexts over longer periods 
of time.
Model for informed consent online
Purpose: design principles and value analysis
A model with corresponding design principles for considering 
informed consent in online contexts: ‘informed’ encompasses 
disclosure and comprehension, while ‘consent’ encompasses 
voluntariness, competence, and agreement. Implementations 
of informed consent must not pose an undue burden on 
stakeholders.
Value dams and flows
Purpose: values analysis
An analytical method to reduce the solution space and 
resolve value tensions among design choices. Value 
dams are created by removing options that even a small 
percentage of stakeholders strongly object to from the 
design space. Out of the remaining design options, value 
flows are created from those that a good percentage of 
stakeholders find appealing. These are then foregrounded 
in the design. Analysis can be applied to the design of both 
technology and social structures.
Value sensitive action-reflection model
Purpose: values representation and elicitation
A reflective process for introducing value sensitive prompts 
into a co-design activity. Prompts can be generated by 
designers or stakeholders.
Multi-lifespan timeline
Purpose: priming longer-term and multi-generational 
design thinking
Primes activity for longer-term design thinking. Multi-lifespan 
timelines prompt individuals to situate themselves in a longer 
time frame relative to the present, giving attention to both 
societal and technological change. 
Multi-lifespan co-design
Purpose: longer-term design thinking and envisioning
The co-design of activities and processes that emphasise 
longer-term anticipatory futures with implications for multiple 
and future generations. 
Envisioning CardsTM
Purpose: versatile value sensitive design toolkit for 
industry and educational practice
A versatile and value-sensitive toolkit comprised of a set of 
32 cards called the Envisioning CardsTM. Cards are built on 
four criteria: stakeholders, time, values, and pervasiveness. 
Each card contains a title and an evocative image related to 
the card theme on one side. The envisioning criterion, card 
theme, and a focused design activity appears on the reverse. 
Envisioning CardsTM can be used for ideation, co-design, 




In fact, a multitude of methodological approaches could be considered VSD. The 
characteristic differentiating VSD from other methodologies for technology design is that 
it all extends from a set of common premises. First, VSD takes an interactive stance on 
technology and its social-technicity nature, engaging with (direct and indirect) stakeholders 
through the use of a tripartite methodology in an iterative and continually improving manner. 
Second, VSD methods selection depends on the context of development, the technology, 
or some value(s) that need(s) to be designed for. Any given method could satisfy one or more 
of the investigations, but methods are not mutually exclusive. Employment of more than 
one method may be necessary for the successful completion of the approach (Friedman 
et al., 2017a). Third, the various methods are not jointly exhaustive. They provide a solid 
starting point for undertaking a VSD approach, but may need to be substantially modified 
or discarded at some point in the design program as novel values, norms, constraints, and 
design requirements emerge in the context of innovation. To this end, the methods listed 
above should not be understood as static or a priori constrained. They should instead 
be seen as an outline for how to begin – one that is open to transformation.  Finally, VSD 
should not be understood as the design program. It is part of a larger design practice 
within any given context. Hence, VSD is not hegemonic in design contexts; it is applied and 
adopted alongside existing design practices and norms. VSD is considered robust across 
various technical approaches for this reason (Friedman and Kahn Jr, 2007). 
As a good starting point, VSD programs can follow eight considerations provided in 
Friedman et al. (2008) to put this iterative approach into practice12: 
1. Begin by considering a value, a technology, or the context of use. Any one of these 
three core aspects easily motivates VSD. Ideally, a practitioner would begin with the 
one that is most explicitly and obviously critical to the designer’s work or interests.
2. Direct and indirect stakeholders. Systematically identify direct and indirect stakeholders. 
Direct stakeholders are individuals who interact directly with the technology or with the 
technology’s output. Indirect stakeholders are individuals who are also impacted by 
the system, though they never interact with it directly. 
3. Identify harms and benefits for each stakeholder group. Systematically identify how 
each category of direct and indirect stakeholder would be positively or negatively 
affected by the technology under consideration.
4. Map harms and benefits onto corresponding values. Sometimes, the mapping of 
harms, benefits, and corresponding values will be one of identity. Other times, the 
12  The considerations should not be construed as a concrete step-by-step method. The founders of VSD have avoided 
proposing step-by-step waterfall models as well as a high-level stage model for the VSD process. This was purposeful for 
multiple reasons. For one, they propose a revision of engineering methodologies to incorporate VSD commitments and 
methods by stakeholders – engineers or product managers, for example – who own or work with said methodologies. 
They do not believe a competing, alternative, prescriptive process will support adoption and appropriation. From the very 
beginning, Friedman developed VSD for appropriation by engineering and design cultures. A good example of this is 
the IEEE’s Ethically Aligned Design standards report, which is part of their Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and 




mapping will be multifaceted (a single harm might implicate multiple values, such as 
security and autonomy).
5. Conduct a conceptual investigation of key values. Develop careful working definitions 
for each of the key values. Designers draw on philosophical literature in order to 
define these values more accurately and identify potential issues that already exist 
with certain conceptualisations of value. Investigation includes how values can be 
translated into norms, and how norms can then be translated into design requirements 
(and vice versa) (Figure 6).
6. Identify potential value conflicts. For the purposes of design, value conflicts should 
usually not be conceived of as either/or situations. Instead, they should be seen as 
constraints on the design space (van de Poel, 2014b). Typical value conflicts include 
accountability vs. privacy, trust vs. security, environmental sustainability vs. economic 
development, privacy vs. security, and hierarchical control vs. democratisation, among 
others (van den Hoven et al., 2012).
7. Technical investigation heuristic and value conflicts. Technical mechanisms will often 
adjudicate multiple (if not conflicting) values, often in the form of design trade-offs. 
Designers should thus aim to make explicit how a design trade-off maps onto a value 
conflict, as well as the differences in how it affects various groups of stakeholders 
(Umbrello, 2018).
8. Technical investigation heuristic and unanticipated consequences and value conflicts. 
To increase agility in responding to unanticipated consequences and value conflicts, 
flexibility should be designed into the underlying technical architecture in support of 
post-deployment modifications where possible.

















VSD has always focused on the theoretical constructs and speculative applications of 
the methodologies along with their actual application to contemporary technologies. 
For example, Friedman et al. (2002) and Millett et al. (2001) describe the application of 
the tripartite VSD methodology in reference to a model for informed consent online. The 
model enrolls stakeholders in order to determine definitions and design requirements for 
engineering web cookies into the Mozilla browser. 
Acknowledging a lack of consensus around practices to elicit user consent in terms of 
web browser cookies, Friedman et al. (2002) began with the value of informed consent. 
Through conceptual investigations, they went on to refine its definition as comprised of 
five conceptual components: disclosure, comprehension, voluntariness, competence, 
and agreement. With these conceptual components, they investigated how stakeholders 
interact with web browsers and the role that cookies play in practices. They concluded with 
eight design principles to help both users and designers achieve fidelity in their use and 
design of web browsers. Fidelity is defined in terms of attaining proper informed consent. 
The eight principles are summarily listed as follows: 
1. Decide  whether  the  capability  is exempt  from informed consent;
2. Take particular care when invoking the sanction of implicit consent for web-based 
interactions.;
3. Note that defaults matter (i.e., the defaults of how a system comes to a user);
4. Put users  in  control  of  the  “nuisance  factor” (allow users to micro-manage their 
consent controls);
5. Avoid technical jargon;
6. Provide  user s with choices in  terms of potential effects rather than in terms of 
technical mechanisms;
7. Conduct field tests to help ensure adequate comprehension and opportunities for 
agreement. (e.g., Value-oriented mock-up, prototype, or field deployment); and
8. Design proactively for informed consent.
A similar co-design approach to phone safety was undertaken by Yoo et al., (2013) through 
designer and stakeholder prompts using Envisioning CardsTM  (see Figure 7). This approach 
allows for collaborative co-design between police offers, homeless youth, and services 




FIGURE 7. Envisioning Card (Source: Umbrello, n.d.)
The VSD approach to technology design has not remained solely within the realm of 
applications for contemporary technologies. It has gone beyond amelioration of problematic 
existent technologies, such as energy infrastructure (Mouter et al., 2018; Oosterlaken, 
2015), to speculative future technologies. Many speculative future technologies, including 
nanotechnology (Timmermans et al., 2011; Umbrello, 2019) and artificial intelligence 
(Umbrello and De Bellis, 2018; Umbrello and van de Poel, 2021), have received an 
abundance of attention from technical specialists and philosophers. Attention has also 
fallen on predictions for the sociocultural and ethical impacts these technologies will have. 
Current, more restricted forms of these technologies are already creating ethical tensions. 
For this reason, the imperative to guide their development towards beneficial ends has also 
garnered substantial attention (e.g., King et al., 2019; Umbrello and Baum, 2018). 
For example, Timmermans et al. (2011) take nanopharmacy as their object of study. 
Nanopharmacy is the use of nanotechnology and nanomaterials for pharmaceutical 
applications. Although some nanomaterials and technologies are already employed in 
medicine, the technologies addressed here are speculative: Lab-on-a-Chip or Doctor-in-
a-Cell technologies. The former are miniature metric devices that can be implanted in a 
patient to give accurate, real-time, tailored measurements of variables in relation to blood 
cells and genomes. Similarly, Doctor-in-a-Cell technologies are miniature interventions 
acting as “a molecular medical team that can be injected into a patient, coursing through 
his bloodstream [to] treat [medical problems]” (Casci, 2004; Timmermans et al., 2011). Like 
most nano, bio, information, and cognitive sciences (NBIC) technologies, they exist across 
multiple dimensions and blur the line of discrete practices. Medicine becomes intermingled 
even more closely with information and communications technology, which means values 
such as safety and privacy become just as blurred. Timmermans et al. propose a VSD 




across disciplines, arguing that a VSD approach is necessary for the attainment of robust 
and salient design.
In a paper published in the International Journal of Technoethics, I likewise argue that VSD 
methodology is particularly potent for designing safe ‘atomically precise’ manufacturing 
(also known as molecular manufacturing or molecular fabricators) (Umbrello, 2019). 
Given the potential harms that advanced nanotechnology can have, which I describe 
elsewhere (Umbrello and Baum, 2018), I argue that the VSD approach can be adopted in 
current nanotechnology design practices. Adoption occurs by designing for four specific 
principles: proportionality, security, safety, and accessibility. While ‘atomically precise’ 
manufacturing is highly speculative, precursor technologies that provide the scaffolding for 
such technological advances can take these values into account. Decisions about physical 
and digital archetecture for current iterations of scaffolding technologies create elements 
of support and constraint for subsequent technological developments. To this end, VSD 
should not be understood as discretely applicable towards only future ‘atomically precise’ 
manufacturing technologies. The VSD approach also applies to technologies that form its 
baser elements.
The same goes for artificial intelligence technolgies, which bear closer consideration here 
given the subject of this dissertation. In the edited collection Artificial Intelligence Safety and 
Security (2018), both Angelo de Bellis and myself published an article proposing the VSD 
approach as a particularly apt methodology in intelligent agent design (Umbrello and De Bellis, 
2018). Whereas Aimee van Wynsberghe applied a modified version of VSD to care robots in 
her doctoral dissertation (Van Wynsberghe, 2013), we took her example in a more general 
application to increase the adoption of the VSD approach given the urgency of in progressus 
AI technologies. Arguing that current practices in AI development tend to be isolated to the 
decisions of designers and associated organisations, closed off from stakeholder enrollment, 
we call for a more situated and contextually based design approach to AI systems. Such 
systems have a distributed impact beyond direct stakeholders (designers and corporations). 
Valuation thus shifts away from a solely economic determinant towards a more harmonised 
amalgamation of human values such as privacy, safety, autonomy, and justice. 
As mentioned, Aimee van Wynsberghe investigated the potential for integrating ethics into 
care robotics via implementation of a tailored form of VSD that she calls Care Centered Value 
Sensitive Design (CCVSD). The normative basis for her research shows how this tailored 
form of VSD is specific to the health and care sector by drawing upon traditional values that 
currently characterise healthcare (Van Wynsberghe, 2013). Her application illustrates how 
the VSD approach can be integrated into existing and developing frameworks. Successful 
integration means accounting for existing values, which she does. In doing so, she 




accomplishes this by investigating the applicability of the CCVSD methodology to robots 
outside the healthcare domain, pushing the boundaries of the methodology to ascertain the 
limits of its application (Van Wynsberghe, 2016).
2.3.1 Commitments and Tensions
Despite the intentions and outcomes (discussed below) of the approach, VSD has not been 
without its critiques. Perhaps most notably, Davis and Nathan (2014) survey criticism from 
a variety of sources and divide them into four distinct categories that critique the VSD 
assumption of universal values, its ethical commitments, its stakeholder participation, and 
the voices of researchers and participants. 
The traditional formulation of a VSD approach takes the universality of human values as 
a fundamental premise. Although it was never explicitly formulated in such a way, the 
function of VSD allows for reduction in the instantiation of values (or reduces stakeholder 
conceptions into concrete ‘Western’ valuations) (Borning and Muller, 2012). Of course, this is 
a contentious position in both philosophical and anthropological traditions (among others). It 
remains a contentious position within the VSD and design communities as a whole. I myself 
provided a substantial critique of the universalist position and its potential misgivings, and 
offered more practical heuristic tools to help designers avoid cognitive biases that are often 
exacerbated by transformative technologies (Umbrello, 2018). More recently, however, I 
provided a philosophical critique of the VSD assumption of universal values by arguing 
against this tradition and in favor of moral imagination theory (Johnson, 1993; Lakoff and 
Johnson, 2003). Moral imagination theory is a more appropriate moral landscape on which 
to practice VSD, enabling the cultivation of culturally sensitive design requirements (my 
paper is reprinted in full in Part II). 
Because VSD does not prescribe any particular ethical theory while affirming universal values, 
it is open to particularly egregious moral theories such as Nazism (Albrechtslund, 2007). The 
founders argue that the instantiation of various values may be supported by some ethical 
theories (utilitarianism or deontological ethics), but not others (virtue ethical theories) (Friedman 
and Kahn Jr., 2003). This remains a point of contention and debate within VSD discourse. As I 
discuss in the second part of this dissertation, the debate results from VSD reliance on overly 
reductionist moral theories such as deontology, virtue ethics, or utilitarianism.
Scholars have also criticised stakeholder elicitation and participation, along with sufficient 
representation of stakeholder and designer voice throughout the design process, as a 
fundamental element of the approach. The a priori determination of relevant stakeholders, 
whether direct and indirect, has been subject to critique (Davis and Nathan, 2014; Manders-
Huits, 2011). So, too, has the emergence of values from those elicitations (Borning and Muller, 




that are often nebulous and cross domain is difficult. Likewise, it is challenging to identify 
technical means that elicit populations adequately enough to ensure an overall design 
that takes all affected stakeholders into sufficient consideration. To be fair, heuristic tools 
have been proposed and implemented with the aim of widening the scope of stakeholder 
analysis and range of enrollment; tools such as  Envisioning CardsTM are intended to de-
bias those elicitations (Friedman et al., 2017b; Friedman and Hendry, 2012). Other heuristic 
tools have been developed to de-bias the cognition of both designers and stakeholders 
during empirical elicitations (Umbrello, 2018). Yoo (2017) develops stakeholder tokens, for 
instance, to identify impacted groups and relationships between stakeholders that may have 
been overlooked. This is a promising avenue for envisioning marginalised or otherwise 
overlooked stakeholders both early on and throughout design programs. 
The same might be said for the voices of researchers and participants, as well as how a 
design program considers their expression. Borning and Muller (2012) hold a view similar to 
that of the anthropologist Donna Haraway, which argues that the position of the researcher 
as a disembodied unit (i.e., the gods-eye perspective) must be criticised for its more 
hegemonic tendencies in making design decisions. Instead, the designers themselves 
should be seen as a dynamic entity as much as any other stakeholder in the design program. 
My critique of the moral commitments of VSD in Imaginative Value Sensitive Design: Using 
Moral Imagination Theory to Inform Responsible Technology Design (Umbrello, 2020b) 
suggests a situated approach to determining how the designer implicates themselves as a 
stakeholder and influences design decisions (beyond simply imputing requirements elicited 
from stakeholder populations). 
Finally, in their most recent work on VSD, Friedman and Hendry acknowledge criticism 
from the last two decades as well as developments towards a more holistic account of VSD 
and its methods. Ultimately, they leave most of the work on moral theorising and ethical 
commitments to future research avenues for scholars to tangle out. To some extent, my own 
work has aimed to do that (and I hope this dissertation further contributes to that objective). 
What moral theory, if any, should provide the foundation for the VSD approach? How do we 
sufficiently incorporate all stakeholders who are impacted by the technology, and how do 
we form complete population sets of those stakeholders? How does VSD impact (or how 
is it impacted by) policy and policy innovation? Given the ecological crises we are facing, 
which I discussed in greater depth in Umbrello (2018b), how do we account for the values 
of nonhuman (i.e., animal) stakeholders and the environment? All of these questions remain 
unanswered but deserve attention. 
 
In sum, design teams have successfully adopted the VSD approach for existing technologies 
as well as the development and deployment of new iterations, such as web browsers and 




technology innovations, such as advanced nanotechnology and artificial intelligence 
systems, can be designed so as to map onto human values (rather than designing human 
values ex post facto). This does not mean that VSD is without misgivings or critiques. 
Whether in terms of its commitment to universal values, its privation of commitment to 
a single or comprehensive moral theory, its lack of guidance in determining the most 
comprehensive set of relevant stakeholders, or its inability to ensure that their voices are 
adequately considered throughout the design phases remain marked points of research 
interest. Each of these points is of great importance to the efficacy and adoptability of VSD. 
2.4 Research Outcomes
As discussed above, the VSD approach has been developed theoretically from philosophical 
and methodological perspectives. This has unfolded both conceptually and through 
practice over the last two decades since its conception. Scholarly literature has explored 
VSD applications ranging from real-world contemporary technologies such as web browser 
cookies (Millett et al., 2001) and IT systems for customs agencies (Vermaas et al., 2010) 
to more speculative technologies such as autonomous agents (Umbrello and De Bellis, 
2018; Umbrello and van de Poel, 2021) and nanotechnology (Umbrello, 2019). However, the 
practice of VSD was never intended to only apply to early stages and during the design 
program. To ensure compliance and the ability of the artifact to respond to emerging values, 
it must also be applied post-deployment. To this end, I conclude the literature review in 
this subsection with illustrations of sustainable results from VSD programs. The remaining 
paragraphs describe an example of an artifact that was developed using the VSD approach, 
detailing its successes and challenges post-deployment.
 
Perhaps the longest lasting product developed from a VSD approach is UrbanSim, a 
“simulation system that models the development of urban areas over periods of twenty or 
more years” (Borning et al., 2004). The system is described on its website as software that 
leverages state-of-the-art urban simulation, 3D visualisation, and shared open data to 
empower users to explore, gain insights into, and develop and evaluate alternative 
plans to improve their communities. UrbanSim is a simulation platform for supporting 
planning and analysis of urban development, incorporating the interactions between 
land use, transportation, the economy, and the environment. (“UrbanSim,” n.d.). 
Created by Paul Waddell at the University of Washington, Borning et al. (2004) aided in 
the development of the technology by adding a participatory tool between designers and 
stakeholders. This tool determines the long-term impacts and alternatives in urban design 
projects. Using the VSD approach, Davis et al. (2006) formulated a list of goals to direct the 
design of UrbanSim: 
• Improve system functionality by developing new tools for stakeholders to learn 




• Support citizens and other stakeholders in evaluating alternatives with respect to 
their own values. 
• Enhance system transparency with respect to its design, assumptions, and limitations 
– so it is not a black box. 
• Contribute to system legitimacy by providing information that is credible and 
appropriate to the context for use. 
• Foster citizen engagement in the decision-making process by providing tailored 
information and opportunities for involvement. 
At the time of research and during early deployment of the software, its success spread out 
across five regions in the United States: Eugene/Springfield, Oregon; Honolulu, Hawaii; Salt 
Lake City, Utah; Houston, Texas; and the Puget Sound region, Washington (Borning et al., 
2004). To date, adoption has spread across three continents and four additional countries 
encompassing Vancouver, Canada; Paris, France; and Johannesburg, South Africa. As a 
consequence, “over 51.7 million people live in areas covered by regional plans informed by 
UrbanCanvas Modeler and over 81.8 million people live in areas covered by regional plans 
informed by UrbanSim” (“UrbanSim,” n.d.). 
Although only a single illustration as to VSD efficacy and distribution has been provided 
here, it captures the consequences of VSD use: from its initial spatio-temporal location, 
the technology has since been distributed across sociocultural boundaries. For this 
reason, technological design must be fundamentally predicated on stakeholder voice 
and participation. Designing artifacts with those elicited values is critical. UrbanSim is a 
prime example of how such technologies construct lived environments. As such, they 
influence what comes after, how people interact, and how those environments will support 
or constrain the values of those who are bound to them. The continued adoption and 
distribution of UrbanSim is a testament to its adoptability and salience among stakeholders 
who participated in designing their urban environments – and, as a consequence, the 
approach used to design such a system. 
3 CONCLUSION 
More traditional design programs seek to create technologies by positioning economic 
values, such as efficiency and productivity, as the primary vectors. Value sensitive design 
moves away from this traditional conception to re-center the human as the vector from 
which design should emerge. This puts ecological and human values (even those of future 
generations) at the center of design programs rather than circumscribing them to ad hoc 
and post hoc additions. This literature review aims to distill foundational works in VSD to 
provide the reader with a thorough (albeit non-exhaustive) guide to how the VSD approach 
developed, its theoretical and methodological underpinnings, the projects that have 
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AN ONTOLOGY FOR ENGINEERING
2
Systems Thinking is a mixed bag of holistic, balanced and often abstract thinking to 
understand things profoundly and solve problems systematically ― Pearl Zhu
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although technological innovations have always played a key role in military operations, 
autonomous weapons systems (AWS) are receiving asymmetric attention both in public 
debate as well as academic discussions – and for good reason (Kania, 2017). These systems 
are designed to carry out tasks that were once exclusive to the domain of human operators. 
Questions regarding their autonomy and potential recalcitrance have sparked discussions 
that highlight a potential accountability gap between their use and who, if anyone, should 
be held accountable. At an international level, discussions regarding how to exercise 
control over the development and deployment of these autonomous military systems have 
been ongoing for over a decade. There remains very little consensus as to what constitutes 
a sufficient level of control. 
In this debate, the concept of meaningful human control (MHC) emerged to encompass an 
ideal of human control over autonomous systems. Various approaches have been taken to 
define a sufficiently complete notion of MHC that ranges from technical requirements (Arkin, 
2008), proper training for use (Article 36, 2015; Asaro, 2009), designer-user engagement 
(Leveringhaus, 2016), and operations planning (Ekelhof, 2019) to design requirements and 
the responsibility of designers (Mecacci & Santoni de Sio, 2020; Santoni de Sio & van den 
Hoven, 2018). Each of these approaches provides insight into how to attain or understand 
MHC over these types of systems. Although they are generally seen as isolated frameworks 
for attaining MHC, they all share some underlying precepts. Approaches that emphasise 
operational planning and the military context for use, as applied by Ekelhof (2019), provide 
a strong contextual landscape for understanding MHC. Other approaches that focus on 
design histories, the intentions and plans of designers, or the responsibility of designers 
and supraindividual agents, as described in Santoni de Sio et al. (2018;2019), provide cogent 
arguments for designing these systems with backward- and forward-looking responsibility. 
Still, they largely focus on a single level of abstraction at the opportunity cost of other levels. 
This chapter employs the concepts of systems theory as a theoretical lens, and systems 
engineering as an applied lens. Together, the two lenses provide an ontology for 
understanding MHC across these levels of abstraction. But the chapter also understands 
these concepts as a motivating factor for adoption of the VSD approach to design 
methodology for MHC. In doing so, it provides a more coherent and explicit ontology of 
engineering. The following chapters will then use this ontology to construct a two-tiered 
approach to understanding MHC – one that marries these often-isolated projects to arrive 
at a definition. It does not make sense to divorce discussions of AWS from actual and 
often trivial military operations; AWS exist within this landscape, not outside of it. One must 
therefore situate these systems within their operational context (Operational Level) to 




when it comes to determining the responsiveness of a system to the relevant moral reasons 
of relevant agents, the design question is still important (Design Level). Part I outlines how 
the coupling of these levels of abstraction can account for technical full autonomy of certain 
types of AWS. This account not only resolves many of the issues regarding (fully) AWS, but 
actually provides the key to achieving MHC.13
2.2 SYSTEMS THINKING 
2.2.1 WHY AN ONTOLOGY OF SYSTEMS?
The term systems theory is prima facie self-explanatory. But a definition of its meaning 
merits mentioning why a dissertation conceptualising a theory of MHC and its application 
(i.e., design) warrants any discussion of more abstract ontology. There are multiple reasons 
for drawing an ontology. To begin, the primary reason for adopting systems theory as 
the ontological framework for this investigation is that it (implicitly) characterises the two 
levels of abstraction for understanding MHC discussed in the chapters that follow along 
with Annex I. The operational level of control is characterised by a plurality of actors and 
networks that complicates, yet also constitutes, how military operations are structured, 
planned, and carried out. Likewise, the design level of control is fundamentally built on the 
notion of tracking and tracing networks of systems and actors both in the use and in the 
design histories of those systems. 
Secondly, systems theory is the theoretical framework from which systems engineering 
derives. As discussed in the next subsection, systems engineering developed in the domain of 
defence. It is essentially the practical and managerial implementation of a systems thinking14 
ontology. Aside from the obvious congruency between systems engineering and systems 
thinking within the military sphere, VSD exists as a sort of parallel approach to systems 
thinking design methodology. As discussed in more detail in Annex II, VSD is fundamentally 
predicated on a systems thinking approach to design. Affirming an interactional stance 
on technology, VSD acknowledges that technology and societal forces co-construct and 
co-vary with one another (Friedman et al., 2017). As a result, technology is neither purely 
deterministic nor instrumental –nor is society wholly constructivist. Rather, various actors, 
institutions, technologies, and their design histories form complex yet important networks of 
interaction. These relationships need to be brought to the fore for salient and responsible 
innovation to take place. 
13  It should be noted that the argument forwarded by this chapter (and dissertation more broadly) does not advocate for the 
development of (fully) AWS. Rather, it focuses on the notion of control over certain types of AWS given how current military 
operations actually function as well as how design practices contribute to control. At the very least, this section aims to 
highlight a potential gap that theorists and policy-makers can address when formulating their own arguments on if/how 
AWS are ethically problematic and whether certain types of AWS should be prohibited. 
14  The term ‘Systems Thinking’ here is used in the verbial sense, that is, conceptualizing things in terms of systems, or, more 
poignantly, within the axioms of systems theory. 
2 2
ACCOUNTS OF MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL
93
This is the substrata that underlies the coupling of two levels of abstraction for understanding 
MHC. Exploration of (fully) AWS and the use of VSD to design for MHC is necessary. Such 
exploration provides a landscape in which diverse moral universes from different societies 
and cultures (each with their own moral traditions and heritage) can come together in good 
faith for discourse on how to confront AWS. Here, systems thinking is the philosophical 
precept motivating most engineering programs across the globe along with their more 
specific military domains. It thus serves as the engineering Rosetta Stone for coupling the 
two levels of abstraction to understand MHC for fully AWS. Likewise, its substructure is the 
common thread unifying this conception of MHC and the VSD approach to designing for 
such control.
2.2.2 ORGANISATION, CONNECTION, AND COMPLEXITY
Systems theory is broadly understood as an interdisciplinary study of organised and 
complex systems (Whitchurch and Constantine 2009). A system can be understood as a 
connected cluster of both co-constitutive and co-varying parts that may be synthetic and/
or biological. Systems are understood as fundamentally constrained by spatiotemporal 
vectors, altered by their context or environment, and defined by their architecture and 
teleology (the latter of which is expressed through operation) (Adams et al. 2014). To this 
end, systems are often characterised as being more than the sum of their constituent parts 
if they express emergent behavior (Dudo et al. 2011; Wan 2011) or synergy (Haken 2013). 
Alteration at any given node(s) of a system can result in alteration at other node(s) as well 
as the resulting emergent behavior (if any). One of the aims of systems theory is to map out 
patterns of behavior for these complex systems to better predict future behavior based on 
environmental inputs. 
This is particularly true for systems that adapt and learn (i.e., machine learning) from their 
environmental context (Ivanov 1993). Similarly, systems can both support and constrain other 
systems to make them more or less robust. Systems theory generally seeks to understand 
the kinetics of systems, their pressures and conditions, and general methods and tools. 
These can be extrapolated to better understand other systems at all levels of recursion 
(Graham et al. 1994) across a variety of fields (i.e., biology, chemistry, ecology, engineering, 
and psychology) with the aim of optimising equifinality (Beven 2006). 
General systems theory (GST) thus aims to develop tools and methods for a general 
understanding of complex systems rather than specific approaches to a single system 
or domain (Von Bertalanffy 1972). GST makes further distinctions between system types 
or, more specifically, between active systems and passive ones. Active systems are 
characterised by structures or components that engage in processes and exhibit active 
behaviour, while passive systems are those structures that are engaged or processed. An 




system when booted and deployed in the field. In other words, any given system can be 
both passive and active at any given spatiotemporal vector. Any given system can also 
be composed of both passive and active systems. This framing is particularly relevant to 
an ontological understanding of complex artificial intelligence (AI) systems, which employ 
what are often considered opaque algorithmic processes that result from hybrid machine 
learning and neural network systems like those being considered for use in AWS (Boscoe 
2019; Turilli and Floridi 2009; Wachter et al. 2017). Given the complexity and need to direct 
optimal systems design, systems engineering becomes particularly relevant to the applied 
domains of this theory. 
2.3 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
Systems engineering then takes the multidisciplinary approach to understanding systems 
and applies it to the understanding, design, management, and deployment of engineered 
systems to ensure optimised equifinality over their lifecycles (Adams et al. 2014; Thomé 
1993). Engineered systems are designed in such a way as to ensure constituent parts work 
synergistically. When they do, emergent behaviours are beneficial. Additionally, systems 
engineering draws on many overlapping human-centric disciplines, such as risk analysis, 
organisational studies, and project management (i.e., paralleling the operations planning of 
Ekelhof’s (2019) conception of MHC) as well as technical disciplines, such as requirements 
engineering, cybernetics, software and electrical engineering, and industrial engineering, 
among others. In doing so, it frames the engineering processes themselves holistically as 
part of the larger system that conditions the project being undertaken. 
As mentioned above, this approach to conceptualising engineering practice originates from 
the defence industry. Since WWII, it has been in continuous (albeit continually morphing) 
use within the defence domain. This is mostly on account of the approach’s performance 
history of mitigating reliability risks where proper systemic function is existential. A direct, 
proportional relationship between project performance and the application of systems 
engineering approaches was demonstrated in a collaborative study between Carnegie 
Mellon University, the Software Engineering Institute, the IEEE Aerospace and Electronic 
Systems Society, and the National Defense Industrial Association (Elm and Goldenson, 
2012). Drawing from systems thinking, systems engineering aims to optimise equifinality by 
approaching the complexity of technologies as dynamic, continually changing systems that 
likewise require co-design and monitoring for their full life cycle (SyntheSys, 2020). 
Full life cycle monitoring and meeting the needs of changing design requirements stems 
from the complexity of dynamic systems as a function of their emergent properties, and thus 
changing values. UK-based information systems engineering firm SyntheSys Technologies 
2 2
ACCOUNTS OF MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL
95
argues that approaching engineering this way “has produced a robust and scientific 
approach to requirements management and verification, a greater focus on the full life 
cycle of a product, and novel modelling techniques for complex emergent behaviour” 
(SyntheSys, 2020). At their core, systems engineering models are predicated on the precept 
that system performance is a consequence of system architecture. This means individual 
nodes, which constitute any given system’s black box of ‘system elements’, form a system 
when assembled in an organised environment. These systems can be clustered into more 
complex networks wherein every given subsystem, which independently constitute a larger 
system of systems, nonetheless functions as a predicate of the emergent performance of 
the whole. This is illustrated in, for example, a military’s information and communications 
technology network or its global logistics systems. Modelling systems this way allows 
designers to emphasise the nuanced interconnections that constitute a system along with 
the relationships and impacts of the system(s) in dynamic environments. It permits greater 
reflexivity to changing needs that result from emergent behaviours, thus helping to better 
predict or specify the complexity of causal relationships. As a consequence, it can address 
the unforeseen or even unforeseeable consequences of system performance in situ. This 
type of modelling, then, is particularly attractive for determining the potential opportunity 
costs of pursuing any given system architecture in any given environment. Once costs are 
evident, it allows for intervention to address any particular issue early on in the design 
process – thus avoiding unnecessary, wanton spending.  
Likewise, coordination and management between modelling domains involved in systems 
engineering are itself part of the ‘system in a system’. These layers are unified through 
uniform systems modelling languages such as SysMLTM, increasing the equifinality of the 
engineers within the system (OMG and SysMLTM 2017; SyntheSys, 2020). This permits more 
accurate integration, verification, and validation of system requirements across separate 
(albeit cooperating) engineering spaces and deployment environments. 
 
2.4 CONCLUSIONS 
On a pragmatic level, systems engineering involves anticipating client needs and specific 
design requirements early on in the development cycle. When this has been achieved, 
engineers can then move on to design synthesis and system validation while continually 
maintaining a holistic picture of the development life cycle of the system (i.e., systems 
thinking). In order to do this successfully, designers must consider all of the potentially 
implicated stakeholders and their values as pertains to the design project. This latter point 
on stakeholders is discussed in greater detail in Part II; it directly aligns with theories of 
responsible innovation and value sensitive design (VSD), in particular (Santoni di Sio et al. 




similar token, systems thinking in general (i.e., systems theory + systems engineering) offers 
a reasonable tool for framing the common ground and need to combine the two levels of 
abstraction to formulate a similarly holistic understanding of MHC.
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MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL 
– TWO APPROACHES 
John: Jesus, you were gonna kill that guy.
The Terminator: Of course; I’m a Terminator
John: ...You just can’t go around killing people.
Terminator: Why?
— Terminator 2: Judgment Day
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3.1 OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF CONTROL 
Ekelhof’s (2019) approach to MHC is predicated on military operational practice, which both 
supports and constrains targets in areas of operations. This method, though it views MHC 
as a function of the role of designers, similar to Santoni de Sio et al., and also of technical 
targeting procedure, as suggested by Leveringhaus (2016), differs in its level of abstraction. 
It focuses on the higher level of organisation and operational control exercised by the 
military as a supraindividual agent. This approach entails that these operational parameters 
necessarily constrain the ‘autonomy’ of any AWS (and this too goes for any human agent 
in the military, such as soldiers). The result is that ‘full’ autonomy—as is often construed in 
discussions on AWS—is not ‘full’ in the sense that is often implied (e.g., self-determining 
agents), but rather is restricted to various operational decisions and a priori planning for 
deployment and operations. 
Ekelhof looks to the case of conventional air operations in order to frame human involvement 
in operations through a dynamic targeting process. By framing the role of human agent 
decision-making within distributed systems, he outlines ways in which policymakers and 
theorists can determine how military planning and operations actually function, and, thus, 
frame the use of AWS within those practices. In his characterisation of the human role in 
military decision-making, he unpacks a six-part briefing package (pre-operation), which is 




Before the mission is undertaken, the air component is briefed with information on mission 
execution, which can either be highly detailed, including information such as “target 
location, times, and munitions”, or less detailed, for example when we consider dynamic 
targeting in situ (Ekelhof, 2019, 345). This information is distributed to the various domains 
of the operation and to specialists, who then vet and use it in order to engage in more 
detailed planning. The executers of the mission (in this case, fighter pilots) are then brought 
in, briefed on the mission details, and take the time to study the information provided, while 
also making any necessary, last-minute preparations for execution. In this briefing package, 
Ekelhof outlines the following six components that can be included: 
1. A description of the target – a military compound – consisting of all available knowledge 
2. A target’s coordinates 
3. A collateral damage estimation (CDE) to provide the operator with an estimation (not 
certainty) of the expected collateral damage (NATO, 2016). In this example, the risk of 




4. A recommendation of the quantity, type, and mix of lethal and nonlethal weapons 
needed to achieve the desired effects (i.e., weaponeering solution) (USAF, 2017). In our 
example, these are GPS guided munitions 
5. The joint desired impact used as a standard to identify aim points
6. The weather forecast that, in this case, describes a night with overcast condition 
(clouds cover either most or all of the sky) and heavy rainfall. (Ekelhof, 2019, 345).
Coupled with other information—such as the rules of engagement—the operator can then 
leave to execute the mission. 
3.1.2 IN SITU OPERATIONS
Step 1: Find
Intelligence and data are required in order to successfully identify the target for an operation. 
In this case, such a target is preprogrammed into the fighter jet’s navigation system as 
well as into the payload’s navigational system. Whereas a dynamic target requires in situ 
data collection, here the task involves arriving at the preprogrammed “weapon’s envelope 
(i.e., the area within which the weapon is capable of effectively reaching the target)”. This 
process is displayed on the operation’s HUD (Ekelhof, 2019, 345).
Step 2: Fix
It is at this stage, once the operator has arrived within the weapon’s envelope, that the 
onboard systems will aim to positively identify the target, which was confirmed during 
operational planning, in order to ensure that payload delivery is compliant with the relevant 
military and legal protocols (cf. NATO, 2016). Given that, in this case, the targets were 
preplanned and confirmed, the operator does not usually engage in visual confirmation for 
positive target identification. Instead, they rely upon the onboard systems and the validation 
process that took place during operational planning to ensure that the identified target is 
lawfully engaged. Therefore, even in this fixed case of preplanning, the human pilot is not 
required to attend to anything else during this phase of the mission other than arriving 
within the weapon’s envelope (Ekelhof 2019, 345-346).
Step 3: Track
The operator tracks the target within the weapon’s envelope to ensure the continuity of 
positive identification and to provide concurrent updates as to the position/status of the 
target. In the case of a static target (e.g., a military compound in Ekelhof’s example), tracking 
is relatively straightforward and involves, like in the fix phase outlined above, simply entering 
into the weapon’s envelope (Ekelhof 2019, 346).
Step 4: Target
During this phase, the relevant rules of engagement (RoE), laws of armed conflict (LoAC), 
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and other relevant targeting rules are invoked to ensure lawful targeting and deployment. 
In addition, other factors are taken into consideration, such as issues relating to collateral 
damage and risk factors posed to one’s own forces. Once again, in this predetermined and 
validated target case, where the target has already been vetted by legal and military experts, 
the pilot is permitted to simply input the relevant data into both the vehicle and weapons 
payload delivery systems to ensure proper execution. In this case, on account of the visually 
impairing weather conditions, no further collateral damage estimates can be provided owing 
to the fact that visual confirmation is not able to be made (even if actively sought). Given that 
the planning at the pre-mission stage had confirmed that collateral damage estimates were 
low, and that this validation was made in-line with the standard protocols that govern such 
decisions, the human pilot does not actively participate or intervene in the mission process 
beyond piloting the vehicle into the weapon’s envelope (Ekelhof 2019, 346). 
Step 5: Engage
At this stage, once the operator enters the designated weapon’s envelope, the onboard 
computer, based on its knowledge of the equipped weapons system’s capabilities, 
suggests to the pilot the most opportune time to release the payload in order to ensure 
its effectiveness. Given that the payload system is GPS guided, there is no need for any 
other forms of targeting based on visual identification. Once weapon release has been 
authorised by the pilot, the munitions guide themselves to the target.
Step 6: Assess
At this point, the task is to assess the damage that resulted from the previous stage and to 
determine the effects of the strike. Naturally, a pilot’s visual assessment may be impaired by 
various factors, such as, in this case, the weather conditions. Likewise, visual assessments 
of collateral damage from a pilot’s vantage point may not accurately reflect the efficacy of 
the strike and its consequences. In the case of aerial engagements such as this, ground 
support forces may be required to allow for a more accurate assessment of the engagement 
(Ekelhof 2019, 346).
3.1.3 OPERATIONAL CONTROL
When considering MHC, then, it appears that most (if not all) of the performance elements 
related to each step of the above process are beyond the pilot’s control, which could be 
argued to be emblematic of contemporary aerial operations in general. Whilst the pilot 
can be said to be in direct operational control of certain aspects of the operation, such as 
piloting the craft to the weapon’s envelope and initiating the weapons release, this type of 
control is arguably not ‘meaningful’, in any sufficient sense, given the pilot’s potential lack of 
‘cognitive clarity and awareness’ of the situation in which they are participating (Article 36, 
2015). This begs the question, then, whether or not the pilot actually does possess sufficient 




Even though discussions at the pilot level may provide some further insight into both 
operations and modern aircraft that employ AWS, they tend to focus on the wrong vector 
(i.e., the operator) rather than emphasising how the military, as a supraindividual agent (i.e., 
an organisation), can maintain MHC over targeting operations. Because of this, the ongoing 
international debate on AWS tends to overly concentrate on the deployment stage of AWS 
and their relationship to the individual operators, thereby attempting to locate the vector 
for MHC between those two agents (AWS-human). In doing so, they ignore the broader 
covariance in the distribution of labour between agents within the military-industrial complex 
that make up the decision-making organ. The steps outlined above, and particularly the 
pre-mission briefing stage with its collateral damage and proportionality assessments, are 
largely sidelined in these discussions. 
What this approach entails, then, is that a distributed notion of agency in MHC is needed to 
accurately account for the numerous decisions and measures that the different agents in the 
broader decision-making mechanism undertake prior to deployment. Accordingly, different 
agents will have different levels of control over any given vector in the process, and any 
sufficient conception of MHC must reflect this. This, of course, does not negate the role that 
human operators play, but rather stresses that they form only a part of the larger decision-
making network. In this sense, ‘full autonomy’ is not full in the commonly understood sense 
but is instead constrained by the larger apparatus of which it forms a part.15
3.2 DESIGN LEVEL OF CONTROL16
The second level of abstraction is drawn from the account of MHC by Santoni di Sio et al 
(Mecacci and de Sio 2020; Santoni di Sio and van den Hoven 2018). Their account differs 
from existing approaches to describing MHC by instead providing a philosophical account 
of MHC, defining it as a covariance between the system’s behavior and an agent’s decisional 
intentions and reasons to act. This entails that systems can be designed in a way that 
permits agents to forfeit some of their direct operational control while still retaining global 
control of the system. This means that greater, not reduced, levels of autonomy (in certain 
cases) may actually permit more comprehensive control of a system. As mentioned in the 
preceding section, more direct operational control does not necessarily constitute being 
‘meaningful’ in the sense that is generally desired with regard to autonomous systems. 
Attaining MHC in their approach allows for clearer lines of accountability to be drawn when 
humans remain ‘in-the-loop’ in relation to these systems, given the fact that tracking the 
relevant reasons behind an agent’s decisions is a necessary condition for MHC. 
15  This echoes, and Ekelhof repeats it as well, the Defence Science Board’s statement that “there are no fully autonomous 
systems just as there are no fully autonomous soldiers, sailors, airmen or Marines” (USSB, 2012, 23).
16  Much of the description provided in this section is adapted from a paper I previously published that similarly recounts the 
account of MHC given by Santoni di Sio et al (Umbrello, 2020).
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Their approach to MHC is functionally comprehensive in its scope, looking not only at 
individual systems but rather at the whole sociotechnical infrastructure of which these 
systems form a part. This means that although the specific design and deployment of 
systems have been implicated as important factors in understanding MHC, they cannot be 
understood in isolation from the infrastructures, organisations, and other agents that are 
inextricably connected to their design, deployment, and use (Umbrello 2020). The approach 
is the design level because it describes how a system can be purposefully engineered to 
facilitate MHC. In other words, MHC becomes a technical design requirement, not only of 
the system itself but also for the relevant sociotechnical infrastructures as well. To do this, 
however, they outline two necessary conditions that must be met: the tracking and tracing 
conditions. Satisfying these two conditions, they argue, permits a more comprehensive 
conception of MHC to take shape, which reaches beyond solely end users and extends to 
agents, such as designers and policymakers, as well as organisations, and sets a level of 
meaningful control and thus clearer lines for attributing responsibility.
3.2.1 TRACKING AND TRACING CONDITIONS 
The tracking condition deals with how responsive a system is to certain actions that are a 
consequence of human reasoning.17 It is more comprehensively defined as: 
First necessary condition of meaningful human control. In order to be under 
meaningful human control, a decision-making system should demonstrably 
and verifiably be responsive to the human moral reasons relevant in the 
circumstances—no matter how many system levels, models, software, or 
devices of whatever nature separate a human being from the ultimate effects 
in the world, some of which may be lethal. That is, decision-making systems 
should track (relevant) human moral reasons. (Santoni de Sio & van den 
Hoven, 2018, p. 7)
The tracing condition is different given that it asks if it is possible to delimit the human 
agent(s) involved in the system’s design and deployment history (e.g., designers, 
manufacturers, users, etc.), who are capable of: (1) understanding the system’s potential and 
(2) can recognise their moral responsibility in relation to a system’s deployment and use 
(i.e., liability of moral consequence). Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven more thoroughly 
define tracing as: 
Second necessary condition of meaningful human control: in order for a 
system to be under meaningful human control, its actions/states should be 
traceable to a proper moral understanding on the part of one or more relevant 
human persons who design or interact with the system, meaning that there 
17  The use of the term ‘reasons’ here is understood as any element that can both prompt and demonstrate human behavior, 




is at least one human agent in the design history or use context involved in 
designing, programming, operating and deploying the autonomous system 
who (a) understands or is in the position to understand the capabilities of the 
system and the possible effects in the world of its use; (b) understands or is 
in the position to understand that others may have legitimate moral reactions 
toward them because of how the system affects the world and the role they 
occupy. (Santoni de Sio & van den Hoven, 2018, p. 9)
MHC, then, is attained by agents who can satisfy both of these conditions. Only then can they 
be said to have MHC over a system. AWS, then, can prima facie be under MHC by an agent 
(or agents) if they are designed to support as much as possible the values of accessibility 
and explicability (explainability and transparency) as manifested in the system’s behaviours. 
If a system is capable of explaining its internal decision-making process (explicability), and 
such systems are themselves transparent (also a factor of explicability), then such a system 
can, at least in theory, be more easily brought under MHC given that an agent’s (or agents’) 
understanding of the system’s use and deployment can be more easily attributed to the 
system’s design architecture. 
With these two necessary conditions, MHC ultimately entails a definition of control that 
is more nuanced and more stringent than operational control, where full direct control is 
demanded. What makes it more stringent than direct control is that it precludes the attribution 
of human control to any system merely because it has an agent ‘in-the-loop’ (e.g., a soldier 
co-commanding a field operation with an AWS). A commander of an AWS, even if they 
have a kill switch, or can visibly see the AWS’s current status and actions, is not necessarily 
equipped to understand why the system does what it does. In such cases, MHC by the end 
user cannot be attained because the tracing condition would not be fulfilled on account of a 
system’s opacity. Although it is true that other agents (e.g., designers, programmers, and/or 
the state’s military institution(s)) may very well understand what is going on in the ‘black box’ 
(though this is not always the case). If the system successfully tracks these agents’ reasons, 
and they are deemed to be responsible for and capable of understanding the behavior that 
the system exhibits based on this tracking, and also for the way it acts based on its tracking 
of more proximal reasons (as discussed below), responsibility can be attributed to these 
agents. In other words, they can be said to have had MHC. It is here that we can begin to 
see how the design level can help to navigate the distributed nature of military operations 
planning, which has been previously discussed in relation to the operational level of MHC. 
Conceptualising MHC in this way is more comprehensive than that of direct operational 
control for it permits (though it is not a necessary condition) the inclusion of supervisory 
control, which sanctions the user to supervise a (semi-)autonomous system that is in 
operational control, yet still permits an end user to intervene in its operation if necessary. 
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Likewise, as already mentioned, this form of direct supervisory control is not a necessary 
condition for MHC to be deemed to have been attained. A fully AWS can, in principle, be 
precise, comprehensive, and transparent in tracking the reasons behind a human agent’s 
decisions in lieu of the ability for human agents to intervene in its operations, thereby still 
meeting the conditions for MHC.18
3.2.2 DISTAL AND PROXIMAL REASONING 
Adopted from the philosophy of intent and action (Bratman, 1984; Mele and William, 1992), 
Santoni de Sio’s and van den Hoven’s conception of an agent’s (or agents’) reasons is 
further developed, helping to not only specify different types of reasoning within complex 
systems but also to better understand the inner workings of the tracking condition (Calvert 
et al., 2018). Calvert et al. (2018) began by developing two distinct types of reasoning: distal 
and proximal. Proximal reasons are those intentions that are associated with an action in 
a temporally immediate way (concurrent), such as the intention to fire upon a target, to 
stop an imminent strike, or to immediately return to base. Distal reasons are longer term 
intentions or objectives that are formulated in a less immediate way. A user’s distal reason, 
for example, to use an AWS is to reduce the risk for human operators when engaging 
enemy combatants, and/or to reduce the economic cost of such engagements. Whereas 
a company’s or programmer’s distal reasons may be for the system to adhere to certain 
contractual norms or to comply with national/international laws (i.e., not permitting an AWS 
to fire upon surrendering combatants).






(longer term, general objective)
Proximal Reasons 
(concurrent intentions)
• Plan to Maximise efficiency
o Reduce briefing-to-deployment 
time
o Increase deployment frequency
o Maximise target accuracy
• Reduce human error
• Plan to adhere to IHR Law, Law of 
Armed Conflict
• Impromptu intention to have the system 
return to base
• Intention to belay a strike given new 
intelligence 
• Intention to modify payload selection and 
delivery
• Intention to change a system’s weapons 
envelope
Distal reasons are those overarching intentions that the relevant agent(s) will have for 
the desired operations of a system. The concept of direct operational control is naturally 
aligned and sensitive to proximal reasons, in which a system functions as a consequence 
of the immediate, concurrent intentions of the human agent. In most cases, these will be 
the end users who are in proximity to the use of the system. With a (semi-)autonomous 
predator drone, for example, if the pilot (user) does not release the weapon payload it is 
18  What this does, then, is shift the canonical notions of accountability as being a function of the end user to other relevant 




because they had no intention, in that instant, to do so (i.e., they could have been distracted 
or preoccupied with some other task). Because traditional systems like these are – to the 
best extent possible – under the influence of their human users’ proximal reasoning, then 
those users are causally responsible for their use and consequent impacts. It is for this 
reason that MHC extends its scope of reasons, to which it must be sensitive to, in order to 
sufficiently satisfy the tracking condition, particularly in the case of autonomous systems. 
(Fully) AWS, which we can imagine being connected to various other autonomous systems, 
such as the information and communication systems of the forward operating base (FOB), 
the unattended ground systems, and the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
systems, must be sensitive to both distal and proximal reasoning. Satisfying only proximal 
reasons (i.e., to release the payload or to return to FOB) can come at the cost of more 
general and objective distal reasons (i.e., reducing friendly casualties).
Mecacci and Santoni de Sio (2020) moved even further beyond this theoretical construct of 
MHC in order to operationalise it by exploring more concrete design requirements. Taking 
the work above on the more specific distal and proximal reasons of the tracking condition, 
they frame MHC as reason-responsiveness. It is here that Mecacci and Santoni de Sio 
make a strong case for the sociotechnicity of autonomous systems given that they broaden 
MHC as being contingent not only on technical design engineering and more rudimentary 
human vectors in engineering, but also on the crucial role of institutional design (discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 5). Regarding reason-responsiveness more particularly, the 
complexity of this system (system-within-a-system) refers to the proximity or distance of the 
various types of human reasoning to the systems’ behaviours (Mecacci and Santoni de Sio, 
2020). They model complexity of these relations to system behaviors in Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1. The proximity scale. (Source: Mecacci and Santoni de Sio, 2020)
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The above figure is meant to illustrate the relationship of both agents and reasons across 
times and as functions of complexity. This type of classification is pertinent given that the 
continuum allows us to more saliently pinpoint the relevant reasons of the relevant agents 
in any given context. Mecacci and Santoni de Sio point out an important bar here, and that 
is the temporal factor as it pertains to the reason-responsiveness of systems are markedly 
different for those of more traditional models of the time dilatation , or lack-there-of, between 
such intentions and human actions (which could be a priori or instantaneous depending on 
the cognitive study model employed). This model, and as shown in Figure 2, is for human 
intentions and the behaviour of autonomous systems. This is made most manifest by the 
time dilation that can occur between human intention and system action with regards to 
proximal intentions (as a function of special distance and system lag for example). 
FIGURE 2. Between human reasons and systems’ behaviour there can be a temporal gap which does 
not compromise the scale. (Mecacci and Santoni de Sio, 2020, p. 110)
The lag, of course, would make itself mostly manifest in terms of a systems’ response to 
proximal reasons given that they are the more specific and temporally immediate reasons. 
As mentioned above, proximal reasons for a fully AWS may be for the platform to belay 
an immanent strike whereas the distal reasons explain the systems more general action 
plan such as entering into the weapons envelope for an aerial strike. This more general 
reason can of course be decomposed into smaller, more proximal reasons, as a function 
of the briefing information such as flying at a particular altitude to avoid anti-air missiles 
or to ensure that changing weather factors do not interfere with onboard navigation and 
targeting systems. Of course, the more general distal reasons need not, and in many cases 
will not, be decomposed as such, thus the expression of many potential proximal reasons 
may not ultimately be articulated in any given operation. This highlights an important point, 




articulated if/when they are articulated, and concomitantly, how responsive the system is 
to those reason (Mecacci and Santoni de Sio, 2020, p. 110). In many cases the proximal 
reasons like those in Table 1 will be articulated by more direct stakeholders like field 
commanders whose proximity is smaller in scale. Distal reasons rather may come in the 
form of superordinate norms from states, treaties, the Laws of Armed Conflict, International 
Humanitarian Laws, that support and constrain certain operational possibilities.  
Designing, however, for the more general and abstract distal reason like those in table 
1 are unquestionably more complex in terms of how to design for them (i.e., like not 
causing disproportionate collateral damage). This does not mean that such AWS cannot 
be sufficiently responsive to distal reasons categorically, in fact current (semi-) AWS already 
do. Semi-autonomous drones can already take-off, land, navigate, and travel without human 
operational control effectively (e.g., General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper drone). However, and 
this is the philosophically important point here, for an AWS to be meaningfully responsive to 
the distal reasons, just as it would be to the more specific and technically (relatively) simpler 
proximal ones, requires that “better automation” (Mecacci and Santoni de Sio, 2020, p. 
112). This brings us back to the beginning of this thesis where I propose that more (better) 
automation, rather than the more intuitive direct (human) operational control can augment 
MHC rather than exclude it. 
If such automation is designed for greater reason-responsiveness, then 
such a higher-level of automation means more MHC and not less. What this 
automation means then is that systems are required to “easily track – that is: 
recognize, navigate and prioritise – the numerous reasons and agents that 
co-occur in every given situation” (Mecacci and Santoni de Sio, 2020, p. 112).
Notwithstanding, this broadened notion of MHC however is rightly criticised as lacking the 
higher-level governance structures that account for the institutional and design dimensions 
of control (c.f., Verdiesen et al., 2020). Verdiesen, Santoni de Sio, and Dignum clearly state 
that this higher level governance structure: 
is the most important level for oversight and needs to be added to the control 
loop, because accountability requires strong mechanisms in order to oversee, 
discuss and verify the behaviour of the system to check if its behaviour is 
aligned with human values and norms. Institutions and oversight mechanisms 
need to be consciously designed to create a proactive feedback loop that 




MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL  – TWO APPROACHES 
This is undoubtedly the case when considering MHC and, as described above, this 
higher-level governance structure is argued to be satisfied by the operational level of 
control. Likewise, the design of both the operational level and design levels are argued 
to be conducive to being operationalised by the VSD approach in the following part. Their 
relatively potent approach for an oversight framework for AWS does still leave open gaps 
for the actual mechanisms at the governance level, sociotechnical level ,and technical level 
for in situ governance when an AWS is deployed (see Figure 3). For this reason this project 
appropriates VSD as the means for framing this central column and designing for it. 
FIGURE 3. Comprehensive Human Oversight Framework. (Source: Verdiesen et al., (2020, p.18)
Still, adopting such a systems thinking approach to conceptualising the tracking condition 
requires that all elements that are part of any given system(s) must be maximally sensitive/
responsive to the relevant (moral) reasons of any agent, whether they are users or 
otherwise. This means that it is not solely the burden of agents to be maximally able to 
behave according to patterns of reasoning, but that every point in a system’s infrastructure 
must be similarly sensitive. This responsiveness can be framed by designers by choosing 
the proper ‘level of abstraction’ (Floridi, 2017) in creating autonomous systems (discussed in 
Part II), which is based on the context of use to ensure receiver-contextualised explanations 
and transparent purposes (Floridi, Cowls, King, & Taddeo, 2020). This means that any (fully) 
AWS must not only be responsive to the user’s reasons but also conform to established 




international human rights laws, and the laws of armed conflict amongst others. Mecacci 
and Santoni de Sio (2020) are explicit in that, although the tracking condition states that 
the system must be responsive to human reasons and not to other vectors in a system, 
they argue that social and legal norms reflect the intentions and reasons of supraindividual 
agents, such as organisations, companies, and states (Mecacci & de Sio, 2020, p. 109). In 
this case, the operational level of control serves as this supraindividual vector. 
3.3 CONCLUSIONS 
The implications of Santoni de Sio et alia approach are not insignificant, as they appear 
to run contrary to the notion that greater autonomy entails less MHC. The systems that 
form the network, which constitutes a fully AWS, and the systems that their integrations 
subsequently form require comprehensive and ubiquitous design that permits them to 
be maximally sensitive not only to the end user’s intentions and reasons for action, but 
also to societal norms as well as legal and policy statutes. As already stipulated, such a 
requirement means having a more stringent notion of what constitutes MHC; however, as a 
consequence, it permits increased levels of autonomy (i.e., in the case of an AWS, removing 
human pilots from both physical and psychological harm) with increased control over the 
system through design decisions as well as operational and regulatory infrastructures. This 
means that MHC can be achieved if systems are maximally responsive to the intentions of 
agents beyond simply the final users, such as the designers, relevant industries, and states 
in general (i.e., the military-industrial complex [MIC]). 
Despite the nuance in this particular approach to conceptualising MHC (cf. Mecacci and 
Santoni de Sio, 2020), this dissertation aims to take a more meta-normative approach by 
combining these theories to produce a more unified notion of MHC for fully AWS. The 
following chapter begins by discussing how the two LoA are complimentary, how both are 
underpinned by a systems thinking perspective, and how they can each be optimised via a 
systems engineering approach via VSD to both operational and design innovation. 
3 3
113
MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL  – TWO APPROACHES 
REFERENCES
Article 36. 2015. “Killing by Machine: Key Issues for Understanding Meaningful Human Control.” 2015. http://www.
article36.org/weapons/autonomous-weapons/killing-by-machine-key-issues-for-understanding-meaningful-
human-control/.
Bratman, M. (1984). Two faces of intention. The Philosophical Review, 93(3), 375–405.
Calvert, S. C., Mecacci, G., Heikoop, D. D., & de Sio, F. S. (2018). Full platoon control in Truck Platooning: A Meaningful 
Human Control perspective. In 2018 21st International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC) 
(pp. 3320–3326). IEEE.
Ekelhof, M. (2019). Moving Beyond Semantics on Autonomous Weapons: Meaningful Human Control in Operation. 
Global Policy, 10(3), 343–348. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12665
Floridi, L. (2017). The logic of design as a conceptual logic of information. Minds and Machines, 27(3), 495–519.
Floridi, L., Cowls, J., King, T. C., & Taddeo, M. (2020). Designing AI for Social Good: Seven Essential Factors. Science 
and Engineering Ethics, 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-020-00213-5
Leveringhaus, Alex. 2016. “Drones, Automated Targeting, and Moral Responsibility.” In Drones and Responsibility: 
Legal, Philosophical, and Socio-Technical Perspectives on the Use of Remotely Controlled Weapons, edited by 
Ezio Di Nucci and Filippo Santoni de Sio, 169–81. Routledge. https://doi.org/9781138390669.
Mecacci, G., & Santoni de Sio, F. (2020). Meaningful human control as reason-responsiveness: the case of dual-mode 
vehicles. Ethics and Information Technology, 22(2), 103-115. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-019-09519-w
Mele, A. R., & William, H. (1992). Springs of action: Understanding intentional behavior. Oxford University Press on 
Demand.
Umbrello, Steven. 2020. “Meaningful Human Control over Smart Home Systems: A Value Sensitive Design Approach.” 
Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (37): 40–65.
NATO STANDARD AJP-3.9 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR JOINT TARGETING Edition A Version 1. (2016).
Santoni de Sio, F., & van den Hoven, J. (2018). Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Systems: A Philosophical 
Account. Frontiers in Robotics and AI. https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/frobt.2018.00015
USAF. (2017). Annex 3-60 Targeting. https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Doctrine-Annexes/Annex-3-60-Targeting/
USSB. 2012. “Defense Science Board Task Force Report: The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems.” Washington, DC. 
https://doi.org/ADA566864.
Verdiesen, I., de Sio, F. S., & Dignum, V. (2021). Accountability and control over autonomous weapon systems: A 
















COUPLING LEVELS OF ABSTRACTION 
- A TWO-TIERED APPROACH 
4
117
4.1 TECHNICAL FULL AUTONOMY AND AWS
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the central premises on which proponents of a ban 
on AWS base their case relates to the concern that certain increased levels of autonomy 
may result in an accountability gap in the event of recalcitrance. Sharkey (2014) aptly 
describes five levels of technical autonomy that can describe AWS targeting (Figure 1). The 
least problematic stage is Level 1 (although Ekelhof’s (2019) analysis arguably brings into 
question ‘which’ human). Levels 4 and 5 are argued to be the most problematic. Level 4, 
like Level 5, is argued to be dangerous given ‘how’ an AWS selects a target (i.e., systemic 
opacity, computer vision, etc.) and its technical ability to do so as a function of the various 
targeting norms and rules of engagement. Similarly, the fourth level brings into question the 
cognitive clarity of the human operator, who has veto power and the ability to determine 
the validity of the system’s chosen target(s). Regardless, Level 5 is typically the subject of 
debate as it is considered the key descriptor of full autonomy in terms of AWS. 
 
1
• Human engages with and selects a target and initiates any attack 
2
• Program suggests alternative targets and human chooses which 
to attack 
3
• Program selects target and human must approve before attack
4 
• Program selects target and human has restricted time to veto
5
• Program selects target and initiates attack without human 
involvement
FIGURE 1. Level of Autonomy. Source: (Sharkey, 2014).
Here we can already begin to tease out some of the potential issues that exist with 
problematising autonomy. Though there are convincing arguments against AWS, other 
than the supposed accountability gap proposed by the above ordinance, such as the 
dehumanisation of war and its deleterious effects on human dignity, or even the functional 
necessity of lethality, it appears that actual military operations planning and deployment 
strategies intuitively constrain the autonomy of any given agent, soldier, or AWS, so as to be 
a function of a larger a priori plan that bears little, if any, intrinsic operational value outside 
the functional capacity to be able to carry out such plans. This, of course, does not preclude 




The technical design, which is predicated on the technical design requirements, must 
reflect both the proximal and distal intentions (i.e., reason-responsiveness) and goals of 
the relevant agents within the deployment envelope. These would be the commanders 
who employ such weapons in their area of operations, as well as the potential human 
operators who may be engaging with them on the ground (i.e., they can be aerial AWS, 
e.g., fully autonomous drones/fighters). Regardless, the capacity for these systems to be 
responsive to the relevant moral reasoning of the agents involved must be considered as a 
foundational variable in the weaponeering decision-making process for any given context 
of deployment in the pre-mission stages. And it is institutional processes like weaponeering 
that de facto predicate a level of a priori operational control like that suggested not only by 
Ekelhof (2019), but also by Verdiesen et al. (2020) as part of the ‘before deployment layer 
(c.f., Chapter 3, Figure 3). 
4.2 COUPLING LEVELS OF ABSTRACTION FOR MHC
In practice, then, systems thinking provides salient grounds for thinking about these various 
LoA. The procedural process of operational planning and target identification form the higher 
(or meta-) level of MHC, as clearer lines of causality can be conceptualised, culminating in 
weapons release and efficacy assessments. This level, of course, can be further broken 
down into more granular LoA like strategic, tactical, and operational, but those would just 
be more compartmentalised categories for the umbrella of military operations. Similarly, 
the design level of MHC is functionally dependent on a system’s understanding of both 
tracing design histories as well as tracking the responsiveness of autonomous systems 
to the relevant moral reason(s) of the relevant agent(s) in the design and use chains of 
such systems. Theoretically speaking, both LoA are predicated on systems or networks of 
interconnected nodes (Figure 2). Similarly, both LoA, despite their different scopes, feed into 
one another. Within the operational level, the bounds within which weaponeering decisions 
are made prior to deployment are contingent on the functionality of the system itself, in 
order for it to be chosen as the most appropriate means for carrying out the intended 
mission. However, such technical responsiveness to on-the-ground needs for successful 
mission completion is not contingent on those types of pre-mission assessments. System-
level recalcitrance can jeopardise the overall level of MHC despite the system being 
bound by the operational level of control. For this reason, weaponeering decisions must 
be reflected in the design level in order for those decisions to be sufficiently salient prior 
to deployment. Thus, the operational level feeds down into the design level by supplying 
the norms, objectives, and intentions necessary for deployment to be lawful, and for the 
operational level itself to be holistic in terms of retaining sufficient control (this is illustrated 
in Part II). Likewise, the various agents who are essential to the pre-mission planning stage 
of operations form part of the number of relevant moral agents (or, collectively, of the 
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supraindividual agent) that permits the design level to actually design AWS to be sufficiently 
responsive to the reasons and intentions of those actor(s), which makes the weaponeering 
of AWS permissible and, thus, under a priori MHC on both LoA. This would, of course, mean 
tightening existing military-industrial partnerships that use these agents as stakeholders 
for whom these systems can be designed for (coupled with the relevant RoE and LoAC). 
This seems intuitively necessary to increase the equifinality of the complex relations of 
the different agents that form these collaborating institutions and more saliently track the 














FIGURE 2. Superordinance of Systems Theory and Engineering over the two levels of abstraction of 
MHC. 
If we envision, then, a scenario that is often discussed in the literature against AWS – 
the case of an AWS killing civilians – we can begin to trace reasons for dismissing this 
prima facie objection. If an AWS kills a civilian on the ground, who is within the weapons 
envelope that was delimited prior to deployment, the killing is not mala in se to the 
extent that collateral damage assessments have already been agreed upon during the 
pre-deployment stage and under the existing norms regarding proportionality. To some 
extent, the killing of civilians is not necessarily equivocal to recalcitrance and can instead 
be traced back to the briefing information (see Chapter 5 on the wrong reasons problem 
of actualised values). If we imagine that, even within the weapons envelope, an AWS kills 
civilians disproportionately, and over and above the acceptable level of collateral damage 
determined during pre-planning, this can be construed as technical recalcitrance, which 




to determine if the system was designed in such a way so as to be maximally responsive 
to the relevant intention(s) of those agents. If this is shown not to be the case, then the 
AWS cannot be said to be under MHC and is, therefore, not only an unviable option for 
weaponeering decisions but is also unlawful as well (this is a good vector for thinking about 
ban criteria). If the relevant agents, such as the designers and users (commanders, AWS 
designers/programmers, proportionality specialists, MIC as a whole, etc.), are capable of 
understanding the system’s capabilities and the consequences of its use, then they can be 
said to be in possession of MHC, both in their weaponeering decisions (on the operational 
level) as well as the design decisions (at the design level). Divorcing one level from the 
other leaves open vectors from which accountability gaps can arise (c.f., Verdiesen et al., 
2020). 
Systems engineering, then, can be said to be the design and applications of both of these 
levels of MHC. Of course, systems engineering seems, and perhaps is, more appropriately 
spoken of in terms of the design level, given its explicit focus on building autonomous 
systems responsibly, in a holistic, and anticipatory way, and specifically aligned with the 
values of the relevant stakeholders. However, it is for this reason that the operational level 
is necessary, and, as mentioned above, the complex network of agents, who are distributed 
across the military target acquisition and deployment process, are all relevant moral agents 
making up part of the larger system of which the AWS forms a part (i.e., the MIC). Likewise, 
AWS themselves are systems that are embedded in the larger sociotechnical network of 
operations and those human agents involved. Analysing and eliciting the needs of these 
human agents in order for them to make informed and (hopefully) lawful decisions in terms 
of weaponeering, both in the early stages of and throughout the development cycle, is 
critical – while always keeping in mind the whole of the systems’ lifecycle, as it relates 
explicitly to those weaponeering decisions rather than as a discrete technological artifact 
divorced from its use-context. In other words, rather than building AWS and marketing these 
systems as novel weapons platforms, both designers and experts, who are involved in 
the planning of operations, must themselves be part of the design team to weaponeer 
the design decisions themselves (i.e., part of the population of direct stakeholders in co-
creation and co-design in VSD). 
If we take this into account when looking at the issues that are often presented by those 
against the development of AWS, many of the technical issues that are presented as mala 
in se, such as increased autonomy (particularly Level 5, as in Figure 1) or the targeting of 
civilians, are only problematic if decoupled from a responsible design process and actual 
military planning and operational practices. When considering these, the augmentation of 
autonomy is necessarily constrained by many (if not all) of these processes; and, in certain 
cases, can increase, not decrease, the ability to have MHC. If these systems are designed in 
such a way as to be maximally sensitive to the relevant moral reasons of the relevant moral 
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agent(s) involved, then they likewise augment MHC, not lessen it. Technical autonomy is 
often the mechanism by which this the augmentation of this sensitivity can and should be 
design for. Mecacci and Santoni de Sio (2020) aptly demonstrate this seemingly paradoxical 
paradigm by looking at the example of autonomous vehicles. The marriage of both LoA, 
then, is teleological as it drives towards systemic synergy in order to avoid component 
friction and, subsequently, to avoid any unreliability in the design and deployment of AWS. 
For systems engineering practices to be successful in optimising equifinality across the 
various levels of nesting, then complexity has to be modeled as a function not only of the 
technical architecture of a system (i.e., AWS) but also the logistical human organisation 
of data (i.e., planning, target data, proportionality assessments, geography, etc.). Because 
of this, systems can become increasingly complex given the volume and quality of the 
data, variables, and components across both technical and human spheres. Much of this 
can be addressed through the design and development of smarter control algorithms 
and environmental systems analyses; while tools such as system architecture modeling, 
verification and learning simulations, statistical and reliability analyses, as well as formal 
decision-making psychology can all be levied to understand the covariance between 
technical design and human operations. Divorcing the operational level from the design level 
leaves design impotent and potentially recalcitrant, ignoring most of the actual processes 
that are taken place within this particular context of use. Divorcing the design level from 
the operational one leaves operations with an opaque and nebulous lethal tool that may 
result in poor, possibly even unlawful, weaponeering decisions. Thinking about systems 
and, more specifically, of these various levels of abstraction as mutually co-constituting one 
another permits the inherent complexity of these systems to be more easily modeled and 
consequentially designed for, rather than leaving design decisions as ad hoc afterthoughts. 
Doing this allows for clearer lines of emergent behaviors and boundaries to be traced, 
provided that systems thinking is employed at all levels of nesting.
4.3 LIMITATIONS AND SPECIFYING THE NEXUS OF 
MHC FOR AWS
There is at least one notable limitation of this multi-tiered approach, which is the 
dynamic engagements of AWS in situ rather than in the case of purely pre-programmed 
engagements (echoed also by Verdiesen et al. (2020) in their framework’s central column). 
This is particularly true of ground-based AWS in comparison to aerial ones. Ground-based 
AWS can (and likely most often will) find themselves in dynamic and changing engagement 
scenarios, even within the weapons envelope. Their ability to adhere to the determined 
mission objectives and targets, while also adapting to an evolving scenario, poses both 




on more agency given the decisions and processes for identification that emerge from 
dynamic war theatres and their proximity (and thus more fine-grained situational input) to 
targets. The operational level may be insufficient for grounding MHC in such cases, yet the 
design level can still provide possible ways of ensuring sufficient control. If the systems 
are designed in such a way as to be maximally reason-responsive to the largest set of 
moral reasons and intentions of the relevant agents – perhaps in this case the commanding 
officer on the ground alongside the AWS and/or the commander supervising the mission/
engagement (i.e., continual monitoring) – then recalcitrance of such systems can be tracked 
and traced back to these individuals, as well as to the designers who originally engineered 
the autonomous systems (i.e., the military-industrial complex as a supraindividual agent). 
The real difference here between aerial AWS weapons is that there is epistemic distance 
between the system and the target, something that is given as a particular variable to 
proportionality and discrimination assessments. This, of course, if much different for 
ground-based AWS which have a significantly smaller epistemic gap with regards to target 
acquisition and engagement. This, in turn, changes how the operational level can be 
applied given the proximal closeness of a system to its targets that does not necessarily 
exist between aerial systems and their targets. 
Either way, what this limitation at least shows is a further nuance that undermines arguments 
for a blanket ban on (fully) AWS. That is to say, the difference between aerial (fully) AWS 
and ground-based (fully) AWS. The operational level seems to tokenise the agent that is 
in direct operational control of the engagement and strips them of most (if not all) of the 
relevant levels of autonomy that are necessary for moral responsibility. For this reason, the 
substitution of such human agents in aerial engagements appears, at least prima facie, 
benign. For a ban on (fully) AWS to be effective, then, it seems that targeting autonomy per 
se is not the right strategy, at least based upon the above example. Instead, a more effective 
route would be targeting various specific types of AWS and differentiating between them 
(i.e., ground, aerial, naval AWS). Of course, this risks over-specifications and leaves open 
the possibility of circumventing very specific designations and criteria for banned systems. 
However, this should not discount the above criticism, rather it should encourage wrestling 
with it head-on in order to ensure more robust policy making. 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Part I of this thesis uses systems thinking and systems engineering as conceptual tools 
to frame the commonalities between two different levels of abstraction in understanding 
meaningful human control of autonomous weapons system. It argues that, with AWS in 
particular, both LoA are necessary for having MHC of AWS. If this coupling is successful then 
the argument that increased levels of autonomy are problematic, which is at the foundation 
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of most calls for a ban on those types of AWS, is greatly weakened and perhaps even 
negated entirely. It does this by showing how autonomy, whether human or that of an AWS, 
is necessarily constrained by military operational planning and the co-construction of these 
systems with the involvement of relevant moral stakeholders. As long as strict conditions 
are met across LoA then increasing the autonomy of AWS to what is traditionally called ‘full’ 
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VALUE SENSITIVE DESIGN: CONCEPTUAL CHAL-
LENGES POSED BY AI SYSTEMS
Progress, not perfection ― (Friedman et al., 2017)
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5.1 INTRODUCTION: A RECAP OF VALUE 
SENSITIVE DESIGN (VSD)
Wherein lies the problem lies also the solution. Mutatis mutandis to the philosophical 
substructure of the species of AWS discussed in the preceding section (i.e., certain aerial 
fully AWS), level 5 autonomy (c.f., Sharkey, 2014) becomes non-problematic. It even becomes 
the key to MHC. When these levels of abstraction for understanding MHC are coupled, 
aerial fully AWS de facto fall under MHC. 
One could levy the argument that such a conception of MHC is too philosophically abstract 
– so abstract that it is rendered incapable of being designed in any way attainable by 
engineers and MIC partnerships. As discussed, autonomous systems are fundamental 
to the network-centric warfare (NCW) doctrine that characterises much of what we now 
understand as modern warfare. These evermore complex systems of people, infrastructures, 
and organisations (i.e., systems-within-systems) complicate things even further, thus making 
the problem of many hands more daunting (Taylor, 2020). But what the preceding section 
aimed to show is how, in principle, the coupling of those two levels of abstraction for 
understanding MHC allows us to more saliently identify the groups (and thus the individuals 
within these groups) that can be held responsible for these systems. This bridges the 
potential responsibility gap of AWS not under MHC. 
However, there remains lacunae to traverse. How can we actually design for this particular 
conception of MHC? The complexity of the design endeavor stems not only from the 
complexity of the systems that characterise MHC, but also from the unique challenges that 
AI systems generally pose to the responsible design and innovation of systems employing 
such AI systems. In both scholarship and popular culture, there is ample discussion of the 
risks, benefits, and impacts of AI. Although the exact effects of AI on society are neither 
clear nor certain, AI is and will doubtlessly continue to have a profound impact on the 
flourishing of humanity (Baum, 2016; Floridi et al., 2018; Winfield et al., 2019). When it 
comes to AWS, Part I describes the determining system behind what makes fully AWS fully 
autonomous in the technical sense. Here, AI is understood as a class of technologies that 
are autonomous, interactive, adaptive, and capable of carrying out human tasks (Floridi 
& Sanders, 2004). I pay attention to AI technologies based on machine learning (ML) in 
particular, as the latter allows the former to learn from interaction with, and feedback from, 
its environment. I argue that these learning capabilities pose specific challenges for the 
design of AI. AI technologies are more likely than not to acquire features that were neither 
foreseen (or even foreseeable) nor intended by their designers. These features, along with 




In this chapter, I build on and extend an approach to ethical design known as Value Sensitive 
Design or VSD (see Annex II). There have certainly been proposals for other tools to achieve 
responsible research and innovation (Initiative, 2016; UNESCO, 2017). But I chose VSD as a 
design methodology for its inherent self-reflexivity. Furthermore, it emphasises engagement 
with both direct and indirect stakeholders as a fundamental part of the design process and 
the philosophical investigation of values (Friedman & Hendry, 2019; Umbrello, 2018). Past 
research has explored how VSD can be applied to specific technologies such as energy 
systems (Mok & Hyysalo, 2018; Mouter et al., 2018), mobile phone usage (Woelfer et al., 
2011), architecture projects (van den Hoven, 2013), manufacturing (Longo et al., 2020), and 
augmented reality systems, to name just a few (Friedman & Kahn Jr., 2000). It has similarly 
been proposed as a suitable design framework for future technologies, both near and long 
term. Examples include its exploratory application to nanopharmaceuticals (Timmermans et 
al., 2011), molecular manufacturing (Umbrello, 2019), intelligent agent systems (Umbrello & 
De Bellis, 2018; van Wynsberghe, 2013), and less futuristic autonomous vehicles (Calvert et 
al., 2018; Thornton et al., 2018). Although these studies provide a useful theoretical basis 
for how VSD might be applied to specific technologies, they do not account for the unique 
ethical and technical issues that various AI systems present.
To address these challenges, both Ibo van de Poel and myself suggest adding a set of 
AI-specific design principles to VSD (Umbrello & van de Poel, 2021). We propose building 
on significant headway made recently in numerous AI for Social Good (AI4SG) projects 
becoming popular in various research circles. Practical, on-the-ground applications of 
AI4SG principles have already been enacted for various AI-enabled technologies (Mabaso, 
2020) This provides researchers with solid groundwork on how ethics can be manifested in 
practice. But AI4SG is difficult and its underlying principles are still fuzzy, given the multiplicity 
of research domains, practices, and design programs (Taddeo & Floridi, 2018). Nonetheless, 
some work has already been done to narrow down the essential AI4SG principles (Floridi 
et al., 2018, 2020). 
5.1.1 VALUE SENSITIVE DESIGN 
To demonstrate the applicability of the VSD approach to AWS design, it is worth revisiting 
the approach itself. For the more interested reader, Annex II provides a literature review on 
the history, issues, and applications of the VSD approach more generally. 
VSD is a principled approach to taking values of ethical importance into account in the 
design of new technologies. The original approach was developed by Batya Friedman and 
colleagues from the University of Washington. As VSD adoption grew more widespread, 
it was developed further by others  – sometimes under somewhat different headings such 
as ‘Values at Play’ or ‘Design for Values’  (Flanagan et al., 2008; van den Hoven et al., 
2015). At the core of the VSD approach is what Friedman et al. (2008) call the tripartite 
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methodology of empirical, conceptual, and technical investigations (see Figure 1). These 
investigations can be carried out consecutively, in parallel, or iteratively. They involve: 1) 
empirically investigating relevant stakeholders, their values, and their value understandings 
and priorities; 2) conceptual investigations into values and possible value trade-offs; and 
3) technical investigations into value issues raised by current technology along with the 
possible implementation of values into new designs.  
 
Conceptual Investigations
Determination and investigation of 
values from relevant philosophical 
literature and those explicitly elicited 
from stakeholders.
Technical Investigations
Evaluation of technical limitations on 
the technology itself, in terms of how it 
supports or constrains indentified 
values and design requirements.
Empirical Investigations
Empirical evaluation of stakeholder 
values through socio-cultural norms and 
translation into potential design 
requirements.
FIGURE 1. The recursive VSD tripartite framework employed in this study. Source: Umbrello (2020b).
One important issue in VSD is how to identify the values that should be taken into account 
in a concrete VSD process, as discussed in greater detail in 6.2 (Davis & Nathan, 2014). 
Friedman et al. (2017) propose a list of thirteen values important to the design of information 
systems: human welfare, ownership and property, privacy, freedom from bias, universal 
usability, trust, autonomy, informed consent, accountability, courtesy, identity, calmness, 
and environmental sustainability. Others have opposed such an approach, arguing that it is 
better to elicit values from stakeholders in a bottom-up fashion (Borning & Muller, 2012; Le 
Dantec et al., 2009). Both approaches probably have their advantages and disadvantages 
(c.f., Umbrello, 2020b). For instance, a more general list could overlook values that are 
important in specific situations. Although bottom-up elicitation can help uncover such 
values, it is also not a watertight solution as stakeholders may fail to articulate important 
values (or crucial stakeholders may not have been identified). Moreover, not all values held 
by stakeholders carry ethical importance that should be included in VSD.
When it comes to identifying values in VSD design processes for AI technologies, some 
considerations are important. There is now widespread consensus that AI raises specific 




conventional information and communication technologies (Floridi et al., 2018). This has 
several implications for the issue of value identification. For one, the original VSD list of 
values does not suffice for AI. Instead, one could take the values identified by the EU High-
Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (HLEG) as starting point (Floridi, 2019; High-
Level Expert Group on AI, 2019): respect for human autonomy, prevention of harm, fairness, 
and explicability. For another, some value list would seem desirable in the case of AI simply 
to ensure that typical ethical concerns arising from AI are not overlooked. This is not to 
say that no other values should be included in the design of AI applications. Perhaps they 
should be for specific context. But they should (and some form of bottom-up elicitation may 
be relevant here19) certainly be supplemented by principles to ensure typical ethical issues 
in AI are properly addressed. This is especially true for highly specific deployment domains, 
such as the military in this case, where context-specific values need to be accounted for. 
The proposal, then, is recourse to the AI4SG meanings and factors discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.2 INTENDED, REALISED, AND EMBODIED 
VALUES OF SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS
Since the empirical and (now) design turns within the applied ethics of technology, the 
notion that ‘artifacts have politics’ has been a fundamental philosophical precept (Winner, 
2003). More clearly, sociotechnical systems embody values (van de Poel, 2020; van den 
Hoven, 2017; van den Hoven et al., 2012). This underlying precept also extends to VSD. 
AI systems are no exception to such embodiment given that they, too, are sociotechnical 
systems. But the added complexity of self-learning and typically opaque inner workings 
in AI makes the question of a system’s value compliance (or recalcitrance) to the various 
codes of AI ethics (e.g., HLEG, IEEE, etc.) a prescient concern. Ibo van de Poel (2020) 
categorises three different understandings of value compliance in sociotechnical systems: 
(1) intended values or IV, (2) realised values or RV, and (3) embodied values or EV. 
For the first, the intended value of compliance is understood as guiding AI designers in 
the design of AI systems. Compliance is also integrated into the design of AI systems by 
those designers so as to align with their intended values as best as possible (van de Poel, 
2020). However, there is a privation in this type of compliance; AI systems can still feasibly 
be compliant in the sense that the intended value may exist in the system, even if it is not 
fulfilled in any meaningful way. 
Consequently, realised values focus on the lacuna of (1). Such values understand compliance 
through a focus on the actual values expressed by the operation of an AI system. But this 
19  Bottom-up approaches can be informed by the actual process of participatory design and responsible research and 
innovation such as those by (Abebe et al., 2020; Liao & Muller, 2019; Smith & Iversen, 2018; Whitman et al., 2018) as well as 
the emerging regulation on constraining data collection practices and the design of AI systems e.g., regarding “protected 
characteristics”, human oversight, and informational roles (Smith & Iversen, 2018; Wachter & Mittelstadt, 2019).
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approach is not without its own issues. Because the focus here is on the actual values 
expressed by the operation of a system, the system must be deployed first. Only then can 
adjudication of its value compliance be determined (this is markedly deleterious for warfare 
systems) . Ideally, such compliance would take place prior to rollout to ensure those values 
are not detrimental or expressed in deleterious ways. Another issue lies in the immanence 
of realised values in that they are too prima facie. Not all system behaviours can be mapped 
out as a meaningful realised value onto the system itself. For example, imagine an aerial 
fully AWS naturally employing the AI systems that make it functionally and fully autonomous. 
The fully AWS is the direct cause of an aerial strike that kills a disproportionate number of 
civilians relative to the military objective. Would this automatically mean that the AWS was 
recalcitrant due to the realised value of non-compliance (i.e., recalcitrance in relation to the 
principle of proportionality) obtained? Intuitively, it would seem a case such as this does not 
warrant such a partisan stance. The failure of the strike in terms of its proportionality is not 
necessarily attributable to the operation of the system itself. But it may be the cause of other 
factors, such as the a priori intelligence gathered, the proportionality assessment, munitions 
weaponeered prior to deployment, and/or changing circumstance attributable to mitigating 
factors on the ground, and so on. 
In both of these understandings, the issue is a problem of compliance with the wrong kind 
of reasons (c.f., Jacobson, 2013; van de Poel, 2020). This problem highlights issues in the 
loci of the reasons themselves. Intended values are problematic because reasons for or 
against those values are predicated on the intentions of designers (and their subsequent 
biases, root values, etc.) rather than on the actual AI systems themselves. Similarly, realised 
values are problematic because the reasons may be predicated on improper and/or 
unprecedented use. Such reasons are therefore also not predicated on the AI system per 
se (i.e., the multi-use nature of technology). Hence, the loci of both forms of compliance are 
located outside the designed system. 
To avoid the wrong kind of reasons problem, van de Poel (2020) argues for a focus on 
embodied values (see Figure 2). Embodied values “should be understood as values that 
have been intentionally, and successfully embedded in an AI system by its designers” (van 
de Poel, 2020, p. 390). In order to fulfill embodiment, two conditions must be met: 
1. Designers must intentionally design AI systems such that they comply with any 
given or set of values; and





FIGURE 2. The relation between intended, embodied, and realised values (Source: van de Poel, 2020, 
n. adapted from Fig. 7.1 in van de Poel and Kroes, 2014).  
Intended values alone may ultimately be incongruent with the actual operation of an AI 
system (or any other designed system, such as an institution like the MIC) that expresses 
different values. These values may also differ – and usually do – as a result of poor design 
choices. Embodied values are the outcome of intended values (by the design team) 
combined with actual realised values as a consequence of proper use. The dynamic nature 
of the conditions that constitute embodied values (intended + actual) results in continual 
feedback, as shown in Figure 2. In VSD, this type of change constitutes a trigger for 
redesign in light of potential issues or value incongruencies (further discussed in Chapter 
6). Three kinds of feedback loops may then be triggered, as illustrated in the three levels of 
directional arrows in Figure 2 above: 
1. IV = EV  system use can be modified with the modification of design
2. EV ≠ IV  the modification of design is necessary 
3. RV = unforeseen consequences  IV may need to be modified 
This dynamism illustrates how the design programs of sociotechnical systems, and 
especially AI systems, are similarly dynamic and continual. Design is a process that 
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continues post-deployment. This process of redesign for incongruencies, such as those 
emerging between system operations and various conditions for its compliance, need not 
only be undertaken by the designers themselves. Redesign can also involve users. This 
is of particular importance given that, in many cases, the designers of a system become 
detached from operations once it is deployed (i.e., one would be hard-pressed to imagine 
the designer(s) in a forward operating base). The AI-system’s ability to learn, change, and 
adapt to dynamic scenarios makes this point even more salient, highlighting the need for 
continual monitoring over the operational lifecycle of a system. 
5.3 CHALLENGES POSED BY ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE (AI) 
AI applications pose specific challenges when it comes to VSD, particularly in light of their 
self-learning capabilities mentioned already. These capabilities complicate the reliable 
integration of values in the design of AI technologies. To illustrate this, both van de Poel 
and myself employ a short, imaginary, and illustrative example of the complications raised 
by AI for VSD. 
Suppose the tax department of a certain country wants to develop an algorithm to help 
detect potential cases of fraud. More specifically, the application should help civil servants 
select those citizens whose tax declaration needs extra or special scrutiny. Now, suppose 
they choose to build a self-learning artificial neural network for this task. An artificial neural 
network consists of a number of input units, hidden units, and one or more output units as 
pictured in Figure 3. 
Suppose the output unit or variable is simply a yes/no indicating whether a specific tax 
declaration needs additional scrutiny. There can be many input variables (units), such as the 
amount of tax to be paid by a certain person, the use of specific tax exemptions, individual 
prior history (e.g., of suspected fraud in the past), and also personal details (age, sex, place 
of residence, etc.). Figure 3 shows how the units (variables) in the artificial neural network 
are connected. Connections between the units can be weighted factors learned by the 
algorithm. This learning can be supervised or not (Russell & Norvig, 2010). If supervised 
learning is applied, the algorithm may learn to make calls on which tax declarations need 
scrutiny – calls that are similar to those of experienced civil servants at the tax office. In 
the case of unsupervised learning, information on which scrutinised cases led to detection 
of actual fraud may be fed back into the algorithm. It can then be programmed to learn to 
select those cases that have the highest probability of leading to the detection of actual 




FIGURE 3. An artificial neural network (Source: Umbrello and van de Poel, 2021). 
Now, one of the values that is obviously important in the design of such an algorithm is 
‘freedom from bias’. This value is already included on the original list of VSD values proposed 
by Friedman and Kahn, Jr., (2002). Friedman and Nissenbaum (1996, p. 332) define ‘bias’ in 
reference to “computer systems that systematically and unfairly discriminate against certain 
individuals or groups of individuals in favour of others.” In traditional VSD, this value may 
be implemented in the design of the algorithm in a number of ways. First and foremost, it 
may be translated into design requirements that no variables in the artificial neural network 
(the nodes in Figure 3) use, as such variables may lead to an unwanted bias. Ethnicity, for 
instance, could be ruled out as a potential variable. But this will not be enough to ensure 
realisation of the value ‘freedom from bias’ as bias may also be introduced through proxy 
variables. Postal codes could be a proxy variable for ethnicity, so one may also want to 
rule out the use of such variables to ensure ‘freedom from bias’ (DeCamp & Lindvall, 2020; 
Kirkpatrick, 2016). 
But even then, a self-learning algorithm could be biased due to the way it learns (Mehrabi 
et al., 2019). It may, for example, be biased because the training set for the algorithm is 
not representative or otherwise skewed. If a form of supervised learning is chosen, the 
algorithm could conceivably learn the biases already present in human judgments made 
for supervisory learning. Even if these potential sources of bias are also excluded, there is 
still no guarantee that the resulting algorithm is free of bias – certainly not if a form of non-
supervised (reinforcement) learning is chosen. One issue is that that the resulting artificial 
neural network may be described as following a certain rule even if this rule was neither 
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encoded nor (easily) derived from the nodes (variables) in the artificial neural network (c.f. 
Walmsley, 2012). In other words, the resulting algorithm can conceivably be described 
as following a rule that is somehow biased without this result being foreseeable or even 
clearly discernible to designers. 
Bias in the algorithm of this imaginary case may thus be emergent and opaque. It is 
emergent in the sense of an unintended and unforeseen consequence from the way the 
algorithm has learned. It is opaque in the sense that the bias may not be immediately clear, 
to humans at least, from inspection of the algorithm or artificial neural network. This point 
is more general and does not just apply to this specific example or the value ‘freedom 
from bias’ (or ‘fairness’). Due to their self-learning capabilities, AI systems – particularly 
those powered by ML – may develop features that were neither intended nor foreseen (or 
foreseeable) by their designers. They may have unintended value consequences. They may 
even unintentionally ‘disembody’ values embedded in their original design (van de Poel, 
2020; Vanderelst & Winfield, 2018). Moreover, these unintended features may not always 
be discernible as they could derive from specific ways the algorithm has developed itself. 
These ways of learning may be hard, or even impossible, for humans to fully understand. 
Such issues are not necessarily insurmountable. In the imaginary case of the algorithm for 
the tax office, technical solutions could make system development in a biased direction 
at least much more unlikely. We could tell the algorithm to optimise itself not only in terms 
of effectiveness (expressed in the number or percentage of cases of fraud detected, for 
example), but also in terms of fairness (such as by presenting a non-biased selection 
of cases for investigation) (Mehrabi et al., 2019). The important point is that addressing 
emergence and opacity requires a set of design principles, or rather design norms, that 
are not needed for traditional technologies. Some of these principles relate to technical or 
design requirements, others to the organisation of the design process and the further life-
cycle of a product (e.g., continued monitoring), and still others may have to do with which AI 
techniques to use or not. In Chapter 6, I propose the AI4SG principles as a way to address 
the specific challenges that AI poses to VSD. 
5.4 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AS THE VSD 
ONTOLOGY
In Part I of this dissertation, I identified systems thinking (the verbial of the theoretical 
approach known as systems theory) as an apt framework for understanding both MHC of 
AWS as well as how to actually design AWS for MHC. There are multiple reasons for adopting 
this framework and they bear reiterating. The first reason for using systems theory is that 




in the Chapters 3 and 4. The operational level of control is characterised by a plurality 
of actors and networks that complicates, yet also constitutes, how military operations are 
structured, planned, and carried out. Likewise, the design level of control is fundamentally 
built on the notion of tracking and tracing networks of systems and actors both in the use 
and in the design histories of those systems. 
Secondly, systems theory is the theoretical framework from which systems engineering 
derives. As discussed in Chapter 2.3, systems engineering developed in the domain of 
defence. It is essentially the practical and managerial implementation of a systems thinking 
ontology. Aside from the obvious congruency between systems engineering and systems 
thinking within the military sphere, VSD maps onto systems-thinking design methodology 
(its underlying philosophical precepts, such as an interactional stance on technology, make 
this abundantly clear). VSD acknowledges that technology and societal forces co-construct 
and co-vary with one another, fundamentally affirming the socialtechnicity of systems (i.e., 
sociotechnical systems such as AI). This means that various actors, institutions, technologies, 
and their design histories form complex yet important networks of interaction. These 
relationships need to be brought to the fore in order for salient and responsible innovation 
to take place. Doing this means not overcomplicating this thesis with banal or unimportant 
theoretical constructs. Rather, the thesis intends to make manifest what is always already 
there: the fact that AI are not discrete technologies, but rather sociotechnical systems. By 
framing them as such, we can approach design for MHC of AWS more holistically. 
5.4.1 THE SOCIOTECHNICITY OF AI SYSTEMS
In his 2020 paper Embedding Values in Artificial Intelligence (AI) Systems, Ibo van de Poel 
synthesises much of the literature on what constitutes sociotechnical systems and how 
such a framing can be used for understanding the particularities that distinguish AI systems 
from other sociotechnical systems. Here, I adopt much of this understanding for framing 
the particular instantiations of AI in the form of (fully) AWS. Like van de Poel, I understand 
sociotechnical systems as “systems that depend on not only technical hardware but also 
human behaviour and social institutions for their proper functioning” (c.f., Kroes et al., 2006). 
In this definition, sociotechnical systems are made up of three interrelated elements: (1) 
technical artifacts, (2) human agents, and (3) institutions (i.e., the norms followed by 2) (van 
de Poel, 2020, p. 391). 
AI systems differ in that they not only possess all three of the above features, but also 
artificial versions of (2) and (3) within their architecture (1). These artificial varieties of (2) and 
(3) are called “artificial agents” and “artificial norms,” respectively (van de Poel, 2020, p. 
391). Intentionality is what distinguishes the human variety of (2) and (3) from their artificial 
parallels, which are characterised in physical-causal terms instead (see Table 1).20
20  Here, one should not be tempted to compare artificial agents with artificial moral agents (AMAs). AMAs are entirely 
eschewed here based on strong arguments against both the possibility of their development as well as their desirability/
utility (Van Wynsberghe et al., 2019).
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TABLE 1. The basic building blocks of an AI system [modified] (Source: van de Poel, 2020, p. 391).
Intentional Physical-Causal
Artifacts Technical Artifacts
Agents Human Agents Artificial agents
Norms Institutions Technical norms
The left-hand column begins with technical artifacts, which are intentional in the sense 
that they are technical objects designed (intended) for operations toward certain functions 
(Kroes, 2010). The source of intentionality is not the artifact itself, of course, but the human 
agents. This does not mean that technical artifacts are devoid of intention. Rather, they 
are the bearers of intention obtained from human agents (i.e., designers). Van de Poel 
further adopts the ‘use plan characterisation’ of technical artefacts described by Houkes 
and Vermaas (2010, c.f., Chapter 2) which characterises technical artifacts as aggregates 
of both physical structures and use plans (van de Poel, 2020, p. 391). The latter of these is 
described as the plan or guide for the projected proper use of an artefact as relates to the 
goal-realisation of its designed function(s) (Houkes & Vermaas, 2010, p. 28). 
In terms of agents in Table 1, there are both intentional agents (i.e., human agents) as 
well as physical-causal agents, (i.e., artificial agents or AAs). AAs are what distinguish AI 
systems from other types of sociotechnical systems where humans are the agents in the 
above illustrated tripartite structure for sociotechnical systems (van de Poel, 2020, p. 391-
2). The fundamental distinction between sociotechnical systems with AAs and those with 
none is that the former mirror many of the abilities possessed by human agents while not 
actually being human. Once again, AI technologies are defined as autonomous, interactive, 
adaptive, and capable of carrying out human-like tasks (Floridi & Sanders, 2004). However 
(and van de Poel is uncontroversially clear here), AAs should not be confused with moral 
agents in a sense similar to how we would describe human agents. There is no exclusive 
or exhaustive list of skills or features that can distinguish the agency of human agents from 
AAs. But this is all the more reason to not tokenise the agency of AI as part of the same type 
in the ‘intentional’ column. Rather, we should type it as something different, i.e., physical-
causal (van de Poel, 2020, p. 392). 
The third part that constitutes a sociotechnical system is norms. As with agents, norms are 
also differentiated into two types: intentional (i.e., institutions/social norms) and physical-
causal (i.e., technical norms) (Bicchieri, 2005). In terms of human agents, these socioculturally 
situated, contingent institutions or social norms both support and constrain actions and 
decisions within certain contexts. Moreover, these types of norms can be explicit as well 
as tacit (Calvert, 1995). Because these types of norms are essentially social constructs, 
AAs cannot directly pattern themselves onto them as would be reasonably expected by 




allows design for a technical counterpart of institutions or, in other words, technical norms. 
5.4.2 EMBODYING VALUES IN AI SYSTEMS
Van de Poel (2020) provides a thorough account for how each of the elements within 
Table 1 can and cannot embody values. It merits noting that for the systems level of AI 
(as opposed to simply the element level), van de Poel (2020) offers the following account 
as a more salient way to begin thinking about designing AI systems to embody values: 
“Value V is embodied in sociotechnical system S if S is conducive to V because of those 
components of S that have been designed for V” (p. 403). Here, the conditional is neither 
overly exclusive nor exhaustive. It does not mandate that all components in an AI system 
need be designed for V in order for V to become embodied. This is because AI systems are 
often not (if at all) designed as whole systems. V can be obtained when relevant institutions 
and technical norms are likewise conducive to V. This notion of value embodiment permits, 
if not mandates, (re)design as a fundamental part of design practices. Relevant embodiable 
components of the system conducive to V for S suffice to embody V; a complete overhaul is 
not needed (van de Poel, 2020, p. 404). This account also allows for current sociotechnical 
systems already in pervasive use to embody values, which can change over time, through 
redesign. What components are relevant to any given system is predicated on the context. 
But given that institutions form the glue maintaining, supporting, and constraining the other 
components, van de Poel (2020) suggests they are a good starting point.
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
What this means for AWS is that the often-criticised unholy alliance between the military 
and industry (the military-industrial complex or MIC) becomes useful if such institutions are 
designed to be conducive to various values that critics of AWS argue are/will be lacking 
in fully AWS (i.e., conducive to the LOAC, IHL, etc.). But as described in Part I, the perhaps 
erroneous focus on autonomy as mala in se regarding AWS is likewise reiterated in this 
account of embodiment. The focus on autonomy has been a hallmark of research on AI. 
Yet this focus should fall less on AWS themselves and more on the norms, both institutional 
and technical, that mostly govern such autonomy. As I have aimed to argue here, VSD is 
fundamentally predicated on a systems-thinking approach. The embodiment of values is 
likewise supported and constrained by the many components that constitute such complex 
sociotechnical systems. However, the added elements that distinguish AI systems from 
other sociotechnical systems (i.e., AAs and technical norms) create additional loci to nest 
values within. The added complexity is mostly a function of the ability of AI to learn, adapt, 
and evolve over time, which further risks the disembodiment of values. Redesign as a 
function of full life-cycle monitoring (discussed in Chapter 6) provides a path to address 
these concerns and maintain MHC.
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The following chapter proposes an adapted VSD approach as a means to address the 
challenges discussed in this chapter. In doing so, it proposes AI4SG factors as a starting 
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When people know a number of things, and one of them understands how the things are 
systematically categorised and related, that person has an advantage over the others who 
don’t have the same understanding ― Luzatto (circa 1735)
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6.1 AI FOR SOCIAL GOOD: NORMS FOR AI DESIGN
The most thorough work on the harmonisation of AI4SG values was recently undertaken by 
Cowls, King, Taddeo, & Floridi (2019), who focus on factors ‘particularly relevant’ to AI (i.e., not 
exhausting the potential list of relevant factors). The seven factors that are particularly relevant 
for the design of AI towards social good are: (1) falsifiability and incremental deployment; (2) 
safeguards against the manipulation of predictors; (3) receiver-contextualised intervention; 
(4) receiver-contextualised explanation and transparent purposes; (5) privacy protection 
and data subject consent; (6) situational fairness; and (7) human-friendly semanticisation 
(Floridi et al., 2020, p. 1773). 
Although discussed separately, the seven factors naturally co-depend and co-vary with 
one another. Thus, they should not be understood as a rank-ordered hierarchy. These 
factors further relate, in some way, to at least one of the four ethical principles that the EU 
High-Level Expert Group on AI lays out: respect for human autonomy, prevention of harm, 
fairness and explicability. This mapping onto the more general values of ethical AI is not 
insignificant, as any divergence from these more general values has potentially deleterious 
consequences. What the seven factors are meant to do, then, is specify these higher-order 





















































Rather than reiterate what has already been clearly evaluated and discussed by Floridi et al. 
(2020), the below paragraphs briefly summarise each of the seven factors (later discussed 
in more detail) alongside ways that VSD practices can be levied to actualise these factors.
(1) Falsifiability and incremental deployment. 
To move the development of AI forward towards the embodiment of values such as 
transparency and safety, the value of falsifiability is important. This is because it is considered 
a critical factor in the social acceptance and trust of technologies more broadly. Falsifiability 
is defined as “the specification, and the possibility of empirical testing, of one or more 
critical requirements, that is, an essential condition, resource, or means for a capability to 
be fully operational, such that something could or should not work without it” (Floridi et al., 
2020, p. 1777). Other values implicated in AI design are thus predicated on their ability to be 
falsifiable or essential to the architectures of a technical system.  
This entails continued empirical testing, which must be undertaken in different contexts 
(and obviously cannot be exhausted without full deployment of a system) to best ascertain 
the possible failures for a system. There is thus a need for an incremental deployment 
cycle wherein systems are introduced into real-world contexts only when a minimum level 
of safety makes such deployment warranted. In sum, “AI4SG designers should identify 
falsifiable requirements and test them in incremental steps from the lab to the ‘outside 
world’” (Floridi et al., 2020, p. 7).
(2) Safeguards against the manipulations of predictors. 
The manipulation of predictors can lead to a range of potentially deleterious outcomes for 
AI, moving away from the promises of AI4SG. Floridi et al. (2020) describe the outcome of 
the manipulation of input data as well as overreliance on non-causal indicators (p. 1779). 
The nature of overreliance on non-causal indicators as well as the often overespoused 
but underthought value of transparency can lead to the gamification of systems towards 
desired ends by those who understand what inputs lead to what outputs (c.f., Boscoe, 2019; 
Ghani, 2016). To avoid this, Floridi et al. (2020) argue that “AI4SG designers should adopt 
safeguards…[to] ensure that non-causal indicators do not inappropriately skew interventions, 
…[and] limit, when appropriate, knowledge of how inputs affect outputs from AI4SG systems, 
to prevent manipulation” (Floridi et al., 2020, p. 1779). 
(3) Receiver-contextualised intervention. 
The co-construction and co-variance of technologies and users implicates a delicate 
balancing act between artifacts and their effect on user autonomy. Within the context of 
technological design and development, this is a value of particular importance (Umbrello, 
2019b). To balance the false positives and negatives that can result in suboptimal levels of 
user-technology interventions, users can be given optionality. This provides one possible 
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route for balancing interventions on autonomy. Optionality is contextualised based on 
“information about users’ capacities, preferences and goals, and the circumstances in 
which the intervention will take effect” (Floridi et al., 2020, p. 1780). Briefly, 
AI4SG designers should build-decision-making systems in consultation with users interacting 
with and impacted, by these systems; with understanding of users’ characteristics, of the 
methods of coordination, and the purposes and effects of an intervention; and with respect 
for users’ right to ignore or modify interventions. (Floridi et al., 2020, p. 1780)
(4) Receiver-contextualised explanation and transparent purposes.
The aims of any given system must be transparent. In other words, operations carried 
out by a system should be explicable or explainable so as to be understood. Given that 
the intricacies of the operations and objectives of a system are the consequence of 
design decisions, design is inextricably linked to these values. The evermore ubiquitous 
deployment of AI systems is already underway. The need for explicability and transparency 
in their operations and goals has garnered a lot of attention due to the potential harm 
that can come about as a consequence of opaque goals and operations (Allo et al., 2016; 
Turilli & Floridi, 2009). In terms of (3), the information used to explain the operations and 
objectives of a system should also be receiver-contextualised (Floridi et al., 2020). 
Because the goals, design programs, and tools used for differing AI4SG projects vary greatly, 
correct contextualisation will similarly vary. Floridi (2017) calls this conceptual schema (of 
what is being framed for whom) the Level of Abstraction. The Level of Abstraction consists 
of the five components that comprise any theory of a given system21. Because the inner 
workings and overall goals of any AI system are the outcomes of designer choices and 
design flows, there must be transparency regarding design decisions to determine if they 
map onto the motivation behind the design and deployment of any given system. The type 
of transparency, the goals, and designer intentions along with the level of transparency 
needed for successful explicability of the operations and goals of AI systems must 
necessarily be determined in the early stages of the design program in question. In other 
words, AI4SG designers should choose a Level of Abstraction for AI explanation that fulfils 
the desired explanatory purpose and is appropriate to the system and the receivers; then 
deploy arguments that are rationally and suitably persuasive for the receivers to deliver the 
explanation and ensure that the goal (the system’s purpose) for which an AI4SG system is 
developed and deployed is knowable to receivers of its outputs by default. (Floridi et al., 
2020, p. 1784)
21  For the sake of brevity and conciseness, I do not include the full description of the five levels of Abstraction. For further 





(5) Privacy protection and data subject consent. 
Scholarship on privacy protection and subject consent is both rich and nuanced, 
encompassing decades of socio-ethical and legal perspectives (among others) informing 
these topics. Given that privacy forms the basis for both good policy and just democratic 
regimes (Peters, 2018), AI4SG programs should naturally make this an essential factor 
(Solove, 2008). Tensions and boundaries between different levels and understandings of 
user data processing and use have already been explored; moreover, nuances in terms 
of how to adequately address such tensions have been proposed (Floridi, 2016; Price 
& Cohen, 2019). As stakeholder data is foundational to the usability and efficacy of AI 
systems, AI4SG systems must seek to provide a sufficient balance that respects the values 
of stakeholders in regard to data processing and storage. Accordingly, Floridi et al. (2020) 
note that “AI4SG designers should respect the threshold of consent established for the 
processing of datasets of personal data” (p. 1786). 
(6) Situational fairness. 
As mentioned in (5), data sets are critical to the function of AI systems. Datasets themselves 
can be biased on account of multiple factors (dataset collection, selection, categorisations, 
etc.). The resulting function of any given system can thus provide biased results (Boscoe, 
2019). Biased decision-making can take on ethical importance when relevant datasets 
involve ethically relevant categories for data, such as race, gender, or age, among other 
possibilities (Friedman & Nissenbaum, 1996). If we are to attain AI4SG, the propagation 
of bias in datasets must be avoided. This is because recursive improvements to systems 
only exacerbate bias if such improvements are designed or trained using biased datasets. 
So, “AI4SG designers should remove from relevant datasets variables and proxies that are 
irrelevant to an outcome, except when their inclusion supports inclusivity, safety, or other 
ethical imperatives” (Floridi et al., 2020, p. 1788). 
(7) Human-friendly semanticisation. 
Managing and maximising the ‘semantic capital’ of agents must be essential to the design 
of AI4SG systems. Floridi (2018) defines semantic capital as “any content that can enhance 
someone’s power to give meaning to and make sense of (semanticise) something” (p. 483). 
AI allows for automation of semanticisation, i.e., making sense of things, which can lead 
to ethically problematic results if done haphasardly. Arbitrary semanticisation can give 
meaning in ways that do not map onto our own understandings (random meaning-making). 
AI semanticisation can also be too narrow due to limited dataset exposure that allows for 
propagation of similarly narrow meanings, thus limiting the redefinition or interpretation 
of things (Al-Abdulkarim et al., 2016). Semanticisation is subjective due to the fact that 
the agent engaging in semanticisation is essential to what and how meaning is made. AI 
systems aimed at total semanticisation are thus unworkable and quixotic. The way around 
this is to delimit the tasks carried out by AI systems. There need not be a total abdication 
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of tasks. Rather, the ones that must be carried out by AI systems should be determined a 
priori to the deployment of an AI4SG system (Floridi et al., 2020). For this reason, “AI4SG 
designers should not hinder the ability for people to semanticise (that is, to give meaning 
to, and make sense of) something” (Floridi et al., 2020, p. 1789).
This section has condensed the seven essential factors necessary to the design of AI4SG 
systems as proposed by Floridi et al. (2020). We can now see how these factors help 
overcome the challenges posed to VSD by AI discussed in the previous chapter. If we adopt 
the specific example given in Chapter 5, then AI4SG norm #6 would require “[removing] 
from relevant datasets variables and proxies that are irrelevant to an outcome” (Floridi et 
al., 2020, p. 1788). This is in line with the traditional VSD approach, but it is not enough as AI 
bias may be emergent and/or hidden (opaque). To address the emergent character of bias, 
norm #1 is particularly important due to the emphasis on incremental development. This 
is primarily a procedural requirement that requires monitoring and extending VSD to the 
full-life cycle of design, as we discuss in greater detail in section 6.4. To avoid opaqueness, 
AI4SG principles #4 and #7 are important. Sometimes, they may imply that certain ML 
techniques should not be used. 
Taking these factors into consideration, the following sections integrate the discussion from 
the preceding chapter on VSD in an attempt to provide some preliminary approaches to 
employing VSD towards AI4SG design. 
6.2 INTEGRATING AI4SG PRINCIPLES AS DESIGN 
NORMS
To address the challenges posed to VSD by AI, we propose an adapted VSD approach. The 
adaptations we propose are threefold: 1) integrating AI4SG principles into VSD as design 
norms from which more specific design requirements can be derived; 2) distinguishing 
between values promoted by design and values respected by design to ensure that the 
resulting design not only does no harm, but also contributes to doing good; and 3) extending 
the VSD process to encompass the whole lifecycle of an AI technology in order to be able 
to monitor unintended value consequences and redesign the technology if necessary. This 























GP I, Art. 48 
GP I, Art. 52 (2)
Proportionality
HR IV, Arts. 22 & 23 
GP I, Art. 57
Military Necessity
H IV, Art. 23 (g)
St. Petersburg Declaration
Limitation
HR IV, Arts. 22 & 23 
GP I, Arts. 35 & 57
Good Faith
Humane Treatment & Non-
Discrimination
(hors de combat)
FIGURE 2. Values hierarchy. (Source: van de Poel, 2013)
6.3 DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN VALUES TO BE 
PROMOTED AND VALUES TO BE RESPECTED
In order for a VSD approach to AI to achieve more than just avoiding harm, an explicit 
orientation toward socially desirable ends is necessary. Such an orientation is still missing 
from current proposals for AI4SG. I propose addressing this gap with an explicit orientation 
to the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). This body of law, the LOAC, is predicated on the 
customary rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). It is the best approximation of what 
we collectively believe to be valuable military/wartime institutions. 
When it comes to the control of AWS (Jus ad Bellum) as well as their deployment (Jus in 
Bello), the former are related to a priori international norms of conflict management and 
customary law such as those of the UN Charter. The latter, which focuses on the rules of 
hostility in situ, include regulation such as the Geneva (in this case, Article 36 of Protocol 
I in particular [see below]) and Hague Conventions regarding the means and methods for 
hostilities. Figure 3 lists the LOAC and Article 36 as higher-order values to be promoted as 
much as possible.
In Chapter 3’s discussion on the operational level of control, we saw how rigorous the 
principles and practices of military operations are prior to deployment and engagement. 
The LOAC are equally rigorous and considered inseparable from the customary law of each 
nation-state signatory. They are thus valid at all times. For this reason, each participant 
within a systems’ operations is aware of these fundamental principles. As such, they are 
expected to become a frame for planning, practices, training, and operations. 
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GP I, Art. 48 
GP I, Art. 52 (2)
Proportionality
HR IV, Arts. 22 & 23 
GP I, Art. 57
Military Necessity
H IV, Art. 23 (g)
St. Petersburg Declaration
Limitation
HR IV, Arts. 22 & 23 
GP I, Arts. 35 & 57
Good Faith
Humane Treatment & Non-
Discrimination
(hors de combat)
FIGURE 3. Article 3622 as the value to be respected regarding the design, engineering, and deployment 
of an AWS as a function of the six LOAC. 
Now, for the sake of transparency, there are strong philosophical and legal arguments 
against the development of (fully) lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS)23. Gabriel Wood 
(2020) makes cogent arguments that the pro-LAWS position is self-undermining for various 
reasons. But he is also clear that such a position does not, and perhaps should not, exclude 
the possibility of researching and designing certain types of AWS. That is the position 
forwarded by this thesis at the onset (i.e., a more nuanced distinction between types of 
AWS to strengthen prohibitive measures). Proponents suggest LAWS are technically more 
capable, either now or in the future, of engaging in warfare to a higher degree of accuracy, 
speed, and target discrimination. The primary argument here is that if this is true, then such 
can also be said for their ability to conduct warfare in a non-lethal capacity. This nullifies 
the arguments for lethality as a necessary component. I, myself, have made the argument 
elsewise that such technical capacities make LAWS preferable (Umbrello, 2019a; Umbrello 
22  In the study, the development, acquisition, or adoption of a new weapon, means, or method of warfare involves a 
High Contracting Party. The Party has an obligation to determine whether its employment would, whether in some or all 
circumstances, be prohibited by the Protocol or any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting 
Party (Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (AP I), 1979).
23  Recall the distinction (noted in the introduction and Annex I) that AWS can be categorised into offensive and defensive 




et al., 2020). For me, Wood’s arguments are philosophically robust enough to neutralise 
them. 
Still (and as this thesis proposes), the argument is less so about the problem of lethality and 
more so about the ‘problem’ of autonomy as the basis for a ban. His argument is oriented 
towards those of AWS proponents whereas mine is oriented towards those of anti-AWS or 
pro-ban proponents. But these seemingly opposite positions arrive at a similar conclusion. 
At the very least, Wood (2020) and I agree that: 
we should welcome the development of autonomous weapons while doing 
our utmost that they are programmed in such a way as to adhere to all the 
laws of war, bearing in mind how their own capabilities will affect the moral 
and legal prescriptions in a given scenario. (p. 234) 
This is an attempt to do just that.
6.4 EXTENDING VSD TO THE ENTIRE LIFECYCLE
To address the emergent and possibly unintended properties acquired by AI systems as 
they learn, VSD should be extended to the full life cycle of AI technologies. This allows 
continued monitoring of the potential for unintended value consequences, which would 
further require redesigning the technology as needed (De Reuver et al., 2020; van de Poel, 
2020). As already mentioned, AI4SG Principal (1) voices a similar idea: “AI4SG designers 
should identify falsifiable requirements and test them in incremental steps from the lab to 
the ‘outside world’” (Floridi et al., 2020, p. 1777). The need for ongoing monitoring arises 
from the uncertainties accompanying new technologies upon their introduction to society 
(van de Poel, 2016). The  previous chapter discusses how this is a fundamental necessity 
in the precept of embodied values, as such values can manifest themselves in different 
ways throughout the lifecycle of an AI system (c.f., Mökander and Floridi (2021)). In these 
cases, post hoc redesign likewise becomes necessary. But it can only be triggered through 
epistemic access granted for continual monitoring over the full life cycle of the system. 
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6.5 MAPPING VALUE SENSITIVE DESIGN ONTO AI 
FOR SOCIAL GOOD PRINCIPLES
Taking the above into account, VSD for AI proceeds in four iterative phases (Figure 4) briefly 
described below: 
• Concept design
• Translate values into 
design requirements
• Value conflicts and choice 
between alternatives
• Detail design
• Build prototypes 
embodying relevant values
• Small-scale testing




• Case-specific values: value 
scenarios
• Military challenges
• Existing sociotechnical 
systems and networks










FIGURE 4. VSD design process for AI technologies. Source: Umbrello & van de Poel, 2021 (modified).
6.5.1 CONTEXT ANALYSIS
Motivations for design differ across different projects. For this reason, there is no normative 
starting point from which all designers should begin. VSD acknowledges that technology 
design can begin with the discrete technology itself as a starting point, or the context for use, 
or a certain value (Figure 5). In all cases, analysis of the context is crucial. Various contextual 
variables come into play that impact the way values are understood (in the second phase), 
both in conceptual terms as well as in practice, on account of different sociocultural and 
political norms. Eliciting stakeholders in sociocultural contexts is imperative within the VSD 
approach to determine whether the explicated values of the project map faithfully onto 
those of both direct and indirect stakeholders. Empirical investigations thus play a key role 









FIGURE 5. Starting considerations for VSD. Typically, one of the three is most pertinent to any given 
design. (Umbrello, 2021)
6.5.2 VALUE IDENTIFICATION
The second phase concerns identification of a set of values that form the starting point of 
the design process. We suggest three main sources for such values: 
1) values that are to be promoted by the design, such as by deriving from the LOAC; 
2) values that should be respected, especially those identified in relation to AI. 
These include respect for human autonomy, prevention of harm (nonmaleficence), 
fairness, and explicability (Floridi et al., 2018; High-Level Expert Group on AI, 2019); 
and
3) context-specific values that are not covered by the first two sources. They derive 
instead from analysis of the specific context in the first phase, especially of the 
values held by stakeholders. 
It should be noted that the second phase does not just involve empirical investigations. 
Rather, it has a distinct normative flavour in the sense that it results in the identification of 
values that should be upheld in further design from a normative point of view. In addition, 
this phase involves conceptual investigations geared at interpreting (in context) and 
conceptualising relevant values. 
6 6
ADAPTING THE VSD APPROACH 
159
6.5.3 FORMULATING DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
The third phase involves the formulation of design requirements on the basis of the 
contextual analysis (phase 1) and identified values (phase 2). Here, tools such as the value 
hierarchy can be useful to mutually relate values and design requirements or to translate 
values into design requirements (Figure 2). We suggest that the translation of values into 
design requirements is somewhat different for the sets of values formulated in the second 
phase. The first set of values derived from the LOAC and Article 36, for example, are values 
to be promoted. They are typically translated into design requirements formulated as 
criteria that should be achieved as much as possible. The second set of values are those 
that need to be respected, especially as relates to AI. We find the AI4SG principles are 
particularly helpful for formulating more specific design requirements. These requirements 
will most likely be formulated as constraints or boundary conditions rather than as criteria 
that should be achieved as much as possible; boundary conditions set the deontological 
constraints that any design must meet to be ethically (minimally) acceptable. For the third 
set of contextual values, the context analysis – and in particular the stakeholder analysis – 
will most likely play an important role in how these are translated into design requirements.
6.5.4 PROTOTYPING 
The fourth phase is the building of tests for prototypes that meet the design requirements. 
This idea is in line with what is more generally described in VSD as a “value-oriented 
mock-up, prototype, or field deployment” (Friedman & Hendry, 2019, p. 62). We propose 
extending this phase to the entire life cycle of an AI technology because, even if such 
technologies initially meet value-based design requirements, they may develop in such a 
way that unexpected and undesirable effects materialise. They could also simply no longer 
achieve the value for which they were intended, or their use may have unforeseen side 
effects that require consideration of additional values (van de Poel, 2018). In such cases, 
there is reason to redesign the technology and do another iteration of the cycle.
6.6 CONCLUSIONS
Predicated on the philosophical underpinnings of Chapter 5, this chapter outlines how VSD 
methodology can and should be adapted to meet the specific challenges that come with AI 
systems design. In order to ensure adoptability and illustrate the efficacy of this approach, 
the following chapter uses the example central to this thesis – aerial (fully) AWS – to more 
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THE AI4SG-VSD DESIGN PROCESS IN ACTION: 
MULTI-TIERED DESIGN AND MULTI-TIERED MHC
Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow 
commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the 
use of force. 




As discussed in the previous chapter and Annex II, a VSD program can begin in at least 
one of three ways: with (1) a technology, (2) one or more values, and/or (3) the context of 
use. In the case of AWSs, the context of use can be construed as the motivating factor 
behind their design and development, such as the need to extricate more human operators 
from hot zones and/or increase cost-efficiency while maintaining operational efficacy. 
The design of systems such as aerial fully AWSs should be explicitly oriented at trying 
to manage tensions and eliminate the moral overload of prima facie conflicting values 
(ICRC, 2002). The prioritisation and subsequent operationalisation of certain values over 
others is directly contingent on the context of use. Consequentially, this context can result 
in one or more values being set aside in favour of prioritising others. For example, the 
value of discrimination (in the sense of properly discriminating between targets, or hors 
de combat) may be set aside in favour of that of military necessity and proportionality with 
regards to aerial AWSs, since discrimination is a necessary part of the a priori briefings of 
the operational level of control and therefore may not need to be prioritised as a technical 
design requirement, whereas other values may (this may even include human judgment of 
the level of lethality with regards to the former two values as a function of weaponeering).
7.2 VALUE IDENTIFICATION 





7.2.1 VALUES TO BE PROMOTED BY DESIGN: LOACS
As mentioned in Chapter 5, AWSs, whether fully (level 5) or semi-autonomous, should not 
be construed as artificial moral agents (AMAs; ICRC, 2002) similar to human combatants, 
but rather as novel weapons that are capable of being designed so as to embody values, 
making them artificial agents (cf., Chapter 5). In light of this, Article 36 de facto brings these 
types of systems under its normative umbrella. Therefore, for such systems to be compliant 
and embody the values expressed by the LOACs, the design requirements translated from 
these higher-order values must promote compliance towards these LOACs as much as 
possible, despite their status as existent necessities that define much of the operational 
level of MHC (cf., Chapter 6, Figure 3).
Distinction (GP I, Art. 48 and GP I, Art. 52 (2)): The MIC must clearly distinguish between 
civilian objects (i.e., people and associated public/private entities and infrastructures). To 
this end, civilians must be protected as much as possible, although they may of course lose 
this protection if they engage in hostilities. 
Proportionality (HR IV, Arts. 22 & 23 and GP I, Art. 57): When military targets are attacked, 
civilians must be protected as much as possible (i.e., distinction). Although civilian objects 
may be collateral damage during engagement with a military target, such damage must be 
proportional and not excessive to the military objective; “To avoid violating this principle 
requires thought and effort. Poor planning and intelligence, slack staff work, leadership, 
command and control can easily result in the destruction of a whole town or village, with its 
hospitals, religious centres and civilian population” (ICRC, 2002, p. 12). Such proportionality 
assessments belong firmly in the operational level of MHC, as described in Chapter 3. 
Military necessity (H IV, Art. 23 (g)): Contingent on the above two laws, military necessity 
allows for the realities of battle to manifest as permitting whatever “reasonable force is 
necessary, is lawful and can be operationally justified in combat to make your opponent 
submit” (ICRC, 2002, p. 12). 
Limitation (HR IV, Arts. 22 & 23 and GP I, Arts. 35 & 57): In direct relation to AWSs, the means 
and tools used by states to wage warfare are not unconstrained. International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL) constrains if/how tactics and weapons are employed on the battlefield; “Weapons 
and tactics that are of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury are 
prohibited” (ICRC, 2002, p. 12). As Gabriel Wood (2020) explains, AWSs that are sufficiently 
advanced, as suggested by their proponents, may de facto contravene the law of limitation, 
given their potential ability to be unimaginably fast, precise, efficient, and thereby a fortiori 
unlawful since the need for lethality consequentially becomes “unnecessary.”  
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Good Faith and Humane Treatment and Non-Discrimination as part of the LOACs are not 
discussed here because they are particular not to the technology of use but to the conduct 
of the military and their a priori use of such tools, rather than the technical function and 
design of the tools themselves. That is not to say that they are not important; however, for the 
purposes of this thesis, and to demonstrate how engineers can begin to think systemically 
about AWS designs that incorporate MHC, the four LOACs above are used as illustrations. 
7.2.2 VALUES RESPECTED BY THE DESIGN
This second level of values are ones to be promoted, especially in relation to AI. 
Respect for Human Autonomy: We increasingly interact with autonomous decision-making 
systems in different domains. Such systems influence our lives in various and multifaceted 
ways, from shaping the context in which individual decision making occurs, to altering 
interactions between individuals and assumptions of democratic participation. Autonomy 
thus refers to the capability of agents to retain full freedom of choice, in tandem with the 
delegation of decisions to systems. Systems, in turn, should be designed so as to promote 
autonomy, avoiding those cases whereby their efficacy falls short in terms of making 
consistent and coherent decisions on the behalf of human users (Floridi et al., 2018). With 
regards to aerial fully AWSs, this autonomy is understood to mean both technical autonomy 
as a function of reason-responsiveness (i.e., the design level of MHC) and the constraints 
on autonomy as a function of the operational level. 
Prevention of harm (or nonmaleficence): This value seeks to prevent risks and harm by 
the understanding the capabilities and limitations of the systems. This is of course in direct 
relation to both abstraction levels of MHC. More specifically, at least one (human) moral 
agent(s) must understand not only the systems’ capabilities and limitations (i.e., on the 
design level), but also as the basis for weaponeering the AWS as a viable and therefore 
lawful option for any given operation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this value 
should not be misconstrued as “doing no harm” in the most exclusive and exhaustive of 
senses. If such AWSs actually arrive at the technical capabilities that Arkin (2008), Guetlein 
(2005), and even myself (Umbrello et al., 2020) have espoused, then they would de facto 
violate the law of limitation, given that such technical prowess would make lethality per se 
unnecessary and subsequently unlawful. Although  we have discussed machines designed 
for death, we must nonetheless remain lawful and always under MHC. This can only be 
accomplished if the agents involved in the design and deployment of such systems are 
sufficiently cooperative to ensure that the knowledge transfer between design and operation 
does not leave epistemic gaps. To this end, and similar to how van Wynsberghe (2012, p. 
111) describes nonmaleficence in her care-centred framework for VSD, nonmaleficence can 
be subsumed under the value of competence, which asserts a system’s capacities and 




safety, efficiency, and quality of task execution, among others. 
Floridi et al. (2018) argue that the value of fairness can be framed as justice and defined 
in a tripartite manner: (1) using AI to correct past wrongs, such as eliminating unfair 
discrimination; (2) ensuring that the use of AI creates benefits that are shared (or at least 
sharable); (3) preventing the creation of new harms, such as the undermining of existing 
social structures (i.e., LOACs/the IHL). With regards to AWSs, fairness can be understood 
technically as promoting distinction to ensure lawful target acquisition and its subsequent 
weapons release, in addition to the social structure of the MIC to promote non-discrimination 
more generally by not introducing technical systems that undermine this LOAC as it is more 
broadly understood. 
The value of explicability means that AI systems should be intelligible and non-opaque, and 
there should be at least one agent that can be considered accountable for the operation of 
the system; i.e., the tracking condition of the design level (Floridi et al., 2018). In AI contexts, 
this raises questions regarding potential accountability gaps, which – beyond the issues of 
information disclosure and visibility – address the need for modalities to render systems 
explainable and understandable to users and stakeholders at large (Mecacci & de Sio, 
2019; Pasquale, 2017). 
7.2.3 CONTEXT-SPECIFIC VALUES NOT COVERED BY (1) AND (2)
As discussed in the introduction, Annex I, and Part I, the development of AWSs can be 
understood as being motivated by a number of converging factors, such as the existent 
trend of increasing automation and the efficiency provided by such systems, the military 
advantage of having tools that provide asymmetric gains, and, of course, the abdication of 
traditionally dangerous military operations away from human operators. Many of the values 
and ethical issues that have potentially emerged as a consequence of the design and 
deployment of AWSs have already been discussed, such as the values espoused by the 
LOACs and Article 36 governing new weapons technologies. However, if the two-tiered 
understanding of MHC described in this thesis is to actually obtain, then, as mentioned, the 
various industrial partners responsible for much of the design and engineering of AWSs 
cannot be extricated from the deployment process; rather, they need to form stronger 
partnerships as part of the MIC. This is the case since the design side of MHC (i.e., the 
industrial partners) forms a set of relevant and even direct stakeholders, seeing as the 
AWS should necessarily be reason-responsive, and also because the design histories of 
such systems necessarily trace back to these agents. They too must then be considered 
direct stakeholders for salient design to take place, rather than be allowed to abdicate their 
moral responsibility to the more direct operational and causal (albeit not always merely 
causal) forward-operating commanders on the deployment side. As such, given the role 
of the industrial side as fundamentally constitutive of MHC over these systems in action, 
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in addition to the framework for MHC and how VSD can be employed for MHC (i.e., full-
lifecycle monitoring and redesign), a contextual analysis serves to elicit such classes of 
values, which relate to the stakeholders’ values and preferences (cf., the common interest 
of the international communities to preserve the values discussed in §7.1). 
Aside from the higher-level distal values of the international community that have given 
rise to the LOACs, Article 36, and other norms that govern AWSs, the systems need to 
not only cater and thus be sensitive to this class of reasons (i.e., stakeholders) but also be 
responsive to distal and proximal reasons of the MICs, as they relate more closely to the 
military objectives and the fundamentally economic values that drive the industrial side 
of the network. In §7.3, I provide some examples of how MIC partnerships, particularly at 
the systems engineering level (i.e., the industrial side), can begin translating higher-order 
values such as the LOACs as well as the values important to the continued sustainability of 
their MIC partnerships as well as their own economic reasons. The latter values are not to 
be construed as being in tension with the other classes of reasons (i.e., economic values 
may only be prima facie in a state of moral overload (van den Hoven et al., 2012)) or with 
the LOACs/Article 36; instead they can be remediated through both salient engineering and 
regulatory measures that legitimise the group agency and moral responsibility of the MIC, 
thereby highlighting the existing relationship between these actors. As previously stated, 
the existent network that constitutes the MIC makes a distinction without differences, since 
the systemic synergy that results in the design and deployment of AWSs, like any other 
system-within-a-system in the military, is not isolatable, and any attempt at such an isolation 
would result in a category error. Therefore, the delineation between military and industry 
as particulars is but performative; in reality, their function is itself an interdependent and 
co-dependent relationship necessitating the need for stakeholders in and of themselves 
within this paradigm.
7.3 FORMULATING DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
Although various instruments and methods characteristic of the VSD methodology can be 
adopted to help designers distil and formalise the necessary requirements for any given 
design, the values hierarchy (i.e., Annex II, Figure 6; Chapter 6, Figure 2) is nonetheless 
useful as a way to illustrate and trace design requirements from norms to values, and vice 
versa. Figure 2 is one example of how to visualise the translation of higher-level values, 
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FIGURE 2. Bidirectional hierarchy of distinction, explicability, and maleficence 
Here, distinction is chosen as the value to be promoted; it is then understood and/or satisfied 
as much as possible by the constraining values of nonmaleficence and explicability as 
the value to be respected. These two constraining values are then translated into AI4SG 
norms (1, 4, and 7, respectively), which in turn are transformed into design requirements. In 
this paradigm, AI4SG principles are adopted as norms, and rightly so, given that they are 
framed as imperatives by Floridi et al. (2020). Naturally, any given context of use, value, and 
specific technology will implicate any number of combinations, and there is no exclusive 
or exhaustive route to satisfy a value translation. It can move either in a bottom-up (or left 
to right, as Figure 2 illustrates; design requirements  norms  values) or a top-down 
(right to left; values  norms  design requirements) direction, as shown above (cf., Longo 
et al., 2020). Situational fairness could just as easily, and probably should, be used as 
the normative tool for operationalising other values, including explicability (i.e., transparent 
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dataset collection, use, storage, and destruction as well as the use of other methods such 
as predictive explanations and recourse interfaces; Yang et al., 2020) as well as justice 
(i.e., promoting non-discriminatory practices through unbiased compliance; e.g., using for 
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FIGURE 3. Bidirectional hierarchy of distinction and respect for human autonomy
Figure 3 again demonstrates that, as stated above, there is no exhaustive way of satisfying 
a value through its translation into design requirements. Here, the same higher value of 
distinction as the one selected for promotion can be understood in conjunction with respect 
for human autonomy – an organic coupling, since their definitional interrelation can be 
translated through AI4SG #3 and #7 (among which the latter is also fundamentally linked 
to the value of explicability in Figure 2, effectively showcasing how the different values 
and AI4SGs are all interrelated and not ordered by rank). Human-friendly semantics are 
necessary here for the relevant moral agents in the design and the use of AWS chains to 
understand the nature and rationale of a specific action on the part of the system. They 
are also an epistemic necessity for proper receiver-contextualised intervention so as to 




of both entities. Here, direct operational control is made possible (i.e., part of the optionality 
of AI4SG #3) while still permitting the system to retain full technical autonomy. Wirth regards 
to the dangers potentially posed by AWSs, full manual override can be permitted for such 
systems, in addition to recourse interfaces and/or monitoring panels that ensure full-lifecycle 
monitoring (e.g., Fair-MAML is one of many examples of a technical option for this norm). 
At a functional level, the normative structure of the AI4SG norms prevents (most) ethical 
harms associated with AI systems. However, they do not guarantee per se that new AI 
applications will actively contribute to the greater social good. The higher-level values 
listed above (i.e., the EU HLEG AI), in conjunction with the related real operationalisation 
of the LOACs, allows for the development of more salient AI systems that contribute to 
global beneficence (i.e., international normative compliance). This multi-tiered approach of 
coupling AI specific and stakeholder values, along with their application to LOAC attainment 
via AI4SG norms, can mitigate dangers posed by the ethical white-washing that occurs 
through the legitimisation of AI technologies that do not respect certain fundamental ethical 
principles (Bietti, 2020; Metzinger, 2019; Reuters, 2021; Sloane, 2019).
Nonetheless, it is becoming increasingly apparent how designers can begin to design 
for MHC with regards to the design level thereof. In order to saliently design for maximal 
reason-responsiveness to both distal and proximal values, the design level should follow 
the requirements outlined in Chapters 5 and 6 on how to accurately embody values in 
sociotechnical systems. In the illustration above, for example, avoiding nonmaleficence can 
be translated into the norm of  falsifiability and incremental deployment (AI4SG #1) as a 
means to attain one of the necessary ingredients for responsibly embodying values in AI 
systems; i.e., the ability for redesigning through continual lifecycle monitoring. In Figure 2, 
this can be incrementally attained through technical design requirements such as model 
validation, adversarial training, and real-time monitoring to ensure the continuity of the build-
in concepts and allow for the possibility of a redesign otherwise. This real-time monitoring 
throughout the lifecycle of an AWS enables the accurate mapping of both higher-order 
values such as the LOACs to be continually validated in situ while also attending to value 
drift in the event of recalcitrance. 
 
This is similarly true for the constraining value of explicability. Part of the tracking condition 
is the presence of at least one agent (individual or group) along the design and use chain 
of an AWS who understands the abilities and limitations of the system. As I argued earlier, 
decisions to employ such system, regardless of the cognitive clarity of the system itself, are 
also constrained by the operational level of MHC as a predicate of weaponeering choices. 
Nonetheless, this is necessary for the tracking condition to obtain; thus, even permitting 
higher levels of autonomy under this understanding of MHC, a system must be sufficiently 
explicable that such abilities and constraints are continuously accessible by the relevant 
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moral agents in the design and use chain. Receiver-contextualised explanations and 
transparent purposes are the normative factors in which this concept can be most aptly 
understood. Translated into certain preliminary design requirements, this can be obtained 
via the implementation of recourse interfaces and predictive explanation tools to allow for 
more real-time understanding of system behaviour. Such tools are likewise interrelated with 
satisfying and/or strengthening the other values, such as nonmaleficence, in the above 
figure, given that more accurate, real-time, and transparent purposes as well as predictive 
explanation tools enable better lifecycle monitoring and more proximal redesigning to take 
place in the iterative process of VSD. 
In any event, this type of visualisation can be used across different sources as listed above, 
such as the LOACs and stakeholder values, to determine how accurately related values can 
produce both similar and different technical design requirements. Future research projects 
can approach this empirically by taking any particular fully AWS variant and providing 
thorough value-design requirement translations to determine its effectiveness. All in all, the 
present goal is to more effectively design for various values in mind – ones that are often 
erroneously conflated if not completely side-lined. 
7.4 PROTOTYPING
In a recent Washington Post piece regarding the employment of AWSs as a means of more 
“ethical” warfare, one of the interviewees, William B. Roper Jr., a foreign policy strategist 
who served as the 13th Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics and one of the Pentagon’s chief proponents for the adoption of AI technologies, 
stated, “It doesn’t make sense to study anything in the era of AI […]. It’s better to let the AI 
start doing and learning, because it’s a living, breathing system, very much like a human, 
just silicon-based” (Fryer-Biggs, 2021). This could not be further from reality, both in regards 
to the explicit push towards direct deployment without falsifiability tests and incremental 
deployment (i.e., AI4SG #1) and in terms of the erroneous equivocation of human learning 
to that of machine learning. With regards to systems capable of such destruction, more 
prudence – not less – is needed in order to ensure that they remain lawful, and thus the 
adoption of a viable weaponeering option for military operations (i.e., under MHC). Part of 
this is a necessary orientation towards making falsifiability and incremental deployment – 
i.e., prototyping and full-lifecycle monitoring – a critical part of designing for MHC.
According to the design requirements laid out in the previous step, prototyping involves 
building mock-ups of the technology in question. This means that the technology is 
removed from the more controlled space of the laboratory or design space and built in 




design decisions may prove to be recalcitrant, or otherwise unforeseen recalcitrant 
behaviour emerges to involve other values. At this point, given the limited deployment of 
the technology, it can be recalled into the design space so that corrective modifications can 
be implemented. With regards to fully AWSs, the motivation behind their development is not 
as urgent as e.g., SARS-CoV-2 contact/tracing technologies, which are spurred on by the 
global crisis conditions and therefore resist slower prototyping and limited testing in favour 
of direct deployment. The development of fully AWSs, then, need not and should not follow 
the unwise route of direct deployment, given the significant risks that AI systems possess, 
particularly ones predicated on such large quantities of data with direct lethal capabilities. 
Small-scale deployment or in-house testing of the efficacy and fidelity of the ability of a 
system to be reason-responsive in potentially complex and dynamic scenarios – vis-à-vis 
war game scenarios – are a necessary (albeit insufficient) condition for the responsible 
development of an AI system of this type to ensure that it can aid in the achievement of 
positive ethical/societal values (i.e., beneficence, justice, explicability, autonomy, and the 
associated distal LOACs) while reducing the ethical (AI) risks (i.e., nonmaleficence). 
It should be especially stressed that prototyping should not be restricted to testing the 
proper technical functioning of an app; it should also account for behavioural and societal 
effects as well as their ultimate impact on the values. The fully AWS is a case in point 
here. While some values – such as explicability and respect for human autonomy – can 
be designed within a system through technical choices, including complexity modelling, 
proper data collection and categorisation, recourse interfaces, and other auxiliary tools, 
some of the other concerns require insight into the behavioural effects of such AWSs. These 
behavioural effects are very difficult, if not impossible, to reliably predict without some form 
of prototyping or, at least, small-scale in-situ testing. It would therefore be advisable to 
conduct a number of trials for such systems that scale up through settings of increasing 
size, starting from very small-scale testing with mock-ups (not unlike what is done in medical 
experiments with new drugs). Such testing trajectories might also reveal new values of 
significance that need to be considered, which can thereby trigger a new iteration of the 
development cycle. 
7.5 CONCLUSIONS
The second part of this thesis discussed how AI systems can pose certain challenges for 
the VSD approach to technology. These challenges primarily result from the use of ML 
approaches to AI, the approaches that are most probable to be adopted for AWS design. 
Machine learning poses two challenges to VSD. First, it may be opaque (to humans) 
how an AI system has learned certain things, which requires attention to such values as 
transparency, explicability, and accountability. Second, ML may lead AI systems to adapt 
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themselves such that they “disembody” the values that have been embodied in them by 
VSD designers. In order to deal with these challenges, an extension of VSD to the whole 
lifecycle of AI systems design was proposed. More specifically, I discussed how the AI4SG 
principles proposed by Floridi et al. can be integrated as norms in VSD when considering 
AI design. In order to integrate the AI4SG principles into a more systematic VSD approach, 
I presented a design process that consists of four basic iterative steps: contextual analysis, 
value identification, translation of values into design requirements, and prototyping. At the 
core of this model is a two-tiered approach to values in AI consisting of (1) a real commitment 
to contributing to beneficence via an explicit design orientation for the LOACs through AI 
and (2) the formulation and strict adoption of a number of concrete AI4SG norms. Without 
the first tier, AI4SG factors may help to prevent (most) categories of ethical harm, but there 
is absolutely no guarantee that new AI applications will actively contribute to the greater 
social good. Meanwhile, the second tier eliminates the risk of societal challenges and of 
LOACs being used to legitimise AI technologies that do not respect certain fundamental 
ethical principles; i.e. the danger of ethical white-washing (which is already visible on 
the webpages of some large companies). In addition, it is important to pay attention to 
contextual values – or at least to the contextual interpretation of the values from the two 
tiers. This is necessary for understanding why certain values are at stake for a specific 
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Considering the ongoing international discussions on the ethics and legality of AWSs 
and whether we can have MHC over certain levels of autonomy, this thesis focuses on 
a more pragmatic understanding of autonomy in the military domain as well as how to 
design for MHC in ensuring the responsible design and deployment of certain types of fully 
AWSs. To this end, this thesis focuses on the question: how can we understand autonomy 
so as to construct a more grounded conception of MHC, and how can we explicitly 
design for MHC? In response to this question, Chapter 2 argued that we cannot jump right 
into questions of autonomy or MHC without first acknowledging the sociotechnicity of 
artefacts and, by extension, that a systems thinking ontology provides a solid framework 
for conceptualising the interconnectedness between AWSs and their social contexts (e.g., 
military, industry, legal norms, and human agents, among others). Avoiding this ontological 
step may cause us to miss the forest for the trees in correctly understanding MHC. In fact, 
systems thinking and systems engineering originated in the military domain for this very 
reason; viz., the complex networks of agents and technologies make salient design and 
deployment difficult, if not impossible, without being viewed and designed through such 
lenses and approaches. 
Aligned with the complexity of the various sociotechnical contexts in which we need to 
understand the design and use of fully AWSs, Chapter 3 outlined two different levels of 
abstraction (LoAs) that, when coupled, form a more holistic understanding of MHC. More 
precisely, the MHC of AWSs cannot be divorced from actual military operations planning 
and management. This managerial and planning abstraction is essential to a systems 
thinking approach (and thus systems engineering) and how autonomy is supported and 
constrained per se, regardless of whether the agent is a human soldier or an AWS. By the 
very nature of the military system, AWSs can be said to be under a certain level of MHC, 
all else being equal on the technical side (i.e., it is fully responsive to all the intentions and 
expectations of military leaders). I call this the operational level of control in understanding 
MHC. However, this is barring the actual technical design, which also needs to align with 
the LOACs and military priorities. The design level of control is a function of the  reason-
responsiveness of an AWS to the moral reasons of the relevant agents in the design history 
and use chain of a system. Once again, the systemic nature of AWSs and their context plays 
a crucial role here. The level of design does not place the burden of control exclusively on 
the end-user but on at least one of the moral agents in this design/use chain. This does 
not necessarily mean a single human agent; it can also include supraindividual agents such 
as the military itself and naturally its partnerships with the industrial firms that design and 
construct AWSs. 
Chapter 4 then united these two levels of abstraction into what is arguably a more 
comprehensive understanding of MHC for AWSs. It did so by placing AWSs within their 




uses of these types of system as well as all agents and systems within that domain. The 
chapter also examined the level of design and the technical functionality of an autonomous 
system and its sensitivity to the moral reason(s) of the relevant agent(s). If a system is 
designed to be maximally responsive to these types of reasons, then it cannot only be 
designated under MHC; autonomy per se is not mala in se as many ban proponents believe, 
but can actually be used to augment MHC. Hence, the marriage of both levels of MHC 
(i.e., operational and design) was shown to be symbiotic with regards to MHC. Here, the 
argument is that military operations typically already constrain the autonomy of any and all 
agents within the military-industrial complex as a function of the procedures that necessarily 
take place a priori to the deployment of force (i.e., the operational level). Likewise, the close 
cooperation between institutions and infrastructures that constitute the military-industrial 
complex (e.g., the military, industry, government, and legislative norms, among others) form 
the supraindividual agent that can be called the possessor of MHC if the design history 
can be  traced  and its behaviours can be  tracked  to the relevant moral agents (i.e., the 
MIC). These two levels of abstraction warrant closer cooperation within the MIC to enable 
more accurate mapping of the moral intentions of the relevant agents onto the AWSs that 
are being developed/deployed. The consequence here is that if MHC obtains across both 
levels of control, then autonomy per se  is not the problematic vector; it can actually be 
increased, thereby increasing MHC.
Value-sensitive design has been adopted as a principled approach for the design of 
various existent as well as futuristic/transformative technologies. The VSD approach is 
fundamentally predicated on the interactional stance on technology – or, more precisely, 
that societal and social factors co-construct and co-vary with technological artefacts. Part of 
this approach is that technologies embody values. However, AI systems, like projected (fully)
AWS, that employ machine learning (ML) and/or artificial neural networks are often opaque, 
and the values that they may (dis)embody can therefore be unforeseen or unforeseeable. 
Chapter 5 discussed the myriad ways in which technologies embody values and how they 
fit within the larger systems thinking approach, as well as how to more saliently frame the 
embodiment of values for AI systems such as AWSs. Because ML systems (often) learn 
in ways that are opaque to humans, we need to pay close attention to values such as 
transparency, explicability, and accountability. To address this issue, as well as the potential 
“disembodiment” of certain values over time, Chapter 6 proposed a threefold modified 
VSD approach: (1) integrating a known set of VSD principles (AI4SG) as design norms, 
from which more specific design requirements can be derived; (2) distinguishing between 
values that are promoted and respected by the design to ensure outcomes that cause 
no disproportionate harm as well as actively promote just war; and (3) extending the VSD 
process to encompass the whole lifecycle of an AI technology, so as to monitor unintended 




Finally, in Chapter 7, I demonstrated the AI4SG-VSD approach described in the two 
preceding chapters with the AWS as the use case. In doing so, I outlined the various 
values to be promoted (i.e., the LOACs), the constraining values to be respected (i.e., the 
EU HLEG AI), as well as the AI4SG norms as a means for translating these abstract values 
into technical design requirements. The hierarchy of values was chosen as the tool for 
illustrating how designers can begin to conceptualise this transition into designing for values 
rather than doing so ex post facto, ad hoc, or not at all. Furthermore, the chapter discussed 
how full-lifecycle monitoring and incremental deployment into an envelope of safe can 
be used to determine the emergent behaviours and consequent implicated values, which 
in turn informs us if a redesign is necessary for a system. In the event that this cannot be 
accomplished, then such types of systems should be considered de facto, or otherwise 
prohibited on account of the associated risks of bypassing such an approach. 
Thus, is meaningful human control over fully AWSs possible? I have aimed to argue yes, 
but only in some instances. This thesis makes a strong case for a nuanced answer; more 
specifically, as things stand, this thesis argues for the possibility of achieving not only MHC, 
but MHC with greater autonomy in certain aerial fully AWSs. Through strong partnerships 
between and within the MIC, clearer design histories and use chains can be determined 
so as to communicate and transfer knowledge between stakeholders adequately. Similarly, 
the salient and lawful weaponeering of systems such as AWSs is directly contingent on 
these types of cooperation, and it bridges any epistemic gaps that designers and users 
may have. Therefore, the systems have to be designed such that they are sufficiently 
reason-responsive to these supraindividual agents. If what I have tried to demonstrate in 
this thesis obtains, then this type of MHC is not only possible but also preferable, and it 
should be seriously considered by both armed forces and policymakers as a salient middle 
path that can satisfy military intentions as well as restrict more egregious forms of AWSs. 
In either case, one may argue that the paths laid out in this thesis are overly constraining. 
The objectives of human-like fully AWSs, ground-based or otherwise, are excluded in this 
landscape, as they arguably should be. To reiterate a similar thought by Scott Robbins, 
“the future of AI is not, and should not be, machines from which human moral responsibility 
has been removed, but in machines that enhance our ability to be morally responsible” 
(Robbins, 2020, p. 172). This is precisely what makes MHC meaningful. 
As mentioned throughout, this thesis takes on one very particular, but central argument 
often proposed by ban proponents as a cogent reason for the prohibition of fully AWS. 
That being said, there are other strong arguments for why certain types of AWS should 
be prohibited; the argument proposed here does not necessary speak to the arguments 
proposed for those positions. There are arguments that AWS will have deleterious effects 
on human dignity, something that I personally am partial to given that I hold central many 




than humans. However, dignity, despite the common heuristic understanding of the term, 
is nonetheless hard to narrow down in such a way that is minimally sufficient for binding 
international treaties. Likewise, I have argued elsewhere that certain aerial (fully)AWS may 
actually be permissible under certain laws of armed conflict, in particular hors de combat 
(combat status). Although this is not the place to go into depth with this argument, what that 
work betrays is the need for systems that are capable of highly-contextualised situational 
awareness, something that is currently technically limited. As a consequence, until AWS are 
capable of such gradual contextual awareness they risk contravening the laws of armed 
conflict and thus should be prohibited pursuant of such.
Regardless, as the contexts of war continue to change as part and parcel of the technological 
development that characterises sociotechnical systems, so too will the specifics proposed in 
this thesis. In particular, the design requirements in the final chapter will certainly not survive 
the test of time, as new and potentially better technical mechanisms emerge to satisfy the 
norms (which may also change) and values of responsible design. What is certain, however, 
is that such values and norms will remain interconnected with the technology in question. 
Similarly, designers will always need a principled approach to actually design for human 
values rather than treating them as mere afterthoughts. At the very least, this thesis aims 
to support the latter two, whereas the former will require constant updating, knowledge 
transfer, and closer partnerships to ensure that MHC always obtains. 
In summary, this thesis aims to argue more broadly that we should resist the totalising 
narrative that equates the autonomy of AWS in any way to that of human agents, military or 
otherwise. Autonomy as described here is not mala in se; it can actually augment MHC rather 
than diminish it mutatis mutandis. As such, Terminator-derived narratives must be resisted 
if we wish to achieve any semblance of responsible innovation, even that mired by the fog 
of war. Doing otherwise risks the detriment of not only a lack of such responsibility, but any 
MHC whatsoever. The middle path provided here offers a nuanced way of understanding 












Artificial intelligence – specifically machine learning (ML) – is becoming ever more ubiquitous 
in society, in terms of its presence in both everyday technologies such as cell phones and 
advanced applications such as fast trading algorithms in the stock market. Coupled with the 
almost unfathomable quantity of data that characterised big data, AI systems have become 
ever more nebulous, opaque, and difficult – if not impossible – to understand. Their ability 
to process inhuman quantities of data and make decisions in an increasingly autonomous 
fashion have enabled them to make their mark not only in civilian spheres such as research 
laboratories, pharmaceuticals, and stock markets, but also naturally in the military domain. 
Once a domain limited to humanity (and of course the animal kingdom as well), warfare is 
marked by races towards greater supremacy and technological prowess in a bid to ensure 
victory and maintain hegemony. Artificial intelligence systems were arguably born in the 
military domain, and they continue to be a driving technology powering many current 
military systems in most arsenals, especially global superpowers such as the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Russia, and China. In particular, the growing global debate on the use 
of AI-powered autonomous weapons has merited attention. The increasing abdication of 
human control and executive authority to machines becomes worrisome when we envision 
the natural consequence of this trend towards total abdication and thus full autonomy 
in selecting and engaging targets without human intervention or consent. These fully 
autonomous weapons systems (AWSs) are the central object of study in this thesis. More 
specifically, this thesis aims to explore how to ensure that meaningful human control (MHC) 
over AWSs is designed for. It argues that, in order to have a sufficiently comprehensive 
understanding of MHC, such a theory must account for the real military procedures of how 
operations are conducted, as well as the design histories and relevant moral agents within 
the military-industrial complex, which are also fundamental to the design and deployment 
of such sociotechnical systems. 
This thesis is functionally separated into two distinct parts. In Part I (consisting of Chapters 
1–4), a systems theory ontology is proposed as a unifying substratum for understanding 
MHC as well as how it can be designed in the proceeding part. Here, the focus is on two 
different levels of abstraction regarding MHC: operational and design. They are posited as 
both necessary, at least in terms of AWSs, for sufficient MHC to be attained. The nuance 
that surfaces here is that full autonomy per se is not necessarily as problematic as some 
detractors of AWSs have claimed, and that, in some cases, greater autonomy can augment 
MHC as a function of proper design. Part II focuses on the value-sensitive design (VSD) 
approach as a methodology. (1) It exists upon the same systems ontology foundation 
proposed in Part I, and (2) mutatis mutandis VSD forms a sufficient – at least preliminary – 
approach to designing for MHC across both levels of abstraction. 
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In order to bridge the levels of abstraction and thereby conceptualise a unified theory of 
MHC over AWSs, as well as to subsequently unify this conception of MHC with a design 
approach that is capable of designing for it (i.e., VSD), chapter 2 proposes systems thinking 
as the ontological substrata. The main reason for adopting this approach is that it (implicitly) 
characterises the two levels of abstraction for understanding MHC. The operational level 
of control is characterised by a plurality of actors and networks that complicates but also 
constitutes how military operations are structured, planned, and conducted. Likewise, the 
design level of control is fundamentally built on the notion of tracking and tracing networks 
of systems and actors within both the use and the design histories of those systems. In 
addition, systems thinking is the theoretical framework from which systems engineering 
derives. It is essentially the practical and managerial implementation of a systems thinking 
ontology, whereas VSD exists as a sort of parallel approach to the systems thinking design 
methodology
To couple the various levels of abstraction, chapter 3 builds on the literature review of 
Annex I, in which both Ekelhof and Santoni de Sio’s works on MHC, among others, are 
explained. In this chapter, the approaches presented in these papers are discussed, in 
addition to how we can begin to view those approaches as symbiotic in terms of their 
systems thinking affinities. The initial groundwork is then laid for understanding how they 
both complement each other without encumberment. 
The marriage of both levels of MHC (i.e., the operational and design levels) is demonstrated to 
be symbiotic with regards to MHC. Here, in chapter 4, the argument is that military operations 
always already constrain the autonomy of any and all agents within the military-industrial 
complex as a function of the procedures that necessarily take place a priori to the deployment 
of force (i.e., the operational level). Close cooperation between institutions and infrastructures 
that constitute the military-industrial complex (e.g., the military, industry, government, and 
legislative norms) likewise form the supraindividual agent that can be said to be the possessor 
of MHC, if the design history can be traced and its behaviors can be tracked to the relevant 
moral agents (i.e., MIC). These two levels of abstraction warrant closer cooperation within 
the MIC so as to allow more accurate mapping of the moral intentions of the aforementioned 
agents onto AWSs that are being developed/deployed. The consequence here is that, if MHC 
obtains across both levels of control, then not only is autonomy per se not the problematic 
vector, but it can actually be increased, thereby increasing MHC. 
Value-sensitive design has been adopted as a principled approach to designing various 
existent as well as futuristic/transformative technologies. The VSD approach is fundamentally 
predicated on the interactional stance towards technology – or, more precisely, that societal 
and social factors co-construct and co-vary with technological artifacts. Part of the rationale 
behind this approach is that technologies embody values. However, AI systems that employ 
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machine learning (ML) and/or artificial neural networks are often opaque, and thus the values 
that they may (dis)embody can be unforeseen or unforeseeable. Chapter 5 discusses the 
different ways in which technologies embody values and how they fit within the larger 
systems thinking approach, as well as how to more saliently frame the embodiment of 
values for AI systems such as AWSs. 
As ML systems (often) learn in ways that are opaque to humans, we need to pay attention 
to values such as transparency, explicability, and accountability. To address this issue, as 
well as the potential “disembodiment” of certain values over time, chapter 6 proposes a 
threefold, modified VSD approach: (1) integrating a known set of VSD principles (AI4SG) as 
design norms, from which more specific requirements can be derived; (2) distinguishing 
between values that are promoted and respected by the design to ensure outcomes that 
not only prevent disproportionate harm but also actively promote just war; and (3) extending 
the VSD process to encompass the whole lifecycle of an AI technology, so as to monitor 
unintended value consequences and redesign as needed.
The AI4SG-VSD approach described in the previous two chapters is employed with the 
AWS as the use case. In doing so, chapter 7 outlines the values to be promoted as much 
as possible (e.g., the LOACs), the (constraining) values to be respected as much as possible 
(e.g., the EU HLEG AI), as well as the AI4SG norms as a means for translating these abstract 
values into technical design requirements. The value hierarchy is chosen as the tool for 
illustrating how designers can begin to conceptualise this translation to design for values 
rather than ex post facto, ad hoc, or not at all. Likewise, I discuss how full-lifecycle monitoring 
and incremental deployment into an envelope of safe use to determine the emergent 
behaviours and consequent implicated values can be used to evaluate whether a system 
requires a redesign. In the event that this cannot be done, such types of systems should 
be considered de facto, or otherwise prohibited, given the associated risks of bypassing 
such an approach.
If we turn back to the beginning and inquire whether MHC is possible for AWSs, the answer 
is yes, but not without some caveats. First, for the MHC of fully AWSs to obtain, MHC must 
couple two levels of abstraction: operational and design. In doing so, prima facie at least 
certain forms of fully AWSs are permitted (e.g., aerial fully AWSs). This is not a banal or trivial 
point; aerial warfare, both that conducted for the purposes of superiority and air strikes, 
is becoming an increasingly preferable option, and the recent trend towards it merits 
more attention. This trend, mainly on account that aerial warfare capabilities are a force 
multiplier, means that fully AWSs are most likely to appear in this vector, rather than the 
more problematic, ground-based imaginings of terminator-type AWSs. In any case, if this 
point holds water, then full autonomy is not mala in se, and it is rendered unproblematic, at 






L’intelligenza artificiale, in particolare il Machine Learning (ML), sta diventando sempre più 
onnipresente nella società, sia nelle tecnologie quotidiane come i cellulari, e sia nelle 
applicazioni avanzate come gli algoritmi di trading veloce nel mercato azionario. Insieme 
alla quantità quasi insondabile di dati che caratterizzano i big data, i sistemi di intelligenza 
artificiale sono diventati sempre più nebulosi, opachi e difficili, se non impossibili, da capire. 
La loro capacità di elaborare quantità disumane di dati e di prendere decisioni in modo 
sempre più autonomo ha permesso loro di lasciare il segno non solo nelle sfere civili come 
laboratori di ricerca, prodotti farmaceutici e mercati azionari, ma anche naturalmente nel 
dominio militare.
Dominio che una volta era limitato all’umanità (e ovviamente anche al regno animale), che 
ha portato la guerra a gare verso una maggiore supremazia e abilità tecnologiche nel 
tentativo di garantire la vittoria e mantenere l’egemonia. I sistemi di intelligenza artificiale 
sono probabilmente nati nel dominio militare e continuano ad essere una tecnologia 
trainante che alimenta molti attuali sistemi militari nella maggior parte degli arsenali, in 
particolare superpotenze globali come Stati Uniti, Regno Unito, Russia e Cina. In particolare, 
ha meritato attenzione il crescente dibattito globale sull’uso di armi autonome alimentate 
dall’intelligenza artificiale. La crescente abdicazione del controllo umano e dell’autorità 
esecutiva alle macchine diventa preoccupante quando si immagina la naturale conseguenza 
di questa tendenza all’abdicazione totale e quindi alla piena autonomia nella selezione e 
nel coinvolgimento di obiettivi senza intervento o consenso umano. Questi sistemi d’arma 
completamente autonomi, autonomous weapons systems (AWS), sono l’oggetto centrale 
di studio in questa tesi. Più specificatamente, questa tesi mira ad analizzare la possibilità 
di progettare AWS per garantire il controllo umano significativo, meaningful human control 
(MHC). Sostiene che, al fine di avere una comprensione sufficientemente completa di MHC, 
una tale teoria deve tenere conto delle reali procedure militari, ovvero di come vengono 
condotte le operazioni, l’avvenimento storico delle decisioni progettuali sulla tecnologia e 
gli agenti morali relativi all’interno del complesso militare-industriale, che sono fondamentali 
anche per la progettazione e la diffusione di tali sistemi sociotecnici.
Questa tesi è suddivisa in due parti distinte. Nella Parte I (composta dai capitoli 1–4), 
viene trattata un’ontologia della teoria dei sistemi, proposta come substrato unificante per 
comprendere MHC e come può essere progettato nella parte precedente. L’attenzione si 
concentra su due diversi livelli di astrazione di MHC: operativo e di design. Sono ritenuti 
entrambi necessari, almeno in termini di AWS, per ottenere un MHC sufficiente. La sfumatura 
che emerge è che la piena autonomia di per sé non è necessariamente così problematica 
come hanno affermato alcuni detrattori di AWS e che, in alcuni casi, una maggiore 
autonomia può aumentare MHC in funzione di una corretta progettazione. La parte II si 
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concentra sull’approccio di progettazione sensibile al valore (VSD) come metodologia. (1) Il 
quale esiste sulla stessa base di ontologia dei sistemi proposta nella Parte I, e (2) “mutatis 
mutandis” VSD costituisce un approccio sufficiente - almeno preliminare - alla progettazione 
per MHC attraverso entrambi i livelli di astrazione. 
Al fine di colmare i livelli di astrazione e quindi concettualizzare una teoria unificata di 
MHC su AWS, nonché di unificare successivamente questa concezione di MHC con un 
approccio progettuale in grado di progettare per esso (cioè, VSD), il capitolo 2 propone il 
pensiero sistemistico(systems thinking) come substrato ontologico. La ragione principale 
per adottare questo approccio è che (implicitamente) caratterizza i due livelli di astrazione 
per la comprensione dell’MHC. Il livello operativo di controllo è caratterizzato da una 
pluralità di attori e reti i quali lo complicano maggiormente, ma costituisce anche il modo in 
cui le operazioni militari sono strutturate, pianificate e condotte. Allo stesso modo, discuto 
di come il monitoraggio dell’intero ciclo di vita e l’implementazione graduale in una zona 
di sicurezza viene utilizzata per determinare i comportamenti emergenti, e i conseguenti 
valori implicati i quali possono essere utilizzati per valutare se un sistema richiede una 
riprogettazione. Inoltre, il pensiero sistemico è il quadro teorico da cui deriva l’ingegneria 
dei sistemi, ed è essenzialmente l’implementazione pratica e gestionale di un’ontologia 
del pensiero sistemico, pertanto VSD esiste come una sorta di approccio parallelo alla 
metodologia di progettazione del pensiero sistemico. 
Per congiungere i vari livelli di astrazione, il capitolo 3 si basa sulla revisione della lettura 
dell’allegato I, in cui vengono spiegati, oltre ad altro, i lavori di Ekelhof e Santoni de 
Sio sull’MHC. Vengono inoltre discussi gli approcci presentati in questi articoli, e come 
possiamo iniziare a vederli simbiotici in termini di affinità di pensiero sistemico. Sono quindi 
gettate le basi per capire come si completano a vicenda senza complicazioni. 
Il matrimonio di entrambi i livelli di MHC (quello operativo e quello di progettazione) si 
è dimostrato dunque simbiotico. Nel capitolo 4 l’argomento è incentrato sul fatto che le 
operazioni militari già vincolano l’autonomia di tutti gli agenti all’interno del complesso 
militare-industriale in funzione delle procedure, che necessariamente si svolgono a 
priori del dispiegamento della forza (cioè, il livello operativo). La stretta collaborazione 
tra istituzioni e infrastrutture, le quali costituiscono il complesso militare-industriale (ad 
esempio, le norme militari, industriali, governative e legislative) forma allo stesso modo 
l’agente sovraindividuale , il quale si può dire essere il possessore di MHC soltanto se la 
storia del design può essere tracciata ei suoi comportamenti possono essere rintracciati 
dagli agenti morali rilevanti (cioè, MIC). Questi due livelli di astrazione garantiscono una più 
stretta cooperazione all’interno del MIC, in modo da consentire una mappatura più accurata 
delle intenzioni morali dei suddetti agenti sulle AWS che vengono sviluppate / distribuite. 
La conseguenza qui è che, se l’MHC si ottiene attraverso entrambi i livelli di controllo, non 
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solo l’autonomia di per sé non è il vettore problematico, ma può effettivamente essere 
aumentata, aumentando così l’MHC.
Il Value-sensitive design è stato adottato come approccio di principio per la progettazione di 
varie tecnologie esistenti e futuristiche/trasformative. L’approccio VSD è fondamentalmente 
basato sulla posizione interazionale nei confronti della tecnologia o, più precisamente, 
che il sociale e i fattori sociali co-costruiscono e co-variano con gli artefatti tecnologici. 
Parte della logica alla base di questo approccio è che le tecnologie incarnano i valori. 
Tuttavia, i sistemi di intelligenza artificiale che impiegano l’apprendimento automatico 
(ML) e/o le reti neurali artificiali sono spesso opachi e quindi i valori che possono (dis)
impersonare possono essere imprevisti o imprevedibili. Il Capitolo 5 discute i diversi modi 
in cui le tecnologie impersonano i valori e come si adattano all’approccio sistemico più 
ampio, nonché come inquadrare in modo più saliente l’incarnazione dei valori per i sistemi 
di intelligenza artificiale come gli AWS.
Poiché i sistemi di machine learning (spesso) imparano in modi che sono opachi per gli 
esseri umani, dobbiamo prestare attenzione a valori come trasparenza, spiegabilità e 
responsabilità. Per affrontare questo problema, così come la potenziale “disincarnazione” 
di determinati valori nel tempo, il capitolo 6 propone un triplice approccio VSD modificato: 
(1) integrando un noto insieme di principi VSD (AI4SG) come norme di progettazione, da 
cui possono essere derivati  requisiti più specifici; (2) distinguendo i valori promossi e 
rispettati dal progetto per garantire risultati che non solo prevengano danni sproporzionati, 
ma promuovano anche attivamente la guerra giusta; e (3) estendere il processo VSD per 
comprendere l’intero ciclo di vita di una tecnologia di intelligenza artificiale, in modo da 
monitorare le conseguenze del valore non intenzionale e se necessario riprogettarla.
L’approccio AI4SG-VSD descritto nei due capitoli precedenti viene utilizzato con AWS come 
caso d’uso. Pertanto, il capitolo 7 delinea i valori da promuovere il più possibile (ad esempio, 
i LOAC), e quelli (vincolanti) da rispettare il più possibile (ad esempio, EU HLEG AI), nonché 
le norme AI4SG come mezzo per tradurre questi valori astratti in requisiti di progettazione 
tecnica. La gerarchia dei valori viene scelta come strumento per illustrare come i designer 
possono iniziare a concettualizzare questa traduzione per progettare per valori piuttosto 
che ex post facto, ad hoc o per niente. Allo stesso modo, discuto di come il monitoraggio 
dell’intero ciclo di vita e l’implementazione incrementale in un involucro di utilizzo sicuro 
per determinare i comportamenti emergenti ei conseguenti valori implicati possano essere 
utilizzati per valutare se un sistema richiede una riprogettazione. Nel caso in cui ciò non 
possa essere fatto, tali tipi di sistemi dovrebbero essere considerati de facto, o altrimenti 
vietati, dati i rischi associati di aggirare tale approccio.
Se torniamo all’inizio e ci chiediamo se l’MHC è possibile per AWS, la risposta è sì, ma 
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non senza alcuni avvertimenti. In primo luogo, per ottenere completamente l’MHC di AWS, 
quest’ultimo deve congiungere due livelli di astrazione: operativo e progettazione. In tal 
modo, prima facie sono consentite interamente solo alcune forme di AWS (ad esempio 
AWS completamente aeree). Questa non è un’osservazione banale; la guerra aerea, sia 
quella condotta a fini di superiorità e sia quella di attacchi aerei, sta diventando un’opzione 
sempre più preferibile, e la recente tendenza verso di essa merita maggiore attenzione 
A causa del fatto che le capacità della guerra aerea sono un indice di moltiplicatore di 
forza, è molto più probabile che in questo vettore appaiono gli AWS completi, al posto 
dell’immaginazione terrestre degli AWS terminator.
In ogni caso, se questo punto è valido, allora la piena autonomia non è mala in se, ed è resa 
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